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INTRODUCTION

The promulgation in 1949 of the Bonn Constitution--or Basic
Law-marked the re-emergence of German political life. The framers of the Basic Law rejected the authoritarian style of previous
political traditions and sought to erect, on a more durable foundation, a political order reflecting the republican and libertarian principles of the Weimar Constitution.' The framers also undertook an
experiment that was almost completely new in German constitutional history-and, indeed rare anywhere in the world-a comprehensive system of judicial review of legislative and executive action
for conformity with constitutional principles.
Although the propriety of constitutional review had been widely
debated under the Weimar Constitution, and there were some instances of judicial review by the ordinary courts, the institution was
by no means firmly established during that period.2 In contrast, the
1. The political history of Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen as a
struggle for hegemony between liberal and authoritarian movements, with the authorita-

rian movements most often in the ascendant until the founding of the present Federal
Republic. Against the background of the conservative reaction to the French Revolution
in the first half of the 19th century, the abortive liberal revolution of 1848 gave rise to
the Frankfurt (Paulskirche) Constitution of 1849 which, however, never came into effect.
See generally P. STEARNS, 1848: THE REVOLUTIONARY TIDE IN EUROPE ch. 7 (1974). This
was followed in 1871 by Bismarck's Constitution for a united Germany which, although
it established a parliamentary assembly, rested on the theory that all political power was
derived from the princes whose dominions coalesced to form the empire. G. CRAIG,
GERMANY: 1866-1945, at 43-44 (1978). After the defeat of Germany in World War 1,the
Constitution of the new Weimar Republic broke with this tradition by proclaiming that
all political power was derived from the people. WEIMAR CONSTITUTION [WRV] art. I.
The Weimar Constitution established representative institutions, sought to protect individual liberty against the state, and provided certain guarantees of social welfare. The
Weimar Republic was destroyed by the Nazi dictatorship which proclaimed the so-called
"Fifhrer-principle" in which all "law" was derived from the will of one man. After
World War lI-and in reaction to the Nazi period-the Basic Law of 1949 was founded
essentially on the liberal, social and democratic notions of the Weimar and Frankfurt
(Paulskirche) Constitutions and traces its lineage to those documents.
2. K. SCHLAICH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 1-3, 60-63 (1985); D. KOMMERS,
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

30-42 (1976); Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 S.

CAL.

L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1980).
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Basic Law established the Federal Constitutional Court, a tribunal
whose principal function was the adjudication of constitutional
questions. In creating a special court for constitutional matters, the
framers took account of the continental tradition that viewed the
regular judiciary as a special kind of bureaucracy, whose pretentions
and abilities would not ordinarily extend to the invocation of constitutional norms against statutory law.' In light of this tradition a special court for the decision of constitutional questions was required.4
The Bonn Constitution was a product of the western liberal tradition which addresses certain central issues of popular sovereignty
and individual rights. Many of the concerns reflected in the Basic
Law are similar to those addressed in the American Constitution
and it was to be expected that many of the constitutional issues that
over the years were subject to adjudication in the United States
would ultimately come before the West German Constitutional
Court. Of those common concerns, the protection of freedom of
expression holds a central position. The struggle over the law of
seditious libel formed the background of an important aspect of
American constitutional history; the totalitarian information policy
See also Deik & Rheinstein, The Development of French and German Law, 24 GEO. L.J. 551,
581 n.86 (1936).
3. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 62-63
(1971) ("IT]he bulk of Europe's judiciary seems psychologically incapable of the valueoriented, quasi-political functions involved in judicial review"); see also Cappelletti & Adams,JudicialReview of Legislation: European Antecedents and Adaptations, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1207, 1215-16 (1966);J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 34-38 (2d ed. 1985). But
see BASIC LAW IGG] art. 1, § 3 (ordinary judiciary also bound by constitution); K.
SCHLAICH, supra note 2, at 13-15.
4. In contrast to the ordinary judiciary-which resembles the career civil service in
appointment, tenure and promotion-the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court
are chosen equally by the two houses of the German parliament. GG art. 94, § i. This
political process of choice is intended to encourage the selection of individuals whose
views and experience are broader than those of the ordinary judiciary. Nonetheless, any
prospective judge must have completed a legal education, and a significant minority of
the judges of the Constitutional Court must be drawn from the ordinary courts. See
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] § 2-3 (Constitutional Court Act).
The concept of a special Constitutional Court, distinct from the ordinary judiciary,
is derived from a similar institution created in Austria in the 1920s under the intellectual
influence of Hans Kelsen. See M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 3, at 46-47. Like a number of
other German courts, the Constitutional Court almost never sits as a single body.
Rather, it is divided into two separate panels or "senates" which have distinct areas of
jurisdiction and are, for almost all purposes, two separate courts. Moreover, an increasingly important segment of the Court's work is performed by "chambers" of three
judges, which have the power to sustain or reject certain constitutional complaints in
clear cases. See BVerfGG § § 15a, 93b, 93c; Zuck, Die Ftinfie Novelle zum Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 1986 NEUE JURISTI$CHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW 968. See also infra n.254.
See generally Vitzthum, Das Vorprifungsverfahrenfir Verfassungsbeschwerden, in FESTSCHRIFT
Rl OTTO BACHOF ZUM 70.GEBURTSTAG 293-320 (G. Piitmer ed. 1984).

250

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:247

of Josef Goebbels had an immediate cautionary effect on the drafters of the Basic Law. 5 Following the pattern of the Weimar Constitution, the Basic Law contains a number of distinct provisions that
establish rights of expression and political organization. Article 5,
for example, provides for certain rights of free expression and prohibits censorship. Article 8 guarantees the right of assembly, while
article 9 secures rights of political association. Article 17 provides
for the right of petition and article 21 guarantees rights of political
parties. With characteristic brevity, the American Constitution contains all rights of expression in the first amendment and these
rights, with their various implications and extensions, are consequently viewed and analyzed as aspects of the same basic right of
expression and thought. In contrast, the dispersal of these provisions in separate sections of the Basic Law encourages an approach
that considers these rights as the distinct subjects of differing analytical approaches.6
With a history extending back to Marbury v. Madison" in 1803and in some respects even earlier-judicial enforcement of American constitutional law has produced well-developed bodies of doctrine that are naturally older than any doctrine elaborated under the
Basic Law. Judicial enforcement of the first amendment, however, is
a relatively recent development. Aside from the famous Holmes
and Brandeis opinions in the decade following World War 1,8 and a
handful of important opinions in the 1930s,' first amendment adjudication in the Supreme Court really begins with the World War II
and post-war period.'" Accordingly, much first amendment doc5. See 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 71, 80 (1969).
6. The text of the Basic Law explicitly provides varying levels of protection for different forms of political rights. The right to form political parties, for example, is accorded a high degree of protection, which can be removed only by a prior judgment of
the Federal Constitutional Court. See GG art. 21. In contrast, the right to form other
kinds of political organizations may be limited by executive action in certain cases, and
any possible judicial review must be pursued in the administrative courts after the executive action has taken place. See GG art. 9. Similarly, the right of free expression of
political opinion may be limited by "general laws" while, according to the text of the
Basic Law, the right of artistic freedom is not so limited. See GG art. 5; see also infra text
accompanying notes 154-157.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes,J.); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
10. For early precursors in the state courts and in the scholarly literature, see Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
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trine is not substantially older than similar doctrine derived from
the Basic Law of 1949.
Although contemporaneous in its growth, the development of
German constitutional doctrine on freedom of speech reflects a substantially different political and philosophical tradition and has
reached different results through different methods of adjudication.
It is perhaps inevitable that a nation with a monarchical and aristocratic tradition that lasted into the twentieth century-along with
the catastrophic history of the Nazi period-would develop views of
the role of political speech and other forms of expression that to
some extent reflected the impact of that experience." Conversely,
the Lockean roots of the American Republic have left traces in first
2
amendment jurisprudence.'
Differing legal traditions are also reflected in the underlying
systems of "ordinary law," the background against which constitutional rights are inevitably defined. Constitutional law, a fairly exotic growth in any system, naturally draws much of its substance
from the ordinary system of law that governs most legal relations,
and the systems of ordinary law in the United States and Germany
are derived from quite different origins. The framers of the American Constitution thought in the concepts and categories of the common law; the authors of the Basic Law were schooled in the German
Civil Code of 1900 which has displayed a remarkable tenacity and
resilience through the upheavals of the twentieth century. Before
expression becomes protected by constitutional guarantees, it may
be governed by doctrines of the ordinary law. Thus when the judiciary turns its attention to the development of constitutional rights,
themes in the ordinary law may sometimes reappear, perhaps in
somewhat altered form, as aspects of constitutional doctrine. In the
United States, for example, the first amendment "clear and present
danger" test reflects aspects of the common law of criminal attempts,'" and the New York Times test for defamation of public offiII. Fears of totalitarianism clearly animated sections of the Basic Law limiting radical political parties and other forms of "extreme" speech, see GG arts. 18, 21; remnants

of an aristocratic tradition may conceivably be seen in the high value given to personal
honor in the German law of defamation. See infra text accompanying notes 167-168.
12. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (citizens have right
to criticize governors because the people are sovereign).
13. Rabban, The Emergence ofModern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 1205,
1271-83 (1983). MoreoverJudge Learned Hand's well-known test for determining negligence in common-law tort, see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173
(2d Cir. 1947), makes an unmistakable reappearance in his revised version of the first
amendment "clear and present danger" test. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950), aft'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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cials' 4 was foreshadowed by a nineteenth century doctrine of
privilege developed-as a minority view-under common law and
state constitutions. 5 In the development of constitutional rights
under the German Basic Law, doctrines of the ordinary law-and
also nineteenth century debates about what should be protected
under the ordinary law-have also played a role.
Varying theories of the ordinary law may have a significant constitutional impact in another respect. One of the most important
questions in any constitutional system concerns the extent to which
the constitution binds not only the state but also private individuals
or groups. Of course the text and history of the constitution can
have an important-and perhaps dispositive-influence on the resolution of this question. Yet, the nature of the system of private
law-which regulates general legal relations among individualswill also have a bearing on the extent to which that system will be
viewed as being subject to replacement by constitutional rules.
Thus not only the constitutional tradition but also the tradition of
the ordinary law may be important in determining the extent to
which the constitution will control the actions of individuals or
groups.
These two strands of doctrine combine in determining the extent to which constitutional rights of speech will be applicable
against private persons in various settings. An examination of this
complex problem will tell us something both about the differences
between various theories of speech under the American and German constitutional systems and also the quite different ways in
which questions of the binding effect of the constitution on individuals are approached and resolved.

11.
A.

THE Li.'TH CASE

Historicaland Doctrinal Background

The first major free speech case decided under the Basic Law of
1949 was a dispute between Erich Luith, a minor official in
Hamburg, and Veit Harlan, a former director of racist films under
the Nazis. The factual roots of the dispute lay deep in the history of
the Nazi period.
During World War II Veit Harlan had written and directed the
notorious anti-Semitic film The Jew Suess, produced under the gen14. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
15. See N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 153-77, 244 (1986).
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eral direction of Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels.' 6 In
1950, after a period of retirement, Harlan directed his first post-war
movie, Immortal Beloved. Incensed by the re-emergence of this director of the Nazi period, LUith called for a boycott of Harlan's new
film. Liuth believed that a boycott would demonstrate to the world
that the new German cinema was not to be identified with this anti7
Semitic director.'
Suing in a state court, the producer and distributor of Immortal
Beloved sought an injunction against Luth, prohibiting him from issuing further calls for a boycott of the film. The plaintiffs sued
under section 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB)-one of the famous "general clauses" of the Code-which provides a remedy
against a person who "intentionally causes injury to another person
in a manner contrary to good morals."' 8 Finding that LUith's state16. See 7 BVerfGE 198, 223 (1958) (Liith). After the war, a criminal court found that
Harlan had committed a crime against humanity by making a film that contributed to the
atmosphere of persecution in the Third Reich; he was nonetheless acquitted on a finding
that if he had not made the movie he most likely would have been sent to a concentration camp or suffered some other grievous fate. Harlan also was classified as "exonerated" in de-Nazification proceedings. See id. at 219, 222-26; cf. 19 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHStJ 63 (1963) (holding that commercial distribution of The Jew Suess in the Federal Republic would be a criminal offense).
17. 7 BVerfGE at 199-200.
18. The "general clauses" of the German Civil Code constitute an important exception to what has been viewed as the general presupposition of some European codesthe view that laws should be set down with a clarity and specificity that will allow judges
to find a clear answer in specific cases without the exercise of any significant creative
power. In sharp contrast with that view, the broad language of the general clauses allows the creation of new causes of action, and provides exceptions to what would otherwise be binding obligations, in a manner that encourages the development of large
judge-made bodies of law. See generally J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW ch. 6
(1968).
BGB § 826-the "general clause" at issue in Li'th-has been used, for example, to
provide tort remedies against individuals who betrayed others to the Gestapo during the
Nazi period. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 680-84 (4th ed. 1980); Nipperdey, Die
HaftungftirpoliticheDenunziation inder Nazizeit, in I FESTSCHn1T FijR HEINRICH LEHMANN
285-307 (2d ed. 1965). It has also been employed to provide a tort remedy for improper
business practices. See H. K6Tz, DELIKTSRECHT 95-96 (3d ed. 1983).
Another important general clause, BGB § 138, renders invalid any "jural act"
(Rechtsgeschaift) which violates good morals; a third requires that all obligations, including contract obligations, be carried out in a manner consistent with good morals "in
light of prevailing usage." BGB § 242. A large number of contracts-particularly the
kinds of agreements that might be considered "contracts of adhesion" under American
law-have been invalidated or reformed under these clauses. See, e.g., Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976); see also Dawson,
Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MIcH. L. REV. 171, 177
(1934) (use of general clauses to rewrite contracts during inflation of early Weimar period).
In general the opportunities for social amelioration present in the general clauses

254

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:247

ments injured the plaintiffs' business in violation of section 826, the
state court issued an injunction prohibiting LUth from making further calls for a boycott of Harlan's film.'"
In response, Liuth filed a "constitutional complaint" in the Federal Constitutional Court-a procedural method through which a
litigant can challenge a lower court's decision on constitutional
grounds. 2 ' Liuth claimed that the injunction against his further expression violated article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law, which gives
every person "the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion, orally, in writing, and in pictures. ' 21 In a ground-breaking
opinion, the Constitutional Court held that Luith's speech was indeed protected by the guarantees of article 5 and required that the
film producers' complaint be dismissed. This result could only be
reached, however, after a complicated and difficult doctrinal
journey.
Because this was the first case squarely presenting important
issues of free expression, the Constitutional Court was required to
confront a number of fundamental points. For example, an initial
argument that was available to Harlan and the film producers-an
argument that may seem strange from an American perspectivewas that because the dispute between the film producers and Luth
was a dispute between private individuals, invoking the rules of"priwere intended to mitigate what might otherwise have been the strictly individualistic and
laissez-faire presuppositions of the BGB. See generally Deik & Rheinstein, supra note 2, at
574.
19. 7 BVerfGE at 201-02. For earlier examples of the invocation of BGB § 826
against economic boycotts, see H. HUBMANN, DAs PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT 200, 225 (2d
ed. 1967);J. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 461-64.

20. All civil actions must be commenced in a state court, as there are no lower federal courts in the German system. After a civil action is heard by a lower state court
(Landgericht) and by the state supreme court (Oberlandesgericht), questions of law can
ordinarily be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court-Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)which decides cases arising under the Civil and Criminal Codes. The BGH stands at the
highest level of the "ordinary" judiciary and its decision is final in most civil and criminal
matters; it should not be confused with the Federal Constitutional Court, which is superior to it in constitutional matters only. See supra note 4 and text accompanying notes 34.
If a litigant believes that a decision of the ordinary judiciary has disregarded his or
her rights under the Basic Law, the litigant may file a constitutional complaint in the
Federal Constitutional Court. See GG art. 93, § 4a. Ordinarily, a constitutional complaint may not be filed in a civil action until the case has proceeded through the state
court system and has been adjudicated by the BGH. In L'th, however, the Constitutional Court accepted the complaint, due to the importance of the issue raised, even
though the state supreme court had not yet heard the case. See BVerfGG § 90(2); see also
10 BVerfGE 302, 308-09 (1960).
21. For the full text of GG art. 5, see infra Appendix, at p. 348.
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vate law," the constitution had no application whatsoever to this
case. In the years before LtUth a number of scholars had argued that
the Basic Law, as an aspect of "public law," had no effect on rights
of "private law"-the body of rules which seeks to do justice between private individuals and which does not ordinarily concern the
state as a party. 2 Because the Basic Law has no impact on private
law disputes, it could be argued, the constitutional right of free expression did not protect Liith's call for a boycott against the private
law claims of the film producers.
This argument rested on the sharp analytic and historical distinction, common in European legal cultures, between "public" and
"private" law.2" Imbued with the laissez-faire attitudes of nineteenth century liberalism (and influenced, perhaps, by the deontological moral theory of Immanuel Kant), 2 4 the theoreticians of the
German Civil Code viewed the civil law primarily as a means of adjusting purely individual and private rights in traditional areas such
as contracts, torts, inheritance, and family relationships. The apparatus of the state was excluded from private law, except to the extent
necessary for the judiciary to allocate the private rights recognized
by the Civil Code, and these rights generally implied a maximum of
individual autonomy and a minimum of intervention to redress individual or group inequalities already existing in society."5 In effect,
22. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
23. For general discussions of the distinction between public and private law in Germany, see, e.g., M. BULLINGER, OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND PRIVATRECHT (1968); H. KRuGER, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 319-33 (1964). For the distinction in French law, see,
e.g., R. DAVID, FRENCH LAw 98-107 (M. Kindred trans. 1972); B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW
OF CONTRACT 22-26 (1982) [hereinafter FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT]. Although the separation of legal doctrine into domains of public and private law had its origin in Roman
law, see, e.g., B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 2 (1962), it has been argued
that the present form of the distinction is a product of the 19th century. M. BULLINGER,
supra, at 37-74. On the Roman Law influence, see generally A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF
THE CIVIL LAW 144-57 (1981) (tracing impact of Justinian's CorpusJuris on distinction
between private and public law in European systems).
24. See H. HATFENHAUER, DIE GEISTESGESCHICHTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN
RECHTS 186, 235 (3d ed. 1983); K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
24 (3d ed. 1975).
25. See, e.g., I K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 154
(trans. T. Weir, 2d ed. 1987) ("The law of contract in the BGB is unequivocally dominated
by the bourgeois idea that contracting parties are formally free and equal."); see also K.
LARENZ, supra note 24, at 48; G. RADBRUCH, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
103-05 (K. Zweigert ed. 1980); F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT
479-83 (2d ed. 1967); but see supra note 18 (effect of general clauses). Cf.A. Bebel, Das
Btirgerliche Gesetzbuch und die Sozialdemokratie, in POLITIK ALS THEORIE UND PR.AXIS 93-107
(A. Langner ed. 1967) (attacking the BGB as class legislation favoring the bourgeoisie).
For a parallel insistence on the autonomy of private legal relationships in 19th cen-
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therefore, the rules of private law were thought to enhance a more
general freedom of individuals not to be interfered with by the
state-particularly in commercial relationships but also in other areas of everyday life.
In "public law," in contrast, the executive or administrative arm
of the state was ordinarily an active party, and the litigation involved
obligations or regulations of the political organs of the state, often
under relatively new regulatory or distributive programs of the late
nineteenth century. Because much public law was relatively newand because it was thought to require a special perspective of its
own-public law was not the subject of adjudication in the ordinary
civil courts. Rather it was largely relegated to a series of special
tribunals, such as the numerous administrative courts that were established in the late nineteenth century.2 6 Confided to these administrative tribunals-and later to a series of even more specialized
courts-were questions involving social insurance and the social
27
welfare programs arising from Bismarck's reforms of the 1880s.
German legal theoreticians viewed the doctrine that arose from social insurance and similar programs as a form of law that was inferior to the intellectual achievements of the Civil Code 2 8-a view that
may still persist, albeit in attenuated form, in German legal culture
today. In any case, the mystique of the Civil Code as a coherent and
valuable body of doctrine that should generally be maintained intact-and basically separate from public law-has had a persistent
life in German legal culture.2 9
This history explains the background of the initial issue considtury American law, see Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423 (1982).

26. Disputes adjudicated in these courts were viewed as not being susceptible of resolution through ordinary "legal" techniques. See Freund, The Law of the Administration in
America, 9 POL. Sci. Q. 403, 418 (1894) ("[In Germany special administrative tribunals]
are justified on the ground that civil judges are not well qualified to deal with questions
of public law, and that purely judicial reasoning is not sufficient to determine a conflict
of public and private rights."); see also E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 230 (1928).
27. On the history and structure of the administrative courts, and other special public law courts for taxation and social insurance, see I E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW
26-27, 31 (2d ed. 1968); H. HA1rrENHAUER, supra note 24, at 143-44. Questions of ad-

ministrative law, taxation, and social welfare in Germany are still decided by court systems that are distinct from the courts that decide matters of civil and criminal law, and
each of these special areas has its own "supreme court" whose purpose is to assure
uniformity in that branch of public law. Id. at 39-40.
28. See H. HAT'ENHAUER, supra note 24, at 259.
29. For a recent illustration, see Z1lner, Die politische Rolle des Privatrechts, 1988 JuRISTISCHE SCHULUNG JuS] 329.
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ered in the Ltith case.. Because all jurists agreed that constitutional
law is a form of public law, it was argued that this form of public
law-like any other form of public law-has no bearing on the separate, distinct and autonomous system of private law. Indeed some
went so far as to suggest that because constitutional rights were historically directed only against the state, the Parliamentary Council
that was convened to draft the Basic Law in 1948 was not even authorized to affect the traditional relationships of private law. 3 0 A
related view was that basic rights were needed only against "superior" authority-i.e., the state-and were not necessary to govern
legal relations among individuals who possessed equal legal status. " ' According to these arguments, therefore, the film producers'
case against LUth-being a dispute between private parties-would
be decided solely according to the private law rules of the Civil
Code.
The argument over this basic issue took a conceptual and somewhat philosophical form because the text of the Basic Law does not
yield a definite conclusion on whether constitutional rights should
generally apply to regulate legal relationships among private individuals."s On the one hand, many basic rights are stated in positive,
declarative form; they are not phrased as prohibitions against the
government.3 3 From this grammatical form it could be argued that
the application of these basic rights should not be limited to cases of
public law. On the other hand, at least one provision of the basic

30. Schatzel, Wek/hen Einfluss hat Art. 3 Abs. 2 des Bonner Grundgesetzes auf die nach dem
24. Mai 1949 geschlossenen Einzelarbeits- und Tarifvertrige?, 1950 RECHT DER ARBErr [RDA]
248, 250. See generally 1 H. VON MANGOLDT, F. KLEIN & C. STARCK, DAS BONNER
GRUNDGESETZ 136 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter VON MANGOLDT] (constitutional framers'
view of civil law).
The argument that basic rights were historically viewed solely as rights against the
state has been sharply disputed. For an important exposition of the contrary view, see
W. LEISNER, GRUNDRECHTE UND PRIVATRECHT 3-29 (1960) (arguing that the original concept of natural or fundamental rights did not distinguish between rights in public and
private law). See also A. BLECKMANN, STAATSRECHT II: ALLGEMEINE GRUNDRECHTSLEHREN
162 (2d ed. 1985) (in French Revolution and German constitutional monarchy, basic
rights were thought to apply against individuals as well as against the state).
31. See Schitzel, supra note 30. See also F. LAwsON, A COMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE
CIVIL LAW 89 (1953) (historically, the civil law "was essentially a law between equals ....
[Therefore,] the constitution of the government and its relations with anyone else ...
were entirely outside Civil Law and were called public law.").
32. See, e.g., I GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR 37 (1. von MiInch 3d ed. 1985). The text of
the Weimar Constitution also left this issue open to question. Cf Laufke, Vertragsfreiheit
und Grundgesetz, in I FESTSCHRFT FOR HEINRICH LEHMANN 146 (2d ed. 1965).
33. See, e.g., GG art. I, § I ("Human dignity is inviolable."); GG art. 2, § I ("Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality .... ").
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rights explicitly applies to private legal relationships;3 4 perhaps it
could be inferred from this provision that without explicit language,
the basic rights do not apply in private relationships.3 5 Yet a small
number of other basic rights explicitly refer to or require governmental action,3 6 and3 7perhaps from these provisions a contrary inference can be drawn.
In sum, *the textual guidance on this point was inconclusive. In
Lith, therefore, the Constitutional Court found that it was required
to step back from the text of the Basic Law and view the problem
from a more general perspective.
B.

The Liuth Opinion, Part I: The "Influence "of the Constitution on
Private Law

In considering the general question of whether constitutional
rights are applicable in private law, the Constitutional Court in the
Lzith case remarked that it was confronted with two "extreme" positions.3 " The first was the view, noted above, that public and private
law are two distinct systems and therefore that public law in general
and constitutional law in particular have no bearing on private
law.

39

The second "extreme" view was a diametrically opposed position. Before Lzith, a number of scholars had advanced the view that
the most important basic rights are not only directed against the
34. GG art. 9, § 3 (prohibiting contracts that seek to interfere with the right to form
labor unions); for commentary, see W. GEIGER, DIE GRUNDRECHTE IN DER
PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNG

13-18 (1960).

35. 1 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, supra note 32, at 37.

36. See, e.g., GG art. 3, § 1 ("All persons are equal before the law."); GG art. 6, § 5
(parliament shall legislate to achieve equality for illegitimate children).
37. Moreover, GG art. 19, § 4 (guaranteeing a judicial remedy for the violation of
individual rights by the government), has been viewed as indicating that the basic rights
apply against the government only. Finally, GG art. I, § 3 (stating that the basic rights
directly bind the legislative, executive and judiciary), has given rise both to arguments
that the Basic Law does not apply to private relationships and the argument that (by
binding the judiciary) it does apply to those relationships.
With respect to rights of free expression protected by GG art. 5, one additional
piece of textual evidence is furnished by the Weimar Constitution. WRV art. 118 guaranteed the free expression of opinion in language similar to that of GG art. 5, but also
indicated that the right was protected against certain acts of private individuals. The
absence of analogous language in GG art. 5 might suggest that rights of expression in
the Basic Law are not protected against individuals. See I Entscheidungen des
Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGE] 185, 192 (1954). Certain state constitutions drafted
before
certain
38.
39.

the adoption of the Basic Law also contain guarantees of speech directed against
forms of private action. See, e.g., CoNsT. or HESSE art. 11 (1946).
7 BVerfGE 198, 204 (1958).
See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
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state, but are also fully and "directly" applicable among individuals
in private legal relationships. The implication of this theory was
that certain constitutional rights should ordinarily be binding on individuals and private groups in approximately the same manner and
to the same extent as they are applicable against the government.
Indeed, in an important line of decisions the Federal Labor Court,
under the leadership of Chief Judge Hans Carl Nipperdey, had
adopted just such a position.4" In one group of cases, for example,
the Labor Court stated that an employee could assert constitutional
rights of free speech against an employer. 4 In other decisions the
court indicated that the constitutional provision requiring equal
rights for women may prohibit wage discrimination by private employers.4 2 The Labor Court had also found that certain other basic
rights-such as the right of marriage4 3 and the right to the free
choice of employment 4 4 -could invalidate provisions in employment contracts that unduly burdened an employee's ability to exercise those rights.4 5 Finally, the court held that an employee's
40. For Nipperdey's views, see Nipperdey, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR ERICH MoLITOR 17-33 (1962); Nipperdey, Gleicher Lohn der Frau ftir gleiche Leistung,
1950 RDA 121; Nipperdey, Die W'rde des Menschen, in 1 DIE GRUNDRECHTE pt. 2, at 1-50
(F. Neumann, H. Nipperdey & U. Scheuner eds. 1950). For a sharp attack on Nipperdey's position, see H. EHMKE, WIRTSCHAFT UND VERFASSUNG 78-83 (1961) (arguing
that "direct" application of constitutional rights among individuals would shift too much
power to regulate ordinary legal relations from the democratic legislature to the courts).
41. 1 BAGE 185 (1954) (employer's firing of an employee for political speech violates GG art. 5 under some circumstances). This conclusion (and some of the conclusions advanced in the cases discussed infra notes 42 & 45) are contained in dictum, but
that does not impair the seriousness with which these statements were taken as the prevailing view of the Federal Labor Court. Later opinions in the Labor Court have continued to assert the applicability of GG art. 5 in private employment relations but the court
has been reluctant to hold that the right has been violated in specific cases. See 41 BAGE
150 (1982); 29 BAGE 195 (1977); 24 BAGE 438 (1972); H.-W. THOMMEL, BETRIEBSFRIEDEN UND POLITPLAKETrE (1985). See generally Gamillscheg, Die Grundrechte ia Arbeitsrecht, 164 ARCHlY FOR DIE CIVILIsTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP 385, 434 (1964).
42. 4 BAGE 240 (1957); see also I BAGE 348 (1955); 1 BAGE 258 (1955) (invalidating industry-wide labor agreements providing lower wages for women than for men).
Although the agreements in these cases possessed a number of elements that might have
led to a finding of "state action" under American law, the court's language suggests that
this principle is also applicable to other forms of employment contracts. See 4 BAGE at
242-45; see also 1973 NJW 77; Nipperdey, 1950 RDA, supra note 40, at 126; 4 BAGE 274,
284-85 (1957). Since 1980, discrimination on the basis of sex in employment relations
has been prohibited by amendments to the Civil Code. See BGB §§ 61 la, 61 lb, 612(3);
I GRUNDGESETZ-KoMMENTAR, supra note 32, at 207-08.
43. GG art. 6, § 1.
44. GG art. 12.
45. See, e.g., 4 BAGE 274 (1957) (invalidating a contractual provision that terminated
the employment relationship upon an employee's marriage). Although the employer in
this case was a state hospital, and the agreement prohibiting marriage had been ordered
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constitutional rights of human dignity and personality are violated if
an employer fails to provide the employee with productive work
during the employment period.4 6
In reaching these conclusions the Labor Court emphasized that
some constitutional rights are so important that they should be
viewed as general rules for the governance of all of society-including the private law relationships of individuals and private groupsand not only as rules for limitation of the government.4" The Labor
Court also noted the relevance of the "social state" provisions of the
Basic Law,4 8 which can be read as approving (or requiring) the active intervention of the state-presumably including the active intervention of the judiciary-to ameliorate various forms of societal,
rather than governmental, oppression. 9 It was these considerations that animated the Labor Court's theory of the "direct" impact
of basic rights on the rules of private law, in contrast with the
sharply opposing view that the constitution had no effect whatsoever on those rules.
In the Luith case the Court took notice of both of these "extreme" positions and then made clear that it was not prepared to
accept either of them fully. Rather, the Court adopted an intermediate theory which permitted a degree-but only a degree--of constitutional control of the relations of private law. The Court began
by acknowledging that the basic rights of individuals do indeed apby a government official, the decision apparently rested on the applicability of the constitutional right of marriage to private contracts, without consideration of governmental
involvement. See id. at 279; see also Nipperdey, in FESTSCHRIF-r F0R ERICH MOuTOR, supra
note 40, at 28.
In 13 BAGE 168 (1962), which was decided after Lith, the Labor Court found that
the constitutional right of occupational choice (GG art. 12) limits contract provisions
that require a departing employee to repay costs incurred by the employer for the employee's education; under some circumstances such provisions could unreasonably impair the employee's freedom to choose another place of employment. In this case,
however, the court found that the specific provision was reasonable.
46. 2 BAGE 221 (1955) (public hospital apparently treated as private employer); 28
BAGE 168 (1976) (private employer). In these cases the court relied on GG arts. 1, 2
(see infra Appendix at p. 348). In a recent decision the Labor Court has also held that the
constitutional right of privacy created by the same provisions of the Basic Law requires
an employer to destroy a personal questionnaire submitted by an applicant whose application for employment had been denied. 46 BAGE 98 (1984); see infra note 285.
47. 1 BAGE 185, 193 (1954) (Under the Basic Law, certain fundamental values
"have entered into [the basic legal] framework, and neither the organization of a workplace nor agreements nor acts of legal peers should be allowed to contradict those values .... Thus these basic rights affect not only the relationship of the individual citizen
to the state, but also the interrelationship of the citizens as legal equals.")
48. GG arts. 20, § 1; 28, § I.
49. See I BAGE at 193; see aso 4 BAGE 274. 276, 279-80 (1957).
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ply most fully against the power of the state exercised as "public
law."'o This conclusion was implied by the history of the concept of
basic rights:5 ' certainly after the gruesome events of the Nazi period it was clear that excessive governmental power represented the
basic threat to those rights. Nonetheless, the Court also emphasized that the Basic Law establishes an "objective ordering of values," and indicated that the introduction of this concept in
constitutional doctrine represents a fundamental strengthening of
the effectiveness of the basic rights and a certain extension of those
rights beyond their traditional realm.5 2
The concept of an "objective" ordering of values--outlined in
the LUth case-was central to the Court's decision in that case and
has come to be a central concept in German constitutional doctrine.
Generally, in German legal theory, an "objective" value is a value
that is applicable in general and in the abstract, independently of
any specified relationship-in contrast with a "subjective" right,
which is the right of a specified individual to some legal result
against a specific party. In effect, by stating that the basic rights establish an "objective" ordering of values, the Court was stating that
those values are so important that they must exist apart from any
specified legal relationship-that is, in this context, apart from any
specific relationship between the individual and the state. These
values are not only specified rights of individuals but are also part of
the general legal order, benefiting not only individuals who may be
in a certain relationship with the state but possessing relevance for
all legal relationships.5 3
The Court's view that the basic rights form an "objective" order appears to bear some relationship to the view that the Basic Law
itself establishes certain fundamental principles that are permanent
ends of the state and cannot be changed, even by constitutional
amendment. 54 The permanence of these fundamental values in the
50.
51.
52.
53.

7 BVerfGE at 204.
Id. at 204-05; but see supra note 30.
7 BVerfGE at 205.
See, e.g., Schneider, Eigenart und Funklionen der Grundrechte im demokratischen Verfas-

sungsstaat, in GRUNDRECHTE ALS FUNDAMENT DER DEMOKRATIE 32

(J.

Perels ed. 1979); see

also Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 675-76 (1980). See generally Brugger, Freiheit der Aleinung
und Organisation der Meinungsfreiheit, 1987 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDREC1ITEZEITSCHRiFT
[EuGRZ] 189, 199.
54. See generally GG art. 79, § 3 (prohibiting amendments of the Basic Law that would
affect certain fundamental constitutional principles); cf. A. BLECKMANN, supra note 30, at
218. In accordance with such a view, the Constitutional Court, in decisions handed
down before the Ldth case, banned two political parties which it found to hold basic
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Basic Law was intended to contrast with what was seen as the legal
relativism of the Weimar Constitution, in which basic principles
could be easily altered by constitutional amendment, and seems to
reinforce the view that the basic rights are intended not only to
grant individual rights against the state but also to apply more generally in all legal relationships. It seems a small step from the proposition that the core of certain rights cannot be changed under any
circumstances because they are so important, to the position that
basic rights are so important that they constitute general presuppositions of the legal order whose function is to affect all areas of
the law.
Moreover, if basic rights are seen as "objective" values essential
for the public good, it is reasonable to suppose that rights may be
impaired even under circumstances in which they have not been
abridged by the state. If a citizen is guaranteed certain rights of
speech, for example, and external pressure is applied that makes it
impossible as a practical matter to exercise those rights, it may make
little difference as far as the abstract rights are concerned whether
that pressure comes from the state or from some other source-for
example, from an authoritarian private employer.5 5 If the goal of
the "objective" value is to encourage the optimal amount of speech
for the good of society, that value can be significantly impaired by
repression of speech whether the repression comes from the state or
from private individuals or groups. Because the basic rights establish "objective" values, then, those rights must apply not only
against the state exercising its authority under public law; according
to the Constitutional Court, basic rights must also have an effect on
the rules of private law which regulate legal relations among
56
individuals.
Yet even though the Court acknowledged that the constitution
must play a role in private law, it also made clear that constitutional
rights do not ordinarily have the same impact in private law disputes
values fundamentally inconsistent with the values of the Basic Law. See 5 BVerfGE 85
(1956) (Communist Party Case); 2 BVerfGE I (1952) (Socialist Reich Party Case). In
applying the specific test of GG art. 21, § 2 (authorizing the banning of certain political
parties), the Court argued that it is fundamentally inconsistent to allow parties to function in a constitutional system that presupposes basic values rejected by those parties.
The court in Ldth cites the two political party cases in introducing its discussion of basic
rights as an "objective ordering of values." See 7 BVerfGE at 205.
55. For a contrary position, see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883). In
that decision Justice Bradley seems to argue that, as a matter of fundamental definition,
only the state can deprive a person of constitutional rights. In Bradley's view, if the state
has not acted there is only a private wrong.
56. 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958).
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as when those rights are asserted against the state in public law controversies. In reaching this conclusion the Court adopted what has
come to be known as the doctrine of the "indirect" effect of constitutional values on private legal relations-as opposed to the "direct" theory endorsed by Judge Nipperdey and the Labor Court.5 7
In a public law action between an individual and the state, a constitutional right can directly override an otherwise applicable rule of
public law. In private law disputes between individuals, in contrast,
constitutional rights were said to "influence" rules of civil law rather
than actually to override them.5 " A certain intellectual content
"flows" or "radiates" from the constitutional law into the civil law
and affects the interpretation of existing civil law rules. In such
cases the rules of private law are to be interpreted and applied in
light of the applicable constitutional norm, but it is nonetheless the
civil law rules that are ultimately to be applied. Even in such cases,
the court emphasized, the dispute "remains substantively and procedurally a dispute of civil law." 9
Under the "indirect" theory of Luith, therefore, private law values retain considerable potency even when confronted by a value of
constitutional law. This position may reflect the strength of the private law tradition and the persistence of the view that there should
be an area of private legal relations that remains free from substantial government control. In this manner the Court may assume that
the values of private law make their own important contribution to
the autonomy of the individual-and to the public good-and therefore should remain in effect, to some extent at least, even when confronted by the countervailing objective and public values of
constitutional law. 60 Consequently, the Court in Llt/h called for an
accommodation of public and private law values when a constitutional
value is threatened in a dispute of private law. The Court's "indirect" theory therefore imposes an obligation on the lower courts to
use their powers creatively to alter or adapt a rule of the civil law
when a constitutional value is implicated.6 A substantial tension

57. See supra text accompanying notes 40-49.
58. 7 BVerfGE at 205-06.
59. Id. at 205.

60. One commentator has argued, for example, that the rules of private law themselves preserve an area of constitutional liberty for those individuals whose rights--e.g.,
the right of contract protected by GG art. 2, § I-would be limited if the constitution
were fully applicable against them. See Diurig, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung, in FEST7
scHRIFrT ZUM 5.GEBURTSTAG VON HANS NAWIASKY 158-61 (T. Maunz ed. 1956).

61. 7 BVerfGE 198, 205-07 (1958).
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remains, however, between the force of the private law values and
the influence of constitutional norms.
According to the Court, the influence of constitutional rules on
private law should be strongest when the applicable private law rule
constitutes "mandatory law"-that is, a rule which cannot be
changed by private agreement, as opposed to a "dispositive" rule
which can be waived by the parties. 61 Mandatory rules form a part
of the ordre publique-the public policy of the community; as such,
they bear a certain resemblance to rules of public law rather than
just reflecting an individual accommodation between private parties.
According to the Court, constitutional values should have an even
greater impact when the "mandatory" law is contained in a general
clause, 63 because the general clauses refer to extra-legal values such
as "good morals" and thus expressly take into account the broader
interests and values of society, including constitutional values.'
Perhaps because the general clauses resemble doctrines of public
law in their nature, any specific private law values that they retain
should have less weight when confronted by the values of the Basic
Law. As a result, the dispute in bith, which invokes "mandatory"
law in the form of a "general clause," is highly susceptible of influence by constitutional norms.65
To recapitulate, then, the Court in Ltith started with the proposition that the producers' action against Liuth was an action of "private" law and, therefore, the constitutional speech rights of Lilthwhile not irrelevant to the action-were only "indirectly" applicable
in the case. In this type of private law action, as in all types of private law actions, constitutional principles "influence" the norms of
private law but do not completely supersede them. On the contrary,
the doctrines of private law retain a certain force and, at bottom, the
action continues to be viewed ultimately as a matter of private law.
62. Id. at 206. For the continental distinction between "mandatory" and "dispositive" rules, see, e.g., I MUNCHENER RECHTS-LEXIKON 7 (H. Tilch ed. 1987). For the incorporation of a similar distinction in the Uniform Commercial Code, see Herman, Llewellyn
the Civilian, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1144-47 (1982). In Germany (as in the United States)
contract law contains a mixture of mandatory and dispositive rules, while tort law is
basically composed of mandatory rules.
63. For the role of the general clauses in the German Civil Code, see supra note 18.
64. 7 BVerfGE at 206.
65. Although the role of the general clauses-as "portals" for the entry of the constitution into the civil law-is emphasized by the Court in Ltith, this aspect of the doctrine
seems to have declined in importance thereafter. In more recent decisions the influence
of the Basic Law on private law has frequently been reaffirmed without specific mention
of the role of the general clauses. See H. BETHGE, ZUR PROBLEMATIK VON GRUNDRECHTSKOLLlSIONEN 405 (1977).
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The impact of the constitution on private law is at its strongest
where, as in Lith, the matter concerns "mandatory law" in the form
66
of a "general clause."1
C.

The Theory of the Lith Case and the American
"State Action" Doctrine

It was ultimately the influence of the constitution on private law
that allowed LUith's free speech rights to prevail in this litigation.
66. But see supra note 65. The intermediate position adopted in Lg'th has met with
general approbation in the literature. See, e.g., K. HESSE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 142 (16th ed. 1988). See also Dirig, Zum
"Luth-Urteil" des Bundesverfassungsgerichtsvom 15.1. 1958, 1958 DIE OFIFENTLICHE VERWAL-

TUNG [DOVI 194, 196. For more critical views, see Schwabe, Bundesverfassungsgerichl und
"Drittwirkung"derGrundrechte, 100 ARCHly DES 6FFENTLICHEN RECHTS [A6R] 442, 443-51,

469 (1975) (theory of Luith case "extremely unclear"); W. GEIGER, supra note 34, at 40
(Lzith theory "imprecise").
In elaborating its "indirect" theory, the Constitutional Court adopted a position
first advocated by the eminent commentator, Giinter Diirig, as an alternative to the "direct" theory ofJudge Nipperdey and the Labor Court. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text; Diirig, supra note 60, at 157-90; T. MAUNZ, G. DORIG, GRUNDGESETZKOmMENTAR, art. I, § 3, No. 127-33; art. 3,§ 1, No. 505-19 (hereinafter MAUNz-DURIG].
It has been argued, however, that in practice the "indirect" theory may reach results that
do not differ significantly from those reached under the "direct" theory of Judge Nipperdey. See VON MANGOLDT, supra note 30, at 132-33. See also Bydlinski, Bemerkungen uiber
Grundrechte und Privatrecht, 12 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT
(n.F.) 423, 440-41 (1962/63). See generally Lewan, The Significance of Constitutional Rights
for Private Law: Theory and Practicein West Germany, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 571 (1968)

(analyzing the views of Diirig and Nipperdey).
In any case, even after Lith, the Labor Court has continued to employ its "direct"
theory in deciding some cases. See, e.g., Canaris, Grundrechteund Privatrecht, 184 AcP 201
(1984); 46 BAGE 98, 102 (1984) (right of personality), 13 BAGE 168, 174-76 (1962)
(right of occupational choice); but see 47 BAGE 363 (1984), discussed infra text accompanying notes 90-92. Intransigence of this sort is possible, as a practical matter, because
certain cases decided by the Labor Court may not be reviewed in the Constitutional
Court. Moreover, continental law has always focused more on the doctrine elaborated
by commentators than on the decisions of judges, and traditionally no court has been
able to claim that it possesses a monopoly of the power of interpretation. Although this
situation is changing in German constitutional law under the authority of the Constitutional Court, the practice of an important tribunal rejecting the Court's views in an important constitutional matter does not appear as illegitimate (or even threatening) as
would an analogous practice in the United States-particularly when constitutional
rights seem thereby to be extended rather than contracted.
Some commentators have suggested, moreover, that the use of separate tests by the
two courts may in fact be justified: the one-sided relations of social power actually involved in the typical employment cases considered by the Labor Court may justify more
direct application of constitutional guarantees to protect employees than would be appropriate in many other relationships of private law. See ZWi1ner, Die gesetzgeberische Trennung des Datenschutzes fir 6ffentliche und private Datenverarbeitung, 1985 RECHT DER
DATENVERARBErTUNG [RDV] 3, 7; infra note 100. See also Gamillscheg, supra note 41; W.
GEIGER, supra note 34, at 13-18.
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The second part of the Li'th opinion, however, turned to other issues. For a more comprehensive understanding of this German
doctrine, therefore, it will be useful to compare its scope and impact
with the "state action" doctrine, its closest American analogue,
before returning to the concluding passages of the Lti'th opinion
itself.
Although problems arising from the "influence" of constitutional norms on private law bear some resemblance to issues raised
by the American state action requirement, the two doctrines differ in
significant respects. Both doctrines seek to distinguish a public
from a private sphere-and acknowledge that constitutional values
are more powerful in the public sphere-but the two doctrines have
important differences of theory and approach which yield quite different results in certain areas.
Under the German doctrine, the impact of constitutional rights
varies according to the distinction between two bodies of law-private and public law-a distinction that is traditional and deeply ingrained in German doctrine and reflected to a significant extent in
the structure of the judiciary. 7 In public law, under German doctrine, the constitution is "directly" and fully applicable. In private
law, under the principles of the Lith case, the constitution is only
indirectly applicable, but it has some-albeit reduced-application
nonetheless. 8 One important result of this approach is that under
the Basic Law the potential application of the constitution cannot be
completely ignored in any case. Because the Basic Law is "indi67. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27. Even though the distinction is fundamental in German legal thought, the precise border-line between public and private law
is not completely clear. Although the state is ordinarily a party in public law disputes,
for example, it does not follow that every dispute in which a state is a party is a dispute
of public law. When the state enters the market as an ordinary participant (e.g., as the
purchaser of ofice supplies or as the operator of a brewery), it enters into a relationship
of private law and assumes a role that many German commentators consider to be indistinguishable from the role of a private individual or corporation. See, e.g., W. GEIGER,
supra note 34, at 26-27. According to the prevailing view, therefore, the constitutional
doctrine applicable to private law applies to the state when it enters into these private law
relationships. In such cases the state is subject only to the "indirect" effect of the constitution outlined in the Lith case, and not to the "direct" effect of the constitution which
limits the state when it acts in a "sovereign" public law capacity. See, e.g., Dirig in
MAINz-DRIG, supra note 66, art. 1, § 3, No. 134-137. See also I GRUNDGESETZ-KoMMENTAR, supra note 32, at 40-42, 831-33; W. LEISNER, supra note 30, at 201-10. For an
argument that the basic rights should apply fully against the state even when it acts in a
private law form as a purchaser or seller of goods, see Ehlers, Rechtsstaatliche undprozessuale Probleme des V/ewalungsprivatrechts, 1983 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt [DVBI] 422, 42425.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 50-61.

1989]

GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

267

rectly" applicable even in disputes of private law, the constitution is
at least indirectly applicable in all cases in which a substantive constitutional value is arguably affected.
In American law, in contrast, the question is not viewed as a
question of the area of law that is being applied. 6 9 Rather, American constitutional doctrine requires a determination of whether the
state has "acted" to burden the affected individual. If the state has
so acted in any area of law-whether in its regulatory capacity or as
a private property owner 7 0-there is state action and the Constitution applies, with full force, to limit that action. If, however, the
state has not so acted, there is no "state action" and the Constitution does not apply. Thus in many disputes between private individuals the Constitution has no applicability whatsoever-even though
a substantive constitutional value may be profoundly affected. 7 '
In the typical case of state action under American doctrine, an
executive officer of the state has acted or has threatened to act
against an individual-perhaps in accordance with express statutory
authority or perhaps not-and consequently that officer or the state
is a party in litigation concerning that action. 7 2 It does not follow,
however, that the state or an officer must always be a party to the
relevant litigation in order for state action to exist: under the American doctrine, the state can be found to have "acted" in certain disputes between seemingly private individuals. The aspects of the
state action doctrine that apply in such cases, however, are quite
different from-and in a sense considerably narrower than-the
general doctrine of the Luith case which makes the constitution "indirectly" applicable to all disputes between private individuals.
The ways in which the state can be found to have "acted" in
disputes between private individuals fall generally into two categories. First, in a number of American cases, certain individuals or
groups have been found to be so closely "involved" with the state,
or so like the state in the exercise of a "public function," that they
69. Indeed, although there is sometimes said to be a distinction between "private"
and "public" law in American doctrine, that distinction is not nearly so clear or well
accepted as it is in continental theory. Cf. Watson, Legal Change. Sources of Law and Legal
Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1983).
70. For treatment of the state in "private law" relationships under German constitutional doctrine, see supra note 67.
71. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no constitutional violation in
exclusion of labor picketers from privately owned shopping center); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (no constitutional violation in private club's exclusion
of black guest).

72. To that extent, therefore, there is a significant overlap between cases in which
state action exists in American doctrine and cases of "public law" in German theory.
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are viewed as if they were the state for purposes of the Constitution.7 3 In such cases the Constitution may be fully applicable
against those individuals or groups-to the same extent as it would
have been if they were in fact the state. There is no general analogue of this doctrine-through which a private actor, by virtue of
its relation with the state, can be held to the full duties of the statein German law.
The second way in which the state may "act" in a dispute between private individuals is more apposite to the problems of the
Lth case. There are some instances in American law in which the
decision of a court in a dispute between private individuals can be
viewed as the exercise of possibly unconstitutional state action.
When a court adjudicates a dispute between private individuals, the
question of whether the court's decision is an exercise of unconstitutional state action in this sense focuses on the provenance of the
rule being applied by the court in the private dispute: the basic
question is whether the decision of policy that is being attacked as
unconstitutional has been formulated entirely by the state or
whether the decision of policy has been formulated in part by a private person or group. In the clearest of these cases, for example, a
court may apply a rule of decision that has been completely formulated by a governmental organ-that is, a statutory rule formulated
by the legislature or a common-law rule totally formulated by the
court, without any significant component of private choice of policy.
If, in such a case, a court applies that rule against an individual-for
example, through the imposition of a damage remedy or injunction
in a tort action-there is state action and the court's application of
the legal rule is subject to constitutional limitations, even though
the party who seeks to have the rule applied is a private individual
and not the state. Even though the dispute is between private individuals, the state has "acted" by formulating the entire choice of
policy that is being applied by the court. Thus, for example, the
rules of libel law that were found unconstitutional in cases like New

73. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (close relationship between coffee shop and state-owned enterprise); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (public function of pre-primary election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(public function of company town). For a recent narrowing of the "public function"
doctrine, see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quotingJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)) (no state action unless the "public function" exercised by a private person or group is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state").
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan14 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.75 were invoked by individual plaintiffs against individual defendants; yet the
defendants in those cases were permitted to assert their first amendment rights precisely as though that rule of libel law had been invoked against them in a criminal libel action by the state. 7 6 For the
purposes of the state action doctrine, it was not important that the
plaintiffs were private individuals and not the state. What was important was that the rule of libel law was formulated entirely by the
state and thus that the basic decision of policy being challenged as
unconstitutional was formulated by the state. The only choice made
by the individual plaintiffs was the choice of filing the action.
Even more apposite than the libel cases-because similar in
some ways to Ltith-is a recent decision in which boycotted
merchants secured common-law tort damages in a state court action
against blacks who had instituted a trade boycott for the purpose of
77
Reversachieving nondiscriminatory treatment in the community.
ing the judgment, the Supreme Court found that the state court's
judgment violated the organizers' first and fourteenth amendment
rights of speech and political association. The Court treated the
state court damage award against the boycott participants exactly as
it would have treated a fine in a prosecution for criminal conspiracy
initiated by the state. The fact that this was an action between individuals did not raise serious doubts as to the full applicability of
constitutional principles. 78 The crucial point was that the decision
of policy represented by the common-law or statutory rule had been
completely formulated by the state; the only private decision by the
plaintiffs was the decision to invoke the rule that the state had
made." 9

74. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
76. "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach ofits civil law of libel." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
77. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
78. "Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state
rules of law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 916
n.51 (emphasis added). Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)
("Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which [defendants] claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that the law has been applied in a civil action .... " (emphasis added)).
79. This category of actions-cases between individuals in which the state has formulated the entire rule of decision-principally includes common-law tort claims and related statutory causes of action. Certain rules of property law that allocate property

270

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:247

When, however, private rights have been enforced under circumstances in which the applicable governmental rule allows the incorporation of a choice of policy by a private individual or groupand it is the judicial enforcement of this choice of policy that is attacked as unconstitutional-American courts have had greater difficulty. These cases typically involve judicial enforcement of such
nominally private arrangements as contracts or testamentary dispositions. In the cases that have raised these problems, the rule as
judicially applied contains a component of private will that has been
exercised in a manner which, if explicitly so formulated by the state,
would violate constitutional principles.
In the famous case of Shelley v. Kraemer,8 ° for example, the
Supreme Court found state action in the judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant at the request of one neighborhood resident against another. The state rule said in effect: "We will ordinarily enforce restrictive covenants in land"; it was the choice of the
residents or the original sellers and purchasers to make this covenant a racially restrictive covenant (which would have been invalid if
imposed by the state) rather than, for example, a restrictive covenant prohibiting taverns (which the state might constitutionally have
imposed itself).
In Shelley the Court found that the Constitution prohibited the
state court's enforcement of the covenant, but in other cases in
which a general common-law (or statutory) rule was filled in by an
individual's discriminatory choice of policy, courts have found no
interests apart from contract should also ordinarily fall into this category, but the
Supreme Court has indicated that at least in some instances in which a property rule
validates self-help actions of individuals no state action is present. See Flagg Bros., Inc.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
It is important to bear in mind that under the doctrine of Lith, in contrast with the
American position, private law cases in which the state has entirely determined the rule
of decision (e.g., German tort actions analogous to Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, and Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. 886) are treated like all other cases of private law; accordingly, these
cases in theory are subject only to the "indirect" influence of the Basic Law. See, e.g., 34
BVerfGE 269, 279-82 (1973) (Soraya); 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (Luth).
A prominent German commentator has recently suggested that all areas of private
law in which the rule of decision has been entirely determined by the state should be
subject to the direct, undiluted impact of the Basic Law-a position that would resemble
the position of the Supreme Court in cases like Sullivan and Claiborne Hardware Co. See
Canaris, supra note 66. For criticism of this position, see Zollner, supra note 66, at 6
(suggesting that considerations of private autonomy support "indirect" constitutional
impact even when the state seeks to mediate between private individuals by setting forth
complete rules of decision). See also Diirig, in MAUNz-DiJRIG, supra note 66, art. 3, § 1,
No. 513.
80. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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unconstitutional state action in judicial enforcement of the private
arrangement. Thus, notwithstanding Shelley v. Kraemer, courts have
found no constitutional violation in the judicial enforcement of wills
that discriminate on the ground of religion, 8' or in the recognition
or enforcement of certain contracts that discriminate on the basis of
ethnic origin.82 A number of explanations have been proposed for
these varying results which remain the subject of doctrinal dispute.8" Cases of this kind pose difficulties under the state action
doctrine because in one sense the choice of policy appears private
but in another sense the choice of policy appears to have been made
by the state. Although the choice of policy itself has been made by
private individuals-without the private choice there would be no
policy-the court has lent its weight to the explicit private policy by
choosing to enforce it. 84
Because the Court in Shelley held that the Constitution prohibits
the enforcement of certain nominally private contractual arrangements among individuals, the decision in that case perhaps comes
the closest of any of the Supreme Court's decisions to introducing
into American law something like the German concept of the com81. See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 349 U.S.
947 (1955); Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28, 315 N.E.2d 825 (1974). Cf
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (racially discriminatory will).
82. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d I10
(1953), aff'd by an equally divided court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated & cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (discriminatory clause in burial contract).
83. For example, Shelley, 334 U.S. 1,has been distinguished from cases like Rice, 245
Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110, on the ground that in Shelley the seller and purchaser of the
property were "willing" and the discriminatory clause was invoked by a third person
who was not a direct participant in the transaction. See Pollak, Racial Discriminationand
JudicialIntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-16 (1959). See also
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962)
(proposing distinctions based on countervailing constitutional interests). Cf. Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (suggesting that
no tenable distinctions are possible).
84. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1713-14.(2d ed. 1988) (doubting that cases enforcing contracts can be distinguished from cases enforcing tort rules,
like New York Times).
According to the Supreme Court, if a state has a statute or regulation requiring that
certain private arrangements, once entered into, must be carried out, such a rule is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires the carrying out of discriminatory arrangements. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972) (a state
regulation requiring that private clubs conform to their own by-laws is unconstitutional
to the extent that it requires the club to enforce a by-law provision discriminating on the
basis of race). But see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (nursing home's decision to
transfer Medicaid patient is not state action, even though state encourages such decisions
through continuing review and financial sanctions in context of extensive regulatory
program).
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prehensive "influence" of constitutional rights on private legal relationships.8 5 The Court's reluctance to extend Shelley v. Kraemer
beyond the context of racially restrictive covenants-thus suggesting that Shelley is actually based on the more traditional view that
a system of restrictive covenants resembles the public function of
zoning-may reflect the fear of uncabined expansion that a more
general acknowledgment of the applicability of constitutional rights
in individual legal relationships might entail. 8 6
One other class of American cases implicating certain problems
raised by Shelley v. Kraemer should be mentioned. In these cases the
applicable rule of law is not unconstitutional and there is no reference to a formally acknowledged private source of policy such as
contract, covenant, or will. Rather, the invocation of an otherwise
innocuous legal rule by a private individual follows an intentional
pattern which, were it followed as an intentional pattern of enforcement by state officers, would render the enforcement unconstitutional. For example-to take one widely discussed problem of the
recent past-a property owner might systematically invoke the state
trespass laws for the purpose of excluding black people but not
white people from the property. The property owner might be a
single householder or the owner of a place of public accommodation such as a restaurant or lunch counter. In these cases the courts
have often found or assumed that judicial enforcement of the rule is
not unconstitutional, presumably because the discriminatory decision of policy is primarily private. Theoretically at least, the court
may not even be required to acknowledge the discriminatory motivation of the exclusion, unlike the situation in contract or wills cases
in which the court is called upon to enforce a private discrimination
that appears on the face of the document being enforced. In these
trespass cases state action has been found only where the property
owner is so closely related to the state (by involvement or function)
that its decision of policy to invoke the statute according to the discriminatory pattern-or in some other unconstitutional mannercan be attributed to the state.8 7
85. See also Barrows v.Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (state court's imposition of damages for violation of racially restrictive covenant held unconstitutional); but see infra note

88.
86. On this point, see H. EHMKE, supra note 40, at 82.
87. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (exclusion of speaker from private property is subject to constitutional limitations because property owner was operating a company town and thus exercising public function), with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976) (exclusion of picketers from shopping center is not subject to constitutional limitations because shopping center is not exercising public function). For an
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An examination of this overall pattern indicates that the force
of the American Constitution in disputes between individuals is in
some instances weaker and in some instances stronger than the effect of the German Basic Law under the doctrine of the Li'th case.
In those actions between individuals in which state action is found
to exist, the United States Constitution generally applies against private individuals as fully as it applies against the state; once state action is found, the whole panoply of constitutional doctrines is called
into play and the Constitution supersedes the "private" law.8 8 In
contrast, in German cases involving disputes between individuals,
the Basic Law only "influences" the rules of private law. The values
of private law remain present in the balance and must be accommodated. Moreover, as discussed below, the fact that the action remains a private law action may have a significant limiting effect on
the scope of the Constitutional Court's review. In these respects,
therefore, the impact of the Basic Law on disputes between individuals appears weaker than the impact of the American Constitution in
those disputes in which state action would be found under American
doctrine.
In contrast, in those private disputes in which state action does
argument that the use of trespass laws to exclude blacks from privately owned public
accommodations should be subject to constitutional limitations, see Lewis, The Sit-In
Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 101, 140-51. For a criticism of this position,
see Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: "'ButAnswer Came There None", 1964 SuP. CT. REV.
137.
The problem of racial exclusions from privately owned public accommodationsonce a problem of great practical importance in the United States-has been largely
resolved through statutory enactment rather than constitutional decision. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 78 Stat. 243-246 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6
(1982)); compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (opinions of Douglas, Goldberg,
Black, J.); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). In this and related areas, however, some
state action questions arising from various forms of discrimination remain. See, e.g.,
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no state action
inexclusion from cooperative apartment on basis of sex); Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old
Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (state action in exclusion on basis of
sex from tavern subject to pervasive state regulation).
88. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenant), with Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (invalidating city ordinance requiring housing segregation on the basis of race). Once the
Supreme Court found discriminatory state action in the state court's enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in Shelley, the Court appeared to treat the case exactly as it would
have treated a case of housing segregation imposed by the legislative or executive
branches of the state, as in Buchanan. To this extent Shelley appears to resemble Judge
Nipperdey's theory of the "direct" impact of the constitution on private law, see supra
text accompanying notes 40-49, rather than the Constitutional Court's "indirect"
theory.
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not exist under American doctrine, the impact of the German Basic
Law becomes stronger than that of the United States Constitution.
When there is no state action in American law, the United States
Constitution ordinarily has no effect at all. Under American doctrine, therefore, if there is state action constitutional rights theoretically apply with full vigor; if there is no state action, there are no
constitutional rights.8 9 Under the German Basic Law, however, the
fact that a certain dispute of private law lies beyond where the state
action line would be drawn under the United States Constitution
has no particular meaning. The rules of private law are still "influenced" by the basic rights of the constitution. Thus the German
constitution continues to have an impact in cases in which no state
action would be found under American law.
This difference between German and American doctrine is perhaps most notable in the area of contractual relations-particularly
private employment contracts-in which the United States Constitution generally has no impact. In these cases the German Basic Law
can have some force. In a recent German case, 90 for example, a
press operator in a private printing shop refused on grounds of conscience to print an advertisement for books that he believed glorified war. The press operator was fired, and he sued in the labor
courts to have the discharge set aside. Holding for the employee,
the Federal Labor Court found that article 4 of the Basic Lawguaranteeing freedom of conscience-exerts a substantial influence
on the applicable private law. Because of the constitution's "influence" on private law, the court found that the "reasonableness" of
the employer's orders to the employee must be evaluated in light of
the employee's constitutionally guaranteed freedom of conscience. 9 The practical result was that the employee's constitutional interests must be balanced against the interests of the
employer in running its business and, under the circumstances of
89. For a particularly clear expression of this point in a recent decision, see RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("The core issue presented in this case is not
whether petitioners were discharged because of their speech or without adequate procedural protections, but whether the school's action in discharging them can fairly be seen
as state action. If the action of the respondent school is not state action, our inquiry
ends" (footnote omitted)).
90. 47 BAGE 363 (1984).
91. According to BGB § 315, a party to a contract can make certain demands for
performance if those demands lie within the party's "reasonable discretion." Under
§ 315, therefore, the employer's demand on the employee had to be "reasonable," and
it was this requirement that was "influenced"-under the Lith doctrine-by the employee's constitutional right of freedom of conscience. See GG art. 4.
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this case, the court struck the balance in favor of the employee. 92 In
this case, therefore, the court indicated that the Basic Law operated
to protect an employee against discharge by his employer under circumstances in which state action would not have been found under
American law.
The application of constitutional rights in private legal relations
under German doctrine is not exhausted, however, by its "influence" on those contractual relationships in.which the United States
Constitution does not ordinarily apply. Indeed, the "influence" of
the German Constitution on the norms of private law may even lead,
in some circumstances, to something that looks very much like the
judicial creation of a constitutional tort action by one private person
against another private person to redress a constitutional violationanother use of constitutional rights that is generally unknown in
American doctrine.93 With respect to the right of free speech, this
result was first suggested by the Blinkftier case,94 a decision that resembles Li'th in certain important respects. If under some circum92. 47 BAGE at 375-79; see infra text accompanying notes i 18-121. In undertaking
the required balancing, the court found that the employee was acting on sincere
grounds of conscience, that the brochure did in fact glorify war, and that the employer
easily could have given the task to another employee. 47 BAGE at 375-79. This case is a
recent example of the Labor Court's application of an "indirect" theory of the impact of
constitutional rights on private law, rather than its own "direct" theory. See supra note
66. For an interesting case in which the "indirect" impact of the Basic Law resulted in a
nullification of a contract to pay interest on a loan, see 1987 NJW 959 (State Court
Libeck, 1986) ("indirect" impact of GG art. I (guarantee of human dignity) and GG
arts. 20 and 28 ("social state" provisions) invalidates borrowers' agreement to pay interest at a rate which, while not usurious, would severely limit their ability to purchase
necessities-a fact apparently known to the lender).
93. Of course American courts have created constitutional causes of action on behalf
of private individuals against certain governmental actors to redress violations of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Since the Bivens-type actions are intended to redress governmental deprivations of certain
constitutional rights, the defendants in those cases must be exercising governmental
action. The Bivens line of cases therefore does not represent a parallel to the German
cases, discussed below in the text, in which the Basic Law has been interpreted to require the creation of what appears to be a constitutional cause of action by one private
person against anotherprivate person. See infra text accompanying notes 94-113.
Acting under the enforcement provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, Congress has also created certain causes of action running directly against individuals. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982)); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)); Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982)). In contrast, the German cases illustrate thejudicial development of certain constitutional tort actions against
private individuals without special legislative action.
94. 25 BVerfGE 256 (1969). For the political and historical background of this case,
see A. VON BRUNNECK, POLTISCIlEJusTiZ GEGEN KOMMUNISTEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 1949-1968, at 177-79, 188-89 (1978).
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stances the "influence" of the Basic Law calls for the judicial
creation of a constitutional cause of action by one private individual
against another, such a result goes beyond even cases like Shelley v.
Kraemer-in which constitutional principles are employed to nullify a
judicially imposed burden on individuals-and emphasizes the power
of the German doctrine that acknowledges the influence of the Basic
Law on individual legal relations.
When the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, Axel Springer Company, an important newspaper publisher, circulated a letter to news
dealers threatening to withdraw its business from any dealer who
carried publications listing East German television programs.
Springer's letter was apparently directed against Blinkftier, a small
left-wing magazine that listed East German programs. Alleging that
the threatened boycott had illegally injured its business, Blinkfiier
sued Springer under section 823(1) of the Civil Code, a basic tort
provision which provides compensation for the intentional or negligent infliction of injuries to property and certain other specified in95
terests, "ina manner contrary to law."
In response to Blinkftier's suit, Springer argued that it possessed a constitutionally protected right to call for the boycott, but
the Constitutional Court upheld Blinkftier's damage claim. In the
first part of its opinion, the Court held that the "influence" of article
5 of the Basic Law did not protect Springer from being found in
violation of section 823(1). Although the speech rights of article 5
do indeed influence this rule of private law, Springer's call for a boycott was not protected because Springer was simply applying its economic power against the news dealers rather than making a general
contribution to the formation of public opinion. 9 6
Moreover, in the second-and more important-part of its
opinion in Blinkfzier, the Court went on to find that Springer's call
95. For commentary on BGB § 823(1), see H. K6TZ, supra note 18, at 38-83. For the
full text of § 823, see infra Appendix at pp. 348-49.
96. 25 BVerfGE at 263-67. Because Springer possessed substantial economic con-

trol over the news dealers, they were not free to rest their decision of whether to join the
boycott solely on the intellectual persuasiveness of Springer's views. See generally
Biedenkopf, Zum politischen Boykott, 1965 JURISTENzErrUNG UZI 553, 555. Springer's call
for a boycott would have been more favorably viewed if, instead of addressing a threatening letter to the news dealers, it had called upon the general public to boycott publications that listed East German programs. 25 BVerfGE at 266. For a careful analysis of
this section of the Blinkffier opinion, see Lerche, Zur verfassungsgerichtlichen Deutung der
Meinungsfreiheit (Insbesondere im Bereiche des Boykotts), in FESTSCHRiFT FOR GEBHARD MOLLER

197-215 (1970). For a recent decision that follows this aspect of the Blinkftier case, see
62 BVerfGE 230 (1982) (article in trade paper, seeking to mobilize the economic force
of retailers against certain manufacturers, is not protected by GG art. 5).
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for a boycott actually violated Blinkf'ier's right to publish information about East German television programs. The Court held that
Springer's attempt to apply economic pressure violated Blinkftier's
constitutional freedom of the press, expressly protected by article 5,
section 1. Thus the Court not only found that a private law damage
award against Springer would not violate its constitutional rights of
speech but, moreover, held that in calling for the boycott, Springer,
a private concern, had violated the constitutional speech rights of
Blinkftier.9"
Because Springer's call for a boycott violated the constitutional
rights of Blinkfitier, the Court also indicated by its ruling that the
failure of the lower courts to issue a judgment for the plaintiff
Blinkfitier perpetuated that constitutional violation.9 8 The result in
this case may suggest that, if necessary, Blinkf'ier could proceed directly against Springer for violation of Blinkftier's basic right of free
reporting; at least, under the Court's "indirect" theory, Blinkfiier
was constitutionally entitled to an interpretation of the general
clauses of the private law that would afford it a remedy against another private individual for a constitutional violation under these
circumstances. 99 Thus, under the Court's "indirect" theory, the
constitutional impact on private law serves not only to protect a defendant against certain judicially imposed burdens that interfere
with constitutional rights, as in Luith. In addition, the impact of the
constitution on relationships between individuals may require the
judiciary to create what is in effect a constitutional cause of action
that will allow private individuals to enforce their constitutional interests against other private individuals 0 0
97. 25 BVerfGE at 267-69; see K. HESSE, supra note 66, at 143. For procedural reasons the second section of the Blinkfiier opinion was essential to sustain the result in the
Constitutional Court. The Federal Supreme Court (BGH)-the court directly belowhad found that the influence of GG art. 5, § 1, protected Springer's call for a boycott, see
1964 NJW 29, and it was against this judgment that Blinkfiler filed a constitutional complaint in the Constitutional Court. The second section of the opinion was essential because Blinkfier, as a constitutional complainant, could succeed in the Constitutional
Court only if its own basic rights had in some way been violated by the lower court's
finding that Springer was not liable. A simple finding that Springer's speech rights were
not protected would not have been sufficient-in itself-for the requisite showing that
Blinkftier's constitutional rights had been violated.
98. See 25 BVerfGE at 256; supra note 97. For the view that the action of the BGH in
dismissing Blinkfi'er's claim constitutes reviewable judicial approval of Springer's boycott, see J. SCHWABE, DIE SOGENNANTE DRITFWIRKUNG DER GRUNDRECHTE 66 & n. 174
(1971); Schwabe, supra note 66, at 459-62. Compare Canaris, supra note 66, at 229-31.
99. See 25 BVerfGE at 263; see generally K. HEssE, supra note 66, at 142-43.
100. In a central passage of the Blinkfiier opinion the Constitutional Court stated:
In order to protect the institution of a free press, the independence of organs
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Indeed, shortly after the decision in Blinkfzier, the Constitutional
Court in the well-known Soraya case' 0 ' expressly approved the creation of what is in effect a constitutional cause of action in damages
by one private individual against another. This cause of action was
not created to protect rights of speech, however, but rather to protect a general constitutional right of "personality," derived from articles I and0 22 of the Basic Law, against the actions of private
individuals.'
The approval of a constitutional cause of action in Soraya was
the culmination of a line of doctrine that the Federal Supreme Court
(BGH)' °3 had originally developed in two basic steps. In the first
step, the BGH found that articles 1 and 2 include a "general right of
of the press must be assured against the incursions of powerful economic groups using
The goal of freedom of the press-to encourage and
inappropriatemeans ....
protect the formation of free public opinion-thus requires protection of the press
against attempts to suppress the competition of ideas by means of economic pressure. The boycott of the weekly paper "Blinkfiier" contravenes this constitutionally protected freedom . . . . The action of the defendant (Springer) is
directed toward the suppression of news through primarily economic means, in
violation of the Iconstitutional] freedom of reporting.
25 BVerfGE at 268-69 (emphasis added).
Among other things, this language suggests that in a system in which the constitution may impose some limitations on private persons, the question of whether the constitution limits a private person in any specific case may sometimes depend upon the
social or economic power wielded by that person. The danger to objective constitutional rights presented by a person or group with strong social or economic power is
naturally greater than the danger presented by other private individuals. See generally I
GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, supra note 32, at 39; Diirig in MAUNZ-D0RIG, supra note 66,
art. 3, § 1, No. 511; Laufke, supra note 32, at 182.

A constitutional principle requiring the government to protect weaker individuals
and groups from the economic or social power of stronger social units may conceivably
also be derived from the "social state" clauses of GG arts. 20, 28. The primary purpose
of these clauses is probably to require the government to furnish means of social welfare
to economically deprived persons, but they also may oblige the government to adjust
private law relations among individuals and groups in order to furnish similar protections. See generally Laufke, supra note 32, at 185-86. For an analysis of some of these
issues in the context of employment law, focusing on the need to protect the weaker
against the stronger economic forces, see Gamillscheg, supra note 4 1, at 407 ("The concept of social power, social strength is the key to the problem.").
In the American literature, certain commentators have also argued that constitutional limitations should apply against substantial aggregations of "private" corporate
power. See, e.g., Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952). The Supreme

Court, however, has never accepted this view. See e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (electric power company enjoying "at least a partial monopoly" status in its area is not limited by due process clause of fourteenth amendment
when it terminates customer's service).
101. 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973).
102. For GG arts. I & 2, see infra Appendix at p. 348.

103. For the Federal Supreme Court, see supra note 20.
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personality" and that this constitutional right is enforceable by injunction not only against infringements by the state but also against
infringements by individuals.° 4 As discussed more fully below, this
"general right of personality" includes, among other things, certain
aspects of what is referred to as "privacy" in American law; the prevailing view is that these rights-and a number of others-are emanations of a central core of human personality. 10 5 Early cases in the
BGH found, for example, that the general right of personality protects an individual's control over the distribution of his own writings, and over the secrecy of his medical records, against
0 6
infringements by other individuals.'
In the second step in this development, the BGH invoked the
implications of articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law to create a damage
remedy, on behalf of one individual against another, for the viola-

104. 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 334, 338
(1954) (Schacht-Letter). For an English translation of this case, see B. MARKESINIS, A
COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE GERMAN LAW OF TORT 191-95 (1986).
105. For recent remarks on the development of the right of personality, see Kastner,
Freiheit der Literatur und Pers6nlichheitsrecht, 1982 NJW 601, 603-04; for an exhaustive survey of the doctrine, see H. HUBMANN, supra note 19. See also P. SCHWERDTNER, DAS PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT IN DER DEUTSCHEN ZIVILRECHTSORDNUNG (1977). For an important
American discussion of rights of "personality," see Pound, Interests of Personality, 28
HARV. L. REV. 343, 445 (1915).
106. 13 BGHZ 334 (1954) (Schacht-Letter) (newspaper's publication of lawyer's letter
with misleading editorial excisions violated lawyer's right of personality): 24 BGHZ 72
(1957) (release of insured's medical data by insurance company employee can violate
insured's right of personality) (dictum).
In connection with the recognition of this new right, the coverage of BGB § 823(l),
see supra text accompanying note 95 and infra Appendix at p. 348, was expanded by
interpretation to provide a statutory remedy for an individual whose constitutional right
of personality had been violated. See 24 BGHZ at 77. For a defense of what some
viewed as a questionable statutory construction, see H. HUBMANN, supra note 19, at 10755; for criticism, see Larenz, Das "allgemeine Persnlichkeitsrecht" im Recht der unerlaubten
Handlungen, 1955 NJW 521. See also Brandner, Das allgemeine Pers6"nlichkeitsrecht in der
Entwicklung durch die Rechisprechung, 1983 JZ 689 at 689, 696.
To a certain extent this line of cases embodies the result that would have occurred
in American law if the arguments of Warren and Brandeis for the creation of a general
right of privacy had been adopted by American courts not as a matter of common-law
development, but rather as a matter of constitutional compulsion. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890); cf id. at 205-07 (right to privacy
rests on the principle of "an inviolate personality"). Such a development would have
been difficult in American law, however, because constitutional rights are ordinarily not
directed against individuals and the failure of courts to create a cause of action is ordinarily not the kind of state action that is necessary for a constitutional violation. See infra
text accompanying note 215. But see Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 291, 297 P. 91,
93-94 (193 1) (deriving tort action for invasion of privacy from provision of state constitution); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905)
(right of privacy derived from natural law and federal and state constitutions).
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tion of the general right of personality. 0 7 Although damage remedies are common in American law, this step was quite dramatic
under German doctrine because the Civil Code relies in the first instance on specific performance'0 8 and limits the areas in which
awards for damages may issue. Indeed, the Civil Code expressly excludes damage liability for most instances of injury to "non-property" interests.' 0 9 Because many assertions of the general right of
personality involve "non-property" interests, the text of the Civil
Code expressly excluded a damage remedy for invasions of broad
areas of this newly acknowledged right; moreover, recent legislative
attempts to create a damage remedy in these cases had failed." 0
Nonetheless, in the Soraya case the BGH found that the influence of articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law overrode the clear statutory
command and established a damage remedy by one private individual
against another for the invasion of the constitutional right of personality."' The BGH found that the impact of the constitution on
private law required this result because otherwise the values of articles 1 and 2 would not be adequately protected against the actions
of individuals. Thus the constitution required the acknowledgement of a private cause of action that the Civil Code had expressly
excluded. Although the BGH took the lead in this doctrinal innovation, the Constitutional Court approved this line of development in
its opinion in Soraya." ,2 Blinkfzier indicates that, in the same manner,
107. 26 BGHZ 349 (1958) (Herrenreiter). For commentary on this decision, see
Larenz, Anmerkung, 1958 NJW 827; for an English translation, see B. MARKESINIS, supra
note 104, at 195-201.

108. See I E. COHN, supra note 27, at 105; Watson, supra note 69, at 1155; 34 BVerfGE
269, 286 (1973) (Soraya).
109. See BGB §§ 253, 847; for the historical background of these provisions, see D.
LEUZE,

DIE ENTWICKLUNG

DES

PERSONLICHKEITSRECHTS

IM

19. JAHRHUNDERT 65-80

(1962).
110. See 34 BVerfGE at 272-73.
111. In Soraya the BGH approved a damage award against a tabloid newspaper that
had published a fabricated interview with the former wife of the Shah of Iran. See 1965
NJW 685. (The tabloid was part of the huge Axel Springer publishing empire, also the
defendant in Blinhfiier; see supra text accompanying notes 94-100.) For other early cases
in the BGH imposing damages for violation of a general right of personality, see, e.g.,
39 BGHZ 124 (1963) (insulting statements about TV personality's appearance and sexual preferences); 35 BGHZ 363 (1961) (unauthorized use of professor's name in advertisement). For a criticism of this line of doctrine, noting the dangers posed to speech
interests, see Loffler, Die Grenzen richterlicher Rechtsindung beim immatenellen Schadensersatz,

1962 NJW 225; for a defense, see H. HUBMANN, supra note 19, at 349-56.
112. 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973). For commentary on the Soraya decision in the Constitutional Court, see, e.g., R. WELLBROCK, PERSONLICHKEITSSCHUTZ UND KOMMUNIKATIONS55-56 (1982); Larenz, Richterliche Konkretisierung verfassungsmissig gesicherter
Rechtsprinzipien und einfaches Gesetz, 1973 ARCHIV FUR PRESSERECHT [AFP] 450; Knieper,
FREIHEIT
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the principles of the Ltith case can be employed to create a constitutional cause of action-by one individual against another-for violations of article 5 rights as well. Indeed we will see below that
recently, in a somewhat unexpected fashion, something of the sort
has once again come to pass. ' Is
This line of cases illustrates another way in which the German
doctrine results in broader constitutional impact than is possible
under the American state action doctrine. Even under the broadest
interpretation of Shelley v. Kraemer" 4 it is the action of a court that
creates state action in American law. The failure of a court to act is
ordinarily not state action; if it were, all private actions would be
converted into state action by a court's failure to grant redress.
Thus, as a general matter, there is no significant argument in American law that there is a constitutional requirement that a new cause of
action be created to protect one private individual against the actions of another. Yet Blinkfzier and Soraya, and other cases acknowledging constitutional causes of action by one private individual
against another, indicate that such a result is a natural implication of
the "influence" of constitutional rights on private law in German
constitutional doctrine first elaborated in the Lith case.
D. A Return to the Liuth Opinion, Part HI: Free Speech
and "General Laws"
The Court's discussion of the relationship between free speech
and private law in Lzith could not conclude simply with a finding that
constitutional rights "influence" private law. Language contained
in article 5, section 2 of the Basic Law-which qualifies the rights of
free expression of opinion contained in section 1-raised a more
specific argument that rights of free expression do not as a practical
matter apply in disputes of private law. Article 5, section 2 states
that the speech rights of section 1-the rights relied on in Ldlth"find their limits in the rules of the general laws .... ." The purpose
of this provision clearly was to permit the legislature to place some
limits on the expression of opinion, and the basic question was
whether section 826 of the Civil Code-and, more generally, all of
the rules of private law-are "general laws" which limit the basic
rights of article 5, section 1. If the rules of private law were found to
Soraya und die Schmerzensgeldrechtsprechung des BVerfG, 1974 ZEITSCtIRIFT FUR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 137. For an English translation of the opinion, see R. SCHLESINGER, supra note

18 at 579-92.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 274-282.
114. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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be "general laws" in this sense, it might follow that the basic right of
free expression of opinion would never be applicable to disputes of
private law because the "general law" embodied in the rule of private law-for example, the private law doctrine prohibiting certain
boycotts-would always limit the basic right of speech from the
outset.
Perhaps foreseeing this possibility, Lith argued that in cases involving speech that contributes to public political life, the "general
laws" of article 5, section 2, should include rules of public law
only. " 5 This argument apparently assumed that the contribution of
speech to public life is so great that speech can only be limited by a
rule of public law-which serves general community values-rather
than by a private law rule, which may be directed primarily toward
serving the economic or other private interests of individuals. According to this view, constitutional law has a significant impact on
private law, and in cases of public speech the private law rules are
not "general laws" that can limit speech. Lith's underlying view,
therefore, was that constitutional values of speech had a distinctly
superior position in comparison with the values of private law.
In the second part of the Lith opinion, the Constitutional Court
rejected this argument without retreating to the position that under
article 5, section 2, private law values always prevail over rights of
free speech. The Court's first task was to determine which laws are
"general laws," which would be permitted to limit free expression.
Drawing on the interpretation of the same phrase in the Weimar
Constitution, the Court asserted that "general laws" are any laws
that do not prohibit an opinion as such [and] that are not
directed against the expression of opinion as such; [rather,
they are laws that] serve to protect a legal value that can be
protected without consideration of a particular opinion,
[that is, they serve] to protect a community value that has
priority over the free expression of opinion.' 16
Under a definition of such breadth, rules of private law certainly
could be "general laws," and private law rules protecting important
personal interests therefore might limit speech under article 5, sec-

115. 7 BVerfGE 198, 202 (1958).
116. Id. at 209-10. For criticism of the imprecision of this formulation, see Klein,
Offentliche und private Freiheit: Zur Auslegung des Grundrechts der Meinungsfreiheit, 1971 DER
STAT 145, 150; for discussion of the meaning of the phrase "general laws" under the
Weimar Constitution and in the legislative history of the Basic Law, see id. at 150-59; see
also Herzog, in MAUNz-DKJRIC, supra note 66, art. 5. §§ I, 2. No. 250-51.
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The Court thus found that the basic speech rights of article 5,
section 1, can be limited by rules of private law under section 2.
This conclusion did not mean, however, that the general rules of
private law would always prevail over expressions of opinion. As
discussed above, all aspects of the legal order-even the rules of
"private law"-are to be influenced by "objective" constitutional
values. Moreover, according to the Court, this influence is particularly important in the case of the rights of free speech because
speech is "absolutely fundamental" (schlechthin konstituierend) in
a liberal constitutional order." 8 As a result, even general laws that
may have the effect of limiting speech-whether they are rules of
private law or of public law-must also be influenced by basic constitutional values, including the basic value of free speech itself.
Thus, in determining the extent of the limitation of speech effected
by the general laws, those laws must themselves be interpreted in
light of the basic right of free speech, so that the special values of
expression are preserved." 9 In other words, the basic right of free
expression can be limited by legislation under article 5, section 2,
but because the legislature and the judges are themselves bound by
the basic right, any general laws that are enacted and interpreted
must in turn be limited by that basic right. As the Court put it, the
basic right and the general laws qualify each other through the exercise of a "reciprocal effect" (Wechselwirkung).' 2 ° In light of this
"reciprocal effect," the only way in which a result can be reached in
any specific case is by deciding whether the values embodied in the
general laws or the values embodied in the basic right are more
weighty under the circumstances and therefore have the more powerful qualifying effect in the particular case. Thus the Court concluded that an individual balancing of the values of the basic right
against the values of the general law must be undertaken in each

117. 7 BVerfGE at 211.
118. See id. at 208. By using this language, the Court emphasized that freedom of
expression is an institution that is necessary to "constitute," or make up, a democratic
government- in this context, the Court quoted justice Cardozo's remark that free speech
is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Id.;
see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). (Although "constitutive" is a literal
translation of the Court's word, "konstituierend," I have used "fundamental" which
seems more idiomatic and readily intelligible in the context). For a recent reaffirmation
of the Court's view in a related context, see 69 BVerfGE 315, 342-47 (1985) (Brokdorf)
(the right of assembly is "fundamental").
119. 7 BVerfGE 198, 208-09 (1958).
120. Id.
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case under article 5, sections 1 and 2.121
In sum, then, the constitutional protection of LUth's call for a
boycott could be determined only by balancing Luith's speech interests against the private law interests of Harlan and the film companies, in the specific circumstances of the case. In the final pages of
the opinion, the Court undertook the required balancing.' 2 2 Acknowledging that there is a "presumption" in favor of free expression, ' 2 3 the Court remarked that speech should be given heightened
protection to the extent that it furthers a discussion of public matters
rather than the purely private or economic interests of the individual speaker.' 24 The Court also reiterated the point that its task was
to interpret the phrase "contrary to good morals" in section 826 of
the BGB' 25 in light of the constitutional influence exerted by article
5, section 1 of the Basic Law-an influence that the Court found to
be particularly weighty because of the implicit reference to evolving
ethical principles contained in the statutory language. The Court
thus sought to determine whether Liith's call for a boycott was
"contrary to good morals" and invoked the speech values of article
26
5, section 1, in answering that question.'
121. Id. at 2 10-1. For the subsequent development of a similar balancing technique
in related areas, see, e.g., 69 BVerfGE 315, 348-49, 353 (1985) (Brokdorf) (right of
assembly); 20 BVerfGE 162, 176-78 (1966) (Spiegel) (freedom of the press); set also 67
BVerfGE 157, 173 (1984) (privacy of the mails and telephone).
As we have seen, the Court explains that balancing is necessary because the rights
of GG art. 5, § i, are limited by "general laws" under GG art. 5, § 2, and those general
laws are themselves influenced by the basic rights. In private law cases, however, balancing also might be required because basic rights only "influence" (rather than supersede)
the workings of private law. See supra text accompanying notes 50-61. Determination of
the extent of this "influence" in a specific case could possibly involve a balancing of the
constitutional guarantee against private law values, even if the specific language of GG
art. 5, § 2, did not exist.
122. 7 BVerfGE at 214-30.
123. Id. at 212.
124. Id. For a recent case relying on this point, see 68 BVerfGE 226, 232-33 (1984)
(Sheriff in Black). But see Klein, supra note 116, at 159-68 (arguing that speech furthering
private values should be given equal weight).
125. See supra text accompanying note 18 and infra Appendix at p. 349.
126. 7 BVerfGE at 215. See supra text accompanying notes 50-61. The Court's insistence on its "indirect" theory in Lith is underscored by the fact that throughout the
opinion the Court seeks to interpret the meaning of the phrase "contrary to good
morals" in § 826 BGB, using the values of GG art. 5,§ 1, to aid that interpretation,
rather than by stating that the case must be decided through an interpretation of Lith's
article 5 rights alone. Presumably the latter technique would have been employed if the
speech provisions of the Basic Law, set forth in article 5,were "directly" applicable to
this dispute. Sometimes it seems, however, that the Court's references to the "interpretation" of § 826 co-exist in uneasy tension with the balancing theory developed under
GG art. 5, § 1, 2. In any case, the two techniques-both advanced by the Court in
Ldth-do not always seem to be precisely the same.
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In undertaking the balancing that was required in order to perform this task, the Court considered a somewhat broader range of
factors than is ordinarily taken into account in American balancing
opinions-focusing with special care on certain aspects of LUth's activities and career that made the speech particularly justifiable in his
case. To determine whether the speech was "contrary to good
morals" in the requisite sense, the Court first considered Liith's motives and goals in calling for the boycott. First, the Court noted that
LUith was not motivated by economic goals of his own and was not in
economic competition with Harlan or the film producers.12 7 Moreover, the goal of the speech-to exclude Harlan as a representative
of German films-arose from Liuth's fear that Harlan's re-emergence would lead world opinion to believe that Germany had not
rejected the national-socialist past. Thus LUith's speech reflected his
general political views concerning an issue that was of essential importance for the German people-the reputation of German cultural life and the German nation after the gruesome events of the
Nazi period. 2 8 Moreover, it was clear that this justification was not
merely a pretext subsequently devised by Liuth, because a number of
other individuals had protested against Harlan's re-emergence for
similar reasons.' 29 The Court placed particular emphasis on the
fact that Liuth was a person with a particularly "legitimate" interest
in taking a position on Harlan's re-emergence as a director, because
of Liith's involvement in activities furthering understanding between Christians and Jews in Germany and his involvement in matters relating to the cinema in Hamburg. Indeed, in this light, the
public probably expected a statement from Liuth on this question
and his response accordingly could be seen as an understandable
defensive reaction rather than an unprovoked attack.'" 0
127. 7 BVerfGE 198, 215-16 (1958).
128. id. at 216.
129. Id. at 216-17.
130. Id. at 218; see also id. at 228-29 (Liith's statement made in public forum as defensive reaction to widespread publicity for Harlan's film).
In the development of free speech doctrine after LUth, the view that certain speech
may be justified as a defensive reaction has played a prominent role-particularly in
cases in which the constitution is found to affect the German law of defamation. Thus
important early decisions took this factor into account in the balancing required by LDth.
See, e.g., 24 BVerfGE 278 (1968) (GEMA-Tonjagerverband) (vigorous criticism of trade
group by consumers' newspaper was in response to group's advocacy of measures unfavorable to consumers); 12 BVerfGE 113 (1961) (Schmid-Spiegel) (state judge's sharp
criticism of Spiegel, a German magazine, was in response to magazine's article calling
judge's credentials into question). For more recent cases invoking similar principles, see
66 BVerfGE 116 (1984) ("Bild"-Wailraff) (sharp criticism of newspaper was justified
when newspaper itself intentionally furthered polarization of political debate); 61
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Against these very powerful interests favoring LUth's speech,
the private economic interests of Harlan and the film producers occupied a distinctly subordinate position.'
Indeed, the Court did
not concede that Harlan had any countervailing constitutional interests of substance. For example, the Court rejected the argument
that LUith's remarks injured Harlan in his "human dignity"-a right
protected by article 1, section 1 of the Basic Law. The Court
doubted that the power of Luith's attack was sufficient to remove
Harlan from his chosen sphere of endeavor-activity in the cinema;
some such damage would have been necessary, apparently, to constitute an invasion of human dignity.'In light of the strength of
Luth's constitutionally protected interests and the minimal nature of
Harlan's economic interest protected by the private law, the constitutional interests prevailed over the private law interests and the injunction against Liuth was accordingly dissolved.
Even though the speech interest prevailed in Luth, however, the
opinion contained uncertain omens for the future. If in a subsequent case the constitutional interest in speech were to be balanced
against "general laws" protecting countervailing constitutional interests--or in the event that speech interests were to be balanced
against interests that were for any reason stronger than Harlan's interests in Luth-the interest in speech might not prevail. Indeed in a
decision that was handed down on the same day as Luth, the Constitutional Court found that rights of speech were subordinate to cerBVerfGE 1 (1982) (Political Pamphlet Case) (both sides in elections employ vigorous
invective and thus a political party must accept certain attacks made during a campaign);
54 BVerfGE 129 (1980) (Art Critique Case) (journalists' criticism of sculptor was in response to sculptor's lecture attacking practices of art critics and museums). For a similar
doctrine in American libel law, see, e.g., Israel v. Portland News Publishing Co., 152
Ore. 225, 53 P.2d 529 (1936).
Another factor that the Court appeared to weigh in the Ldth case is its approval of
the content of Luth's speech. See 7 BVerfGE at 218-19, 229-30. Certainly, in light of the
history of the Nazi period, the Basic Law could readily be seen as approving speech that
would further the relations between Christians and Jews and improve the reputation of
Germany in the eyes of the world. Cf. Lerche, supra note 96, at 203 (Luith's call for a
boycott was protected not "because it constituted an expression of opinion, but rather
because it proceeded from honorable grounds to honorable ends and the means employed were appropriate.").
131. 7 BVerfGE 198, 218-19 (1958).
132. Id. at 220-21. One basic right that the Court did not explicitly consider is GG
art. 12, § 1, which grants a measure of protection to an individual's free choice of occupation. Perhaps the Court should have made clear that the case involved a conflict of
two basic rights-Lu6th's right of speech and Harlan's right of occupational choice. See
Diirig, supra note 60, at 197. Indeed Harlan's own article 5 rights of expression as a film
producer might also have been more explicitly discussed. See Klein, supra note 116, at
154.
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tain traditional property interests under the balancing test of
Lth."' Moreover, the delineation of a balancing technique as a basic technique relating to speech raises heightened problems of uncertainty-a particularly severe problem in speech cases, if one takes
seriously the view that expression is both particularly valuable and
133. 7 BVerfGE 230 (1958). In this case the Constitutional Court upheld an injunction obtained by an apartment house owner against a tenant who attached a political
placard to the outside wall of the house. Here, the article 5 speech rights of the tenant
confronted the constitutional property interests of the owner and, as in Li'th, the Court
sought to balance the competing interests. In striking the balance, the Court found that
the tenant's interests were not particularly strong because he was the candidate of a
large political party and thus had many alternative forms of expression at his disposal.
Id. at 237. Moreover, the placard contained nothing that related specifically to the tenant or to the neighborhood. In contrast, the landlord's interests were substantial: other
tenants had complained about the placard and the owner was thus seeking to maintain
congenial relations in the apartment house, id.; moreover, attaching a placard to the wall
of the building was not an ordinary use of the property. As a result, the landlord's
property interest prevailed over the speech interest of the tenant under the specific facts
of the case.
The differences between American and German doctrine in this area are illustrated
by a comparison of the German apartment house case with American shopping center
decisions following Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)-cases that also involve a
clash between speech and property interests. Typically, shopping centers have sought
to exclude individuals who wish to give speeches or distribute leaflets on shopping
center property. The question under American "state action" law is whether the shopping center is so related to the state, or is exercising a function that is so much like a
function ordinarily exercised by the state, that the shopping center's action should be
considered the action of the state for this purpose. After some vacillation, the Supreme
Court has found that a typical shopping center does not exercise state action. The Constitution, therefore, has no limiting effect whatsoever on the decision of the shopping
center to exclude speakers. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), overruling Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
In contrast, a German court would not find that the constitution is completely inapplicable in determining whether individuals have rights to speak in shopping centers or
on other private property. Rather, as exemplified in the apartment house case, the principles of Ldlh would require a careful weighing of the opposed speech and property
interests under the specific circumstances of the case. Although there are suggestions of
such a balancing in a few American cases, see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 55 1,
567-70 (1972), the Supreme Court has ultimately ignored that technique in favor of the
more traditional state action analysis. See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp.,
407 U.S. at 567, 568-69).
In contrast some American scholars have suggested that a balancing technique
should be introduced in the Supreme Court's state action law, see Henkin, supra note 83;
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963). See also Glennon &
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
SuP. CT. REV. 221 (arguing that Supreme Court actually employs balancing technique in

state action cases). Cf. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d
341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (state constitution grants individuals certain rights of speech and petition in privately owned shopping centers-an
example of constitutional rights asserted by one "private individual" against another,
without any explicit consideration of state action, in state constitutional law); Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980).

288

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 48:247

also particularly fragile.'" 4 If a new balance is to be struck on the
manifold facts of each case, the result in any future speech decision
(and consequently the future extent of protection of speech) will be
particularly difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the sort of stabilizing
principles that may ultimately emerge in the course of common-law
adjudication from a number of decisions employing ad hoc balancing may be somewhat slow to develop in a system in which stare
decisis and the hierarchical authority of courts is not so well established as it is under Anglo-American doctrine." 5 The resulting uncertainty may have the effect of discouraging the expression
of
3 6
opinions that are indeed constitutionally protected.'
It is concerns of this general sort that presumably have led the
Supreme Court of the United States to reject the techniques of ad
hoc balancing-techniques like those of the Li'th case-in many areas of first amendment adjudication."3 7 Instead, the Court has fre134. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (first amendment rights are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society.").
135. For an example of an attempt by the Constitutional Court to draw general principles from the balancing exercised under the doctrines of Ltth, see 60 BVerfGE 234, 24041 (1982) (Credit Shark Case). See also Tettinger, Der Schutz der perso'nlichen Ehre imfreien
Meinungshampf, 1983 JZ 317. Even these subsidiary principles, however, are quite general in form and do not purport to create relatively clear categories of protected or
unprotected speech. See infra text accompanying notes 137-138. They remain principles
that must be taken into account in the course of a more comprehensive balancing.
136. For a similar argument in American free speech doctrine, see, e.g., Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). For a debate on the
role of balancing in first amendment theory, see Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance,
71 YALE LJ. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in
the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962) [hereinafter Meaning of First Amendment]; Frantz,
Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963);
Mendelson, The FirstAmendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L.
REV. 479 (1964) [hereinafter Reply to Frantz].
The uncertainties of balancing also have raised concern in the German literature,
but the proposed solutions have not always been particularly favorable to speech interests. See E. STEINDORFF, PERS6NLICHKErrsSCHtrrz IM ZIVILRECHT 20 (1983) (suggesting
that balancing should be replaced, in part, by an absolute protection of "core" personality interests opposed to speech); Tettinger, supra note 135, at 325 (expressing concern
that interests of personality may be accorded insufficient weight when balanced against
speech interests). See also Brandner, supra note 106; W. GEitER, supra note 34, at 40-4 1;
Klein, supra note 116, at 154-55; Herzog, in MAUNZ-DURIG, supra note 66, art. 5, §§ 1, 2,
at No. 259-60.
137. The Court has generally rejected ad hoc balancing when the question is whether
speech of a particular content is protected against governmental regulation. The Court

does engage in ad hoc balancing, however, when adjudicating cases that do not involve
the government's regulation of the content of speech but rather regulation of the time,
place, or circumstances of speech. See e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
The Court has also employed ad hoc balancing in reviewing regulations of the content
of speech in certain special areas. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (speech of public employees); United
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quently adopted the technique of "categorization," through which it
attempts to define with as much clarity as possible certain relatively
narrow areas of unprotected speech and finds that most speech that
does not fall into these categories is constitutionally protected. ,3
This technique is employed in an attempt to achieve a substantial
measure of clarity and predictability in first amendment adjudication
and consequently to restrain the chilling effect that may arise when
the scope of constitutional protection cannot readily be predicted in
advance-a problem that is often present when a court employs ad
hoc balancing.
To illustrate the difference between the two techniques, the
opinion in Ldith can be compared with the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ,139 a
case in which black residents of a Mississippi town organized a boycott against local merchants in order to achieve equal treatment in
the community. The boycott in Claiborne appeared to have been
much more effective than the boycott sought by Liuth, but the
speech and organizational activity engaged in by the defendants in
Claiborne were held to be constitutionally protected. In a tort action
brought by the merchants, the Court found that the various forms of
speech and association engaged in by the organizers of the boycott
were covered by the first amendment and did not fall into any unprotected category. Only those forms of speech that involved advocacy of imminent violent action-when such action actually was
imminent-fell into a category of unprotected expression and could
thus be subject to liability;' 4 ° political association was also protected, unless the group was directed toward violent action and individual members specifically intended to achieve that end. 4 ' The
14 2
Court found, however, that no such activity had been shown.
The minute weighing of countervailing interests, such as that undertaken in Ltth, was not present in the Claiborne case.
Reliance on an ad hoc balancing technique to protect speech
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (action as symbolic speech). See generally Bogen,
Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REV. 387 (1979).

For explicit rejection of ad hoc

balancing as a permissible first amendment technique in libel actions, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S, 323, 343-44 (1974).
138. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). For an important exam-

ple of this technique, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
139. 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
140. 458 U.S. at 927-28 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
14 I.Id. at 908-09, 918-20.
142. See id. at 924-25, 928.
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may evoke the added danger that balancing can be felt by the judiciary to be a fundamentally unjudicial form of operation-unjudicial
because it does not call for the elaboration and application of something that looks like a rule. Rather it may appear to call upon the
judiciary for the sort ofjudgment, uncabined by principle, that legislatures and executives are often thought better equipped to perform
than courts. This view of constitutional balancing may lead to a lack
of confidence on the part of the judiciary and a reluctance to assert
that a constitutional right elaborated through balancing rather than
the working out of a guiding rule should prevail over ordinary
law. 143 This reluctance also may be apparent even when constitutional balancing is applied to private law adjudication which may itself sometimes require the balancing of countervailing private
rights. To judges brought up in the tradition of the private law, the
weighing of countervailing private rights may seem to involve balancing of a more limited and familiar kind than the weighing of
more capacious public interests required in constitutional balancing. The elaboration of balancing tests instead of categorical rules
in constitutional law therefore may sometimes lead to a reluctance
to apply constitutional doctrine vigorously in private law cases. This
reluctance may be particularly marked when a relatively new constitutional value confronts a more traditional value long protected by
the ordinary law. It is to this sort of problem that we now turn.
III.
A.

THE MEPHIsTO CASE

Artistic Endeavor and the Rights of Personality

In retrospect, with its significant discounting of private law values and its manifest willingness to engage in careful appellate review to protect constitutional rights of expression, the Court's
opinion in Lih can be seen as a relatively strong assertion of constitutional values over the traditional values of the ordinary law. By
insisting, however, that the matter remained in form and substance
a dispute of private law, the Court acknowledged a permanent state
of tension which contained the seed of a re-emergence of those
traditional values. In light of the historical importance of private
law in the German legal tradition perhaps it was to be expected that
such a move would not be long in coming; it came in the famous
143. Cf., e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (remitting "[primary responsibility" for the weighing of speech and national
security interests to Congress).
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Mephisto case decided in 197 1. 4 4 In this case the re-assertion of private law took two forms: first, certain traditional legal values that
can limit expression-values long protected in the ordinary lawwere accorded very significant weight as an independent constitutional right; and, second, the Constitutional Court sharply limited
its scope of review in private law cases.
As was also true of Ltth, the Mephisto case had its roots in the
history of the Nazi period. In the 1920s Klaus Mann, son of the
great writer Thomas Mann, befriended a young actor by the name of
Gustaf Griindgens. Griindgens eventually married Klaus Mann's
sister, although the marriage was short-lived. With Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the Mann family was forced to leave Germany. Gruindgens remained and continued his rise to fame as an
actor in Hamburg and Berlin. Ultimately, he was appointed director
of the Prussian State Theatre as prot6g6 of Hermann G6ring, commandant of the Luftwaffe and amateur of the arts. Griindgens' most
famous role was that of Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust.' 4 5
In 1936 Klaus Mann completed a novel entitled Mephisto, Portrait of a Career. Published in Amsterdam by an 6migr6 press, the
novel portrayed the rise of an actor, Hendrik Hofgen, whose life
history was clearly modeled on that of Griindgens. Writing in later
memoirs, Mann explained that although the portrait of H6fgen was
based on the external facts of Grindgens' life, it was intended to
depict a general type of opportunist intellectual in the Third Reich
rather than to portray Griindgens as a specific individual.' 4 6 In
1963 a West German firm announced plans to publish Mephisto in
the Federal Republic of Germany. Griundgens died in the same
year, but his adopted son and heir filed an action under the Civil
4 7
Code, seeking an injunction against publication of the book.1
144. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971). For examples of the prolific commentary on this case,
see, e.g., Rupp, Zum ".Mephisto Beschluss" des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. 1972 DVBI 66;
Schwabe, Anmerkung, 1971 DVBI 689.
145. See S. MELCHINGER, R. CLAUSEN & G. GRUNDGENS, GRUNDGENS FAUST (1982).

146. 30 BVerfGE at 175-76; see K.

MANN, DER WENDEPUNKT:

EIN LEBENSBERICHT

383-

85 (1981). For Mann's comments on Griindgens as a young actor in the 1920s, see id. at

186-90.
147. Griindgens' heir proceeded under BGB § 823(l), a general tort provision that
provides a civil remedy against any person who "intentionally or negligently infringes
on the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another person, in a manner contrary to law." See supra text accompanying note 95 and infra Appendix at p. 348.
Prior to Mephisto, the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) had found that the right of "personality"-allegedly infringed by Mann's novel-was an "other right of another" within
the meaning of BGB § 823(l). See 50 BGHZ 133, 143 (1968) (and cases cited therein);
supra note 106. For a general analysis of BGB § 823(l), see H. K6TZ, supra note 18, at
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At the outset of the action a lower court issued a preliminary
injunction and, in response, the publisher of Mephisto appended a
brief foreword which included Mann's statement-taken from the
original 1936 edition-that "all characters in this book represent
[general] types, not portraits."' 4 8 In subsequent proceedings, however, a state supreme court and the Federal Supreme Court (BGH)
found that the prefatory disclaimer was insufficient and prohibited
further publication of the work.' 4 ' The courts found that although
the general portrait was clearly that of Griindgens, Mann had inserted certain fictitious events, and the reader's probable imputation
of these generally discreditable incidents to Griindgens would injure his continuing reputation.-'5
The courts rejected the publisher's argument that the work was protected by article 5, section 3
of the Basic Law, which contains an explicit guarantee of the freedom of artistic endeavor.' 5
In a decision upholding the injunction, the Constitutional
Court undertook its first major interpretation of the guarantee of
artistic freedom set forth in article 5, section 3 of the Basic Law. In
the structure of the Basic Law, this guarantee is set apart from article 5, section 1, which protects free expression of "opinion"-an
indication that the drafters considered the values of artistic endeavor to be separable from the values inherent in other forms of
protected expression. According to the Court, the main function of
section 3 is to protect the autonomy of the artistic process against all
incursions by the state. The Court also noted that the guarantee of
artistic freedom protects not only the process of artistic creation but
38-83; for a comparison of BGB § 823(1) with BGB § 826, the general clause at issue in
Luth, see id. at 90-91.
148. 30 BVerfGE 173, 177 (1971). Because Klaus Mann had committed suicide in
1949, the publisher of Alephislo was the only defendant in the action commenced by
Griindgens' heir. The difficulty of finding a publisher for Mephisto in West Germany had
clouded the final months of Mann's life. For the problems encountered in attempting to
publish the novel, see K. MANN, BRIEFE UND ANrwORTEN 1922-1949, at 614 (M. GregorDellin ed. 1987); 2 E. MANN, BRIEFE UND ANTWORTEN 118-68 (A. Prestel ed. 1985). See
generally E. SPANGENBERG. KARRIERE EINES ROMANS (1984).
149. See 50 BGHZ 133 (1968) (opinion of BGH in AMephisto).

For the hierarchy of

courts through which a civil action must ordinarily proceed before it can reach the Constitutional Court, see supra note 20.
150. The lower courts found that if Mann had invented discreditable incidents, it was
incumbent upon him to avoid making the general portrait recognizable as Griindgens.
The courts focused particularly on a description of Hofgen's "conduct toward a dancer
with whom Hofgen carried on a long-standing relationship and whom H6fgen perfidiously caused the Gestapo to imprison and deport when she became dangerous to his
career." 30 BVerfGE at 179-8 1. There was apparently no indication that a similar event
had occurred in Grihndgens' life.
151. "Art and scholarship, research and teaching are free." GG art. 5, § 3.
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also the process of distribution and publication. 52 Because all parties agreed that Klaus Mann's novel was a work of art, the work was
covered by this guarantee
and the publishers of the work also en53
joyed its protection.
Because Mephisto was a work of art, the plaintiff faced a major
problem because the provisions of article 5, section 3 of the Basic
Law seem to guarantee artistic production without qualification. It
is true, of course, that article 5 does contain some qualifications of
the rights of expression, but these qualifications appear to limit the
rights of section 1 only, and not the rights of section 3. As discussed
in Ltith, article 5, section 2 of the Basic Law subjects the rights of
free expression of opinion-article 5, section 1-to the limits found
"in the rules of the general laws." Article 5, section 2, also qualifies
these rights of expression by "statutory provisions for the protection of youth" and by "the right of personal honor."' 5 4 The latter
limitation-which refers to the law of defamation in general-might
seem particularly applicable to the problem of Mephisto.
In its opinion in Mephisto, however, the Constitutional Court
confirmed that the language of article 5, section 2, imposes limits on
152. 30 BVerfGE 173, 189 (1971). On the distinction between the process of artistic
creation (Werkbereich) and the process of distribution to the public (Wirkbereich), see
Miller, Strafrecht, Jugendschutz und Freiheit der Kunst, 1970 JZ 87.
153. Although all parties in Mephisto agreed that Mann's novel was a work of art, in
other contexts the question of whether a writing or other production qualifies as "art"
under GG art. 5, § 3, is sharply disputed, and the use of this problematic term in the
Basic Law has given rise to elaborate doctrinal discussions. See, e.g., I Entscheidungen
des Bundesverwahungsgerichts IBVerwGE] 303 (1954) (Stinderin); Arndt, Umwelt und
Recht: Die Kunst in Rechl, 1966 NJW 26-28.

For a recent analysis of the problems raised by the definition of "art" under the
Basic Law, see Henschel, Zum Kunstbeg7ihffdes Grundgesetzes, in FESTSCHRtvr FUR RUDOLF
WASSERMANN 351 (C. Broda ed. 1985). See also, e.g., Schick, Der verfassungsrechtliche Begrif

des Kunstwerks, 1970JZ 645 (arguing that courts should defer to experts in determining
what qualifies as "art" under GG art. 5, § 3); Miller, supra note 152, at 89 (work should
be considered "art" if it possesses typical "formal" characteristics of a work of art, regardless of its quality); Z6beley, Zur Garantie der Kunstfreiheit in der gerichtlichenPraxis, 1985

NJW 254 (distinguishing three general methods of determining whether material qualifies as art).
For recent statements by the Constitutional Court on the protection of artistic freedom, see 67 BVerfGE 213 (1984) (Anachronistic Parade) (traveling street-theater production based on Brecht poem is "art" under GG art. 5, § 3); 1984 NJW 1293 (Preliminary
Committee decision) (Sprayer of Zurich) (the spraying of designs-which otherwise
might be "art"--on the walls of buildings owned by others is not protected by GG art. 5,
§ 3). See also 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987); 84 BGHZ 237 (1982) (political satire as art). For a
discussion of the fascinating problems raised by the Sprayer case-involving a collision of
the basic rights of artistic freedom and property-see Hoffmann, Kunstfreiheit und
Sacheigentum, 1985 NJW 237. See also supra note 133.
154. See infra Appendix at p. 348.
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section 1 alone, and does not limit the artistic freedom guaranteed
by section 3. Thus, according to the Court, "art, in its independence and autonomy, is protected in article 5 section 3 without reservation."' 5 5 In this connection, moreover, the integrity of the work
of art must be respected; it is impermissible to extract certain portions of the work and call them "expressions of opinion" under section 1, thus subjecting them to the limitations of section 2.156 The
result of the Court's interpretation in Mephisto, therefore, is that artistic endeavor may enjoy greater protection than political speech
(and other expressions of opinion) because art is not limited by the
"general laws" that can limit expressions of opinion.'
The Court's decision that the guarantees of article 5, section 3
of the Basic Law are not limited by section 2 did not, however, require a finding in favor of publication of the novel.. Although the
155. 30 BVerfGE at 191. The Court traced this special protection of art to the severe
repression of artists during the Nazi period. Id. at 192. The Court's explanation curiously ignores the fact that political speech and other "expressions of opinion" were
subjected to restrictions of at least equal stringency under the Nazi dictatorship.
156. Id. at 191.
157. The Weimar Constitution also contained guarantees of art and learning that
were not restricted by the "general laws" which could limit expressions of opinion. Compare WRV art. 118(l) (expressions of opinion), with WRV art. 142 (protection of art and
scholarship); see generally I BVerwGE 303 (1954) (Stinderin). This apparent preference
for art over expression of opinion, including political speech, may reflect a history in
which artistic endeavor has generally been prized and political activity often regarded
with some disdain. Such a view contrasts with American first amendment doctrine,
which clearly places expressions of opinion on political affairs and other "matters of
public concern" at the core of protected speech. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (opinion of Powell,J.); Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982). Indeed, American commentators have sometimes
encountered difficulty in justifying the extension of first amendment protections to
works of art at all. Compare, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), with Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245. The preference for artistic over political endeavor, suggested by the structure
of GG art. 5, seems consistent with the elaboration of a strong right of personality under
GG arts. 1, 2, which can in many instances outweigh the values of public speech, see supra
text accompanying notes 104-106 and infra notes 170-180; in both developments the
inner life of the individual is emphasized in a manner that can place the public and the
political in a secondary role. On the other hand, the Court's emphasis in Lth on the
"fundamental" or "constitutive" importance of political speech in a democracy, see supra
note 118 and accompanying text, may indicate a hierarchy of speech values rather different from that suggested by the text of GG art. 5.
In an interesting reprise of an argument that was apparently put to rest in Luith, see
supra text accompanying notes 22-3 1, the plaintiff in Mephisto argued that GG art. 5, § 3,
applied only against the state, and therefore could not protect an artist in an action of
private law filed by another individual. Following the general doctrine of Ltith, however,
the BGH found that GG art. 5, § 3, incorporated a basic value of the constitution and
consequently was applicable in private law through the general clauses of the BGB. See
50 BGHZ 133, 144-45 (2d ed. 1968).
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rights of artistic freedom could not be limited by the "general laws,"
it did not follow that artistic freedom was completely without limit.
The Court stated that the guarantee of artistic freedom must be
seen as only one constitutional guarantee in a larger constitutional
setting. If there are other constitutional guarantees that conflict with
artistic expression, the protection of artistic expression ma; be limited to some extent by those countervailing constitutional
guarantees.' 58
The Court found such a countervailing constitutional guarantee-in effect, a constitutional right of an individual not to be libeled-in the guarantee of human dignity contained in article 1,
section 1 of the Basic Law.' 5 9 As we have seen, a line of cases in the
BGH and other courts had found that certain rights of personalityincluding rights of reputation-are protected by the guarantee of
human dignity in article 1, section 1 (and by the right of free development of the personality in article 2, section 1), and this constitutional protection is not only applicable against the state but also
applies in a manner that limits the rights of other individuals in the
relationships of private law.' 60 In Mephisto the Constitutional Court
found that a right of reputation traditionally invoked in the law of
defamation falls within this constitutional protection of human dignity. The Court noted that a work of art has an effect in real life and
that it may consequently have a deleterious impact on the personality rights of others.' 6' It was this countervailing constitutional guarantee of personality, therefore, that could have the effect of limiting
artistic expression.
The Court concluded that if a work of art threatens human dignity by using (or misusing) details of an individual's life history, the
Basic Law may require that the protection of personality be given
greater weight than the guarantee of artistic expression. The decision of which competing constitutional protection should prevail
can be determined only "through a weighing of all the circumstances of the individual case."' 6 2 Even without applying the limita158. 30 BVerfGE 173, 193 (1971).
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 101-111.
161. 30 BVerfGE at 193-94.
162. Id. at 195. In the course of this balancing the court should take into account the
extent to which the author has drawn a portrait of a specific individual from real life and,
if the court finds that such a portrait has been drawn, it must then consider the extent to
which "falsifications" of the recognizable person's life story have injured that person's
reputation or memory. Id.
The Court also noted that the constitutional protection of human dignity does not
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tions of article 5, section 2 of the Basic Law, therefore, the Court
found that the rights of artistic freedom are subject to a form of
constitutional balancing similar to that required under section 2 by
the opinion in Lith. The apparent difference between rights arising
under article 5, section 1, and those arising under section 3 is that in
section 3 the balance may only be struck between artistic freedom
and a countervailing constitutionalinterest-not between artistic freedom and those "general laws" that represent community or individ63
ual interests not rising to constitutional status.1
In private law disputes, however, even that distinction may be
more apparent than real. In private law disputes the "general laws"
that can be asserted as limits on expressions of opinion under article
5, section -but apparently not as limits on artistic freedom under
section 3-are laws that often can be viewed as protecting important
personal interests. Given the very general nature of constitutional
provisions such as the guarantee of "human dignity" and the "free
development of the personality," such personal interests often can
be viewed-if the court so desires and if the underlying legal tradition is hospitable to such a result-as protected aspects of those
general constitutional guarantees. As a result, broad constitutional
provisions can be employed to elevate personal interests-in some
cases interests resembling those traditionally protected by the private law-to the status of constitutional values that may counter the
constitutional interest in artistic endeavor. o 4
In private law matters, therefore, there is always the possibility
that a "general law" asserted as a limit on expression can be seen
not only as a general law under article 5, section 2 of the Basic Law,
end with the death of the individual concerned-a point of importance in Mephisto because of Gruindgens' death shortly after the commencement of the action. See supra text
accompanying note 147; 30 BVerfGE at 194; see also id. at 196; 50 BGHZ 133, 138-39
(1968). The Court added, however, that this protection diminishes as the public's recollection of the deceased individual fades. In the balancing required by zMlephisto, therefore, less weight is to be given to the "human dignity" of a deceased individual as more
time elapses from the individual's death.
For a general discussion of the rights of personality after death in German law, see
H. HUBMANN, supra note 19, at 265-68, 340-48. See also P. SCHWERDTNER, supra note 105,
at 106-17. American doctrine ordinarily denies recovery for defamation of a person who
is dead when the statements are made; under some state survival statutes, however, the
libel action of a living person may not necessarily abate upon that person's death. See 2
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAw OF TORTS 44-45 (2d ed. 1986).
163. See 30 BVerfGE 173, 193 (1971).
164. See Lerche, Schranken der Kunstfreiheit, 1973 AFP 496, 499 (there is hardly any
clearly relevant interest that cannot be assigned a constitutional status); Schwabe, supra
note 144, at 689 ("[F]or all really important legal interests a constitutional underpinning can easily be proved.").
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but also as a law that asserts or represents a countervailing constitutional interest-an aspect of human dignity or personality that will
limit the rights of section 3 as well. Moreover, if that is the case, a
"general law" protecting that interest would certainly be a more
1 than it would be if not
powerful counterweight in limiting section
16 5
values.
constitutional
further
to
found
If the court employs a broad constitutional provision to incorporate a value of the ordinary law, this technique may have the effect
of limiting constitutional rights of expression by re-casting countervailing personal interests in constitutional form. As we have seen,
an attempt of this sort had been made in Luth and rejected by the
Court. In Dith, Harlan argued that the continued exercise of his
profession was endangered by LUth's call for a boycott and that this
interest was a constitutionally protected aspect of his human dignity.
Because his professional interest was a constitutional interest,
Harlan argued, that interest should limit Liuth's constitutional interest in speech. The Court rejected the argument on the ground that
Harlan could show no infringement of his human dignity unless he
possibility that
was completely excluded from his profession-a
66
seemed remote under the circumstances.1
In Mephisto, in contrast, the Court followed a line of doctrine
developed in the BGH, and found that a personal value similar to
the value represented in the ordinary law of defamation is a constitutionally protected aspect of human dignity. "It would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of human
dignity, which is the foundation of all Basic Rights, . . . if an individ-

ual's general claim to the respect of others could be degraded or
abased, even after his death."' 6 7 Thus, in this manner, a personal
interest confronting constitutionally protected speech was incorporated in the capacious protection of human dignity and thereby
granted the status of a constitutional right. As such, the protection
against defamation was entitled to a powerful limiting effect on the
constitutional values of artistic expression.' 68 As discussed further
165. See 34 BVerfGE 269, 282 (1973) (Soraya) ("The potential strength of the general
law receives a constitutional strengthening" from the impact of GG arts. I and 2); see also

35 BVerfGE 202, 225 (1973) (Lebach).
166. See supra text accompanying note 132. The Court also ignored the possibility
that Harlan's apparent private law interest also might be protected under the more specific provisions of GG art. 5, § 1, or GG art. 12. See supra note 132.
167. 30 BVerfGE 173, 194 (1971).
168. As noted above, the "right of personal honor"--the right protected by the laws
of libel-also receives constitutional acknowledgment in GG art. 5, § 2, in which it is
specifically mentioned as a limitation on the free speech fights of GG art. 5,§ I. See supra
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below, the Court found that the question of which constitutional interest should prevail could be answered only through a process of
balancing in each individual case.' 6 9
Following Mephisto, the technique of developing and elaborattext accompanying note 154. This portion of GG art. 5, § 2, apparently refers, however,
to a "right" that exists only to the extent that it is reflected in statutory law, see 33
BVerfGE 1, 17 (1972), and does not purport to create an independent basic right. In
any event, the Mephisto case involved rights of artistic.expression protected by GG art. 5,
§ 3, which, as the Court found, is not limited by the "right of personal honor" or any
other part of § 2. See supra text accompanying note 155.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 162-163; infra text accompanying notes 181186.
The Court's finding that the right of artistic expression under GG art. 5, § 3, is not
subject to the limitations of GG art. 5, § 2, raises questions about the treatment of arguably artistic material that may contravene other legal norms. GG art. 5, § 2, for example, restricts certain sexually explicit material covered by "statutory provisions for the
protection of youth," see 30 BVerfGE 336 (1971); under the principles of Mephisto, however, that limitation applies to the guarantees of GG art. 5, § I,only, and not to the
protection of art contained in GG art. 5,§ 3. Absolute protection for artistic endeavor
under GG art. 5, § 3, might therefore prohibit regulation of this material.
Some courts have met this argument by finding that certain publications "dangerous to youth" are not works of art and therefore are not entitled to the protections of
GG art. 5, § 3. See Meyer-Cording, Das literarische Portrait und die Freiheit der Kunst, 1976JZ

737, 744; see also 39 BVerwGE 197 (1971). In a somewhat different argument-an argument that recalls the Court's opinion in Mephisto-some commentators have asserted
that these publications threaten the "right of personality" of minors and that laws for
the "protection of youth" safeguard this constitutionally guaranteed right. Since under
Mephisto a countervailing constitutional interest can limit the otherwise unrestricted right
of artistic expression, this argument would permit regulation of even those works that
qualify as works of art, if the threat posed to the personality of minors "outweighs" the
protections of GG art. 5, § 3, under the specific circumstances. Thus, what may seem to
be general societal values can be recast as constitutionally protected interests, with the
result that further limitations are imposed on the "absolute" values of GG art. 5, § 3.
Indeed this technique goes one step beyond the technique of Alephisto because here the
countervailing constitutional interest (supposedly of the minors) is asserted by the state
rather than by the individuals to whom the constitutional protection is said to be due.
See generally Meyer-Cording, supra; Scholz, in MAUNz-DUaRIG, supra note 66, art. 5, § 3, No.
70 (arguing that GG art. 6-protection of family and children-also can limit artistic
freedom).
A similar question is raised by works of art that are thought to be "subversive."
Although general laws directed at seditious speech may limit the freedom of expression
of opinion under GG art. 5, § i, the Mephisto case makes clear that "general laws" will
not limit works of art protected by GG art. 5, § 3. In this area, however, the Constitutional 'Court has employed a technique similar to that of Mephisto in order to suggest
that, here also, some limitation of artistic expression may be possible. According to the
Court, the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and its "free democratic basic
order" are values of constitutional rank, which can prevail over artistic freedom if the
effect of a work of art on an average viewer or reader would create a direct and present
danger to the existence of the Federal Republic and its basic order. See 33 BVerfGE 52,
70-71 (1972) (The Laughing Man) (dictum). This approach goes beyond the technique of
Mfephisto (and even beyond the suggested technique for limiting material that is "dangerous to youth") because here the individual right of artistic expression is not balanced
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ing constitutionally protected rights of personality has had an important effect in imposing substantial limits on expression in the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In some instances the
constitutional right so recognized has been a right that offsets the
seemingly absolute guarantee of article 5, section 3, as in Mephisto;
in other instances it has strengthened the effect of a "general law"
limiting speech, in the balancing undertaken under article 5, sections 1 and 2.70 In this process the broad provisions of article 1
and article 2, section 1-guaranteeing "human dignity" and the
"free development of the personality"-have played a principal
role, for this language gives maximum opportunity for casting personal interests of reputation and privacy as constitutional rights of
the person affected by the speech or other expression.
Cases further developing this technique were decided by the
Constitutional Court shortly after Mephisto. In the important Lebach
case, 7 ' for example, the Court prohibited the showing of a documentary television film describing-with apparent accuracy-the
planning of a famous robbery of an army munitions depot which
resulted in the deaths of four soldiers. The Court found that the
privacy right of a convicted accessory to the offense-who was soon
to be released from prison-overrode the article 5, section 1 rights
of the television station in depicting this well-known event of recent
history. In the documentary film the accessory was referred to by
name, and the Court found that his chances of successful reintegration in the community would be threatened if the film were shown in
that form-particularly in light of the fact that references to homosexual relationships among the conspirators figured prominently in
the script. Important in the Court's decision was its finding that the
prisoner's rights of personality under articles 1 and 2 of the Basic
Law included a right of "informational self-determination"-a right
"exclusively [to] determine whether and to what extent others might
be permitted to portray his life story in general, or certain events
against an individual right of human dignity or personality, but rather against an asserted community right of governmental "self-preservation."
In light of these developments, it appears that courts and commentators come quite
close to imposing on the supposedly unrestricted right of artistic expression many of the
limitations actually imposed by the general laws under GG art. 5, § 2-even though § 2
is, in constitutional theory, not applicable for the purposes of restricting artistic expression. See Lerche, supra note 164, at 499.
170. See, e.g., 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973) (Soraya), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 101-112; 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973) (Lebach), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 171-176.
171. 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973); for an English translation, see B. MARKESINIS, supra note
104, at 205-13.
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from his life."' 72 It was this constitutional right that was to be balanced against the broadcaster's article 5, section 1 rights of free reporting. After a detailed consideration of the facts, the Court found
that the complainant's right of personality outweighed the broadcaster's right of free reporting under the specific circumstances of
3

the case.17

It is worth emphasizing that in Lebach the right of personality
was construed to require the prohibition of a television production
that was not claimed to contain false statements. Rather, the Court
upheld the complainant's constitutional right to be free from certain
invasions of personality that might result even from completely accurate speech. In this case, therefore, the courts acknowledged (apparently as a matter of constitutional compulsion) a cause of action
172. 35 BVerfGE at 220. For a recent invocation of the "right of informational selfdetermination" in a public rather than a private law context, see 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983)
(Census Case), discussed infra text accompanying notes 283-286.
173. Since the decision rested in part on a general law that created a qualified right to
control one's own picture, Kunsturhebergesetz [KUG] §§ 22, 23; see generally P.
SCIIWERDTNER, supra note 105, at 218, the Lebach case is an instance of a constitutional
right strengthening the force of a general law. See 35 BVerfGE at 225.
In the balancing process undertaken in Lebach, the Court acknowledged that both of
the contending rights-the broadcasters' right of reporting and the prisoner's right of
personality-were central to the constitutional system. Id. at 225. According to the
Court, however, even an objective television report could seriously invade an individual's private sphere because of the psychological impact of television and its broad geographical range. Id. at 226-27. Moreover, the documentary form is particularly
dangerous because the film's point of view is often accepted as a representation of reality. Id. at 228-29. Indeed, viewers in the Federal Republic are generally less critical in
their acceptance of television than of other mass media. Id. at 229. On the other hand,
while contemporary reports of crimes have great value, id. at 231, after a period of time
has elapsed this interest becomes less pressing. id. at 233-34. Moreover, with the passage of time a prisoner's interest in resocialization after release from prison increases.
Id. at 235-36. In sum, the documentary, which was to be broadcast a few years after the
offense occurred, would unduly impair the prisoner's chances of resocialization. Id. at
235-44. The television station's position as a quasi-public enterprise also may have
played a role in the Court's decision. Id. at 221. For an interesting discussion of some
of the factors in the Court's balancing in Lebach, see Wenzel, Anmrkungen zur LebachEntscheidung des Bundesuerfassungsgerichts, 1973 ArP 432. See also E. STEINDORFE, supra note

136, at 24-25 (suggesting that the decision in Lebach should have rested on the prisoner's absolute right to be let alone); P. SCHWERDTNER, supra note 105, at 218-25 (arguing that press interests were given too much weight in Lebach).
For an even more extreme case, in which the right to control one's own picture
prevailed over rights of expression and reporting, see 1966 NJW 2353 (BGH) (prohibit-

ing use of plaintiff's picture in connection with a television report of his activities in the
Third Reich); for criticism of this decision, see Arndt, Umwelt und Recht: "Vor unserer
eigenen Tir", 1967 NJW 1845. These cases lend added weight to a recent argument in
the American literature that a "privacy" right to control information about oneself can
in reality be a right to self-misrepresentation. Posner, The Right ofPrivacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393 (1978).
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similar to that advocated by Warren and Brandeis as a matter of
common-law development-a cause of action that goes well beyond
an action for defamatory and untrue statements such as those found
to be at issue in Mfephisto. 74
It also is worth noting that, in the Lebach case, the Court went
beyond any clear parallels in the ordinary law. Whereas the offense
of defamation, generally at issue in Mephisto, was traditionally subject to sanction through the criminal and civil law,1 75 the drafters of
the Civil Code had failed to recognize any general right of personal76
ity that would ordinarily cover true statements invading privacy .
Moreover, as we have seen in the Soraya case,' 77 the German courts
have construed articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law to require the creation of a damage action to protect rights of personality against invasion by individuals-a decision that overrides explicit provisions of
78
the Civil Code.'
As the various rights of personality have been construed in the
Constitutional Court, a wide range of constitutional invasions may
result from the use of language in various forms, including press
reports. In consequence, the limiting effect of the constitutional
right of personality on expression can be substantial. Thus, Mephisto
and its successors show that the influence of the constitution on private law can work not only as a protection for speech and press in
protecting against certain forms of private actions-as in Luth. It
can also work against rights of expression by creating causes of action against the press and other speakers based on the recognition
of new constitutional interests that can be infringed by speech.
Moreover, the Lebach case suggests that in the required balancing of
the competing constitutional interests, the press sometimes can be
174. See supra note 106. If an American court were confronted with the Lebach case,
freedom of expression almost certainly would be given greater weight than it was accorded by the Constitutional Court under German doctrine. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (first amendment protects broadcast of name of
rape victim obtained from public court documents); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); but see Briscoe v. Reader's Digest, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d
34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment k.
Indeed, first amendment considerations have substantially impeded development of the
type of invasion of privacy action proposed by Warren and Brandeis. See Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law--WVere Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966);
Zimmerman, Requieinfor a Heavyweight: A Farewell to 1'arren and Brandeis s Privacy Tort, 68
L. REv. 291 (1983).

CORNELL

175. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] §§ 185-187; BGB § 823(2). See H.
at 276.
176. Id. at 53.
177. 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 101-112.

KOTZ,

supra note 18,
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cast as the more socially powerful of the two private parties, with a
correlatively reduced weight accorded to its interest." 9
In sum, one legacy of the Mephisto case was the Court's acknowledgement of the view that there in effect existed a constitutional
right not to be libeled-as a component of a broader constitutional
right to be free of invasions of personality-and that these constitutional rights could be asserted not only against the state but also
(and indeed more commonly) against individuals such as writers and
others who were engaged in the expression of opinion or artistic
expression. These rights of personality-some of which had existed
previously as components of the ordinary law-were now accorded
constitutional status. 0
B.

The Scope of ConstitutionalReview in Mephisto

The recasting of the interest in reputation as an important constitutional right was not the only indication of the re-emergence of
private law values in Mephisto. At least as significant was the judges'
finding that under the Court's balancing doctrine the weighing of
the constitutional value of expression against conflicting values was
generally to be remitted to the private law courts.' 8 ' Although the
prevailing opinion in Mephisto continued to acknowledge the influ179. See supra note 100.

180. Some commentators have pointed out that the opinion in Mephisto omits any express reference to the "indirect" effect of the constitution on private law-the doctrine
endorsed in Ltith-and have inferred that, for libel cases at least, the Court has abandoned that technique in favor of a "direct," full application of the Basic Law. Schwabe,
supra note 144. At least one scholar has seen a "direct" constitutional impact in the
creation of the constitutional right of personality by the BGH and its incorporation in
the category of an "other right of another" in BGB § 823(l). See Canaris, supra note 66,
at 208; see also supra notes 106 & 147. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court in
later decisions has reiterated language reflecting the "indirect" effect of the Basic Law in
cases like Alephisto. See 34 BVerfGE 269, 279-80 (1973) (Soraya). See also infra note 191;
Canaris, supra note 66, at 211; Wente, Informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht und absolute
Drittwirhungder Grundrechte, 1984 NJW 1446, 1447.
Professor Schwabe's position, noted above, proceeds from his more general view
that the Basic Law should have the same-"direct"-impact in public and in private law
cases because both types of cases involve the action (or wilful nonaction) of the judiciary, a public authority. See Schwabe, supra note 144. Schwabe's view of the essential
unity of constitutional application in public and private law cases-although widely discussed-remains a minority view in German constitutional doctrine. For comprehensive
statements of Schwabe's views, see J. SCHWABE, DIE SOGENANNTE DRiTrwIRMKUNG DER
GRUNDRECHTE (1971). See also J. SCHWABE, PROBLEME DER GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK
(1977).
181. See 30 BVerfGE 173, 195-99 (1971). The Court was equally divided on this portion of the decision. According to the Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG § 15), no
finding of unconstitutionality can be made by an evenly divided panel; therefore the
lower court's injunction against the publication of Alephisto was upheld. References to
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ence of article 5 of the Basic Law on disputes of private law, the
judges' description of the relationship between the Constitutional
Court and the private law courts reflected a substantial shift from
the position espoused in Ltith. Instead of engaging in the elaborate
de novo balancing undertaken in Lbith, the opinion imposed severe
limits on the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing the civil
courts' weighing of the countervailing constitutional interests. In so
doing, the prevailing opinion appeared to accord new weight to the
basic view-outlined in Lth-that even when constitutional values
are at issue, a civil action ultimately remains an action of private
law. 182
According to the prevailing opinion in Mephisto, it is the task of
the civil law judge to undertake an "evaluative weighing of the circumstances of the individual case" and to "render concrete" the
83
limits of one party's constitutional protection against the other.1
The Constitutional Court can only find a constitutional violation if
the judge below "has not recognized that a weighing of values of
countervailing Basic Rights is necessary or if his decision rests on a
fundamentally incorrect view of the Basic Rights-particularly, an incorrect view of the extent of the area protected by the Basic Right."' 8 4
If the civil law court has asserted the correct principles, the constitutional right of the losing party is not violated even if the civil judge's
balancing "might be questionable because he attributed too much
or too little weight to the interests of one or the other side.'" 8 5 In
deciding whether the rights of expression have been violated, the
Constitutional Court cannot place itself in the position of the private
law judge and undertake its own balancing of the countervailing
interests.
Under the doctrine of Mephisto, therefore, the Constitutional
Court is substantially constrained in reviewing decisions of the private law courts that have a bearing on constitutional rights. Interestingly, the language of the opinion suggests that this conclusion is
not a decision of procedure only. Rather, in the relevant passages
of the prevailing opinion, the questions of the scope of review and
of the underlying right seem to be treated as equivalent questions.
it is not only that the Constitutional Court cannot intervene to imthe "prevailing opinion" in the following discussion refer to the opinion upholding the
judgment of the courts below and prohibiting further publication of Mephisto.
182. See 30 BVerfGE at 197; supra text accompanying note 59.
183. 30 BVerfGE at 197.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id.
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pose its own balancing of the interests; rather, it appears that the
basic right is itself not violated if a civil judge, who does not appear
to have mistaken the general principles involved, weighs the interests and comes to a different conclusion than the Constitutional
Court would have reached had it weighed the interests itself.' 86 In
theory this approach could result in different conclusions in identical cases in the Constitutional Court, so long as the civil judges in
each case proceed from a correct general understanding of the constitutional principles at issue. The prevailing opinion appears to
conclude that one has a constitutional right only to the statement of
correct general principles and a plausible application of those principles to the specific case by a private law judge; one does not have a
constitutional right to any specific result.
In taking this position, the prevailing opinion rested heavily on
two cases that had been handed down after LUth. These cases shed
further light on the underlying nature of the Court's view in Mephisto. In the first case the Constitutional Court accorded substantial
deference to a Patent Court's decision that the government's disclosure of certain technical information submitted with a patent application did not violate the applicant's property rights guaranteed by
In the second decision the Court held
article 14 of the Basic Law.'
that its scope of review was quite limited in determining whether a
state court's award of support payments in a separation case was so
low that it violated the constitution.188 Although the court relied on
these decisions to justify its limited scope of review in Mephisto,
neither of these cases involved the freedom of speech or artistic expression and the patent case, particularly, involved the allocation of
contending economic interests. Substantial reliance on the doctrine
of the patent case in Mephisto suggests that the prevailing opinion
186. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 185.
187. 18 BVerfGE 85 (1964). In this case, the Constitutional Court was apparently
impressed with the difficulty of the underlying patent law and the complexity of the
technical assessments that must be undertaken in order to apply that law.
188. 22 BVerfGE 93 (1967). The complainant argued that a woman's right to equality
(GG art. 3, § 2) may require that support payments include compensation for the loss of
employment and professional development if she remained in the home during marriage; moreover, she argued, the constitutional protection of marriage (GG art. 6) could
be impaired by unduly low support payments-presumably on the ground that high
awards deter separation and divorce. 22 BVerfGE at 95. In deferring to the private law
court on these issues, the Constitutional Court noted that the appropriate level of support payments must depend on such specific circumstances as the length of the marriage, the presence of children, and the state of the labor market. The Court intimated
that such a detailed consideration must be left to the private law courts in each case. See
id. at 99.
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considered the nature of the balance to be struck in cases of artistic
freedom-and presumably in all speech cases-not to differ substantially from the balancing of any other constitutional rights (including property rights), and that a reasonable attempt to balance
the appropriate rights was all that the constitutional guarantee of
artistic freedom afforded. What appears to be ignored in this view is
the Li'th court's insistence that expression is "absolutely fundamental"-a position that might suggest the attribution of greater weight
to rights of speech than to many other rights, and would also support more careful review by the Constitutional Court in cases in89
volving rights of expression.'
Applying the deferential standard of review outlined in MKphisto, the prevailing opinion upheld the lower courts' order agaim t
publication of the novel. According to the opinion, the private law
courts had not adopted a fundamentally incorrect view of the basic
rights at issue: the ordinary courts had taken into account the imipact of the publication on Grundgens' reputation and had also given
weight to countervailing artistic values. Consequently, there was nc0
reason to reject the finding of the lower courts that a significart
group of readers would recognize Griindgens in the portrait of Hen.
drik Hofgen and that libelous details had been inserted into an
otherwise recognizable portrait. 9 ' In sum, the Constitutional
Court deferred to the balancing of the private law judges below.' 9 '
189. See supra text accompanying note 118. Although the language in Ldth assertin:
the "fundamental" or "constitutive" nature of speech refers to the expression of opin
ion (GG art. 5, § 1)rather than to artistic expression (GGart. 5, § 3), there is no indica.
tion in the opinion of the prevailing judges that the deferential review of Mephisto was to
be limited to cases involving artistic expression. Indeed, the unqualified protection afforded by GG art. 5, § 3-in contrast with the more limited provisions of GG art. 5,
§ 1-might even suggest a greater degree of constitutional review in the case of artistic
expression than in the case of certain other forms of expression. Cf. supra note 157 an
accompanying text.
190. Specifically, the Court cited what it called the "fabricated conduct of Hofge-i"
with respect to the dancer, Tebab. See supra note 150.
191. In a parallel assertion of private law values, the prevailing opinion in Meplito
also rejected the argument that a complete prohibition of publication-instead of an o -1.er
permitting publication with a more extensive explanatory foreword-was a disprc Iortionate sanction for the degree of harm caused to Griindgens' memory. Therf is a
"principle of proportionality" with constitutional rank, but the Court indicated th V the
principle is applicable in public law cases only, as a protection of the individual against
disproportionate exercises of state power. The principle does not apply in priva'( law
disputes, which involve competing interests of individuals, who are "equally-situated
subjects of the law." 30 BVerfGE 173, 199 (1971). In those disputes, the Constitu:i6nal
Court can determine only whether the sanction is so unreasonable that it violat,:. the
less demanding equality provision of GG art. 3, § I. Id. at 199-200.
Dissenting in kMephisto, Judge Stein argued that the injunction did indeed viol. t ' the
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In an important dissenting opinion' 9 2 in Mephisto, Judge Ruppvon Briinneck argued that the deferential review endorsed by the
prevailing opinion marked a sharp break from the doctrine of LIth
and subsequent cases in which the Court had undertaken its own
constitutional balancing.' 9 3 In Rupp-von Briinneck's view, the prevailing position would result in no constitutional review at all if the
lower court merely specified the applicable basic right or rights and
repeated an appropriate statement of general principles extracted
from opinions of the Constitutional Court. Rupp-von Briinneck
noted that even the patent case cited by the prevailing opinion conceded that the boundaries of the scope of constitutional review were
not fixed and that a certain latitude must be conceded to the judges
of the Constitutional Court. 9 4 Moreover, she concluded, a proper
co-sideration of Mephisto's function as a work of art would have resu'ted in a reversal of the courts below: by extracting certain portic.ns of the novel and testing them against reality the lower courts
kad failed to view the work of art as a whole and, in fact, had limited
th e absolute guarantee of article 5, section 3 of the Basic Law by the
t9 5
ir applicable limitations of section 2.
p: inciple of proportionality. Id. at 217-18. See also Schwabe, supra note 144, at 690 (arg- iing that the principle of proportionality should apply in cases like Mephisto because it
is inappropriate to distinguish between the strength of the constitutional impact in priv ite and public law); supra note 180. Indeed, in subsequent private law cases, the princi, le of proportionality has sometimes been applied as an alternative to, or along with, the
?eneral balancing technique of Ltith. See, e.g., 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973) (Lebach); see also
12 BVerfGE 143, 161 (1976) (Deutschland-Magazin) (Rupp-von Briinneck, J., dissenti.1g).

The principle of proportionality has, if anything, become even more important in
Mephisto. For general discussions of the doctrine, see Grabitz, Der Grundst z der Verhdltnismdssigkeit in der Rechtsprechungdes Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 1973 AR 568;
1Aendt, Der Garantiegehaltder Grundrechte und dos Ubermassverbot, 104 A6R 414 (1979).
92. In the last few years, dissenting opinions in the Constitutional Court have played
a ; )le similar to that of dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court of the United States.
St generally Zierlein, Erfahrungen mit dem Sondervotum beim Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1981
DC V 83. Until recently, however, the dissenting opinion was almost unknown in Germat jurisprudence and, apparently. in the civil law world generally. Dissents and other
sep- ate opinions became possible in the Constitutional Court only after they were expres,!y permitted by statute in 1970, see BVerfGG § 30(2), and separate opinions are still
not fiund in most other German courts. The number of separate opinions filed in the
Constitutional Court remains quite modest by American standards; in the period 197079,ju, ges of the Constitutional Court filed 56 separate opinions, in a total of 659 cases.
See Z'. rlein, supra, at 88-89.
193 30 BVerfGE 173, 220-21, 173 (1971).
194 According to Rupp-von Briinneck, this latitude must be exercised in accordance
with t e importance of the basic right at issue. Id. at 220.
195 Id. at 221-22. According to Rupp-von Briinneck, the unlimited protection of GG
art. 5, , 3, rests on the "maturity of the citizen"-the citizen's ability to understand that
a nov. is something other than an expression of opinion and that it is, instead, a crea.e years since
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In sum, although the prevailing opinion in Mephisto continues to
recognize the influence of constitutional rights of expression on the
private law, that opinion seems to endorse a much stronger role for
private law values confronting expression than did the Court in
Liith. First, the prevailing opinion found that the interest in freedom from defamation, long protected by the criminal and civil law,
is a constituent of the constitutional right of human dignity protected by article I of the Basic Law; accordingly, that interest has
substantial weight in the balance against rights of artistic expression. Second, a reassertion of private law values also seems evident
in the Court's withdrawal from full constitutional review in private
law cases by extending substantial deference to the results of balancing undertaken by the private law courts.
C.

Mephisto: Implications and American Contrasts

1. Deference and the "PreferredPosition. "-The importance of the
Court's decision in Mephisto-and some further implications of its
underlying theory-may perhaps be illuminated by exploring some
related points of contrast with American constitutional doctrine.
These points suggest the longer-term significance of the prevailing'
opinion in Mephisto if its view of the constitutional status of expression were to be adopted over the long run.
#
One of the most striking aspects of the Mephisto opinion is its
apparent assumption, in sharp contrast with bith, that the interest in
free expression is not significantly weightier than any other constitutional interest. Certainly, Griindgens' rather remote interest in ptsonality is found capable of outweighing Mann's rights of artisiic
expression, and the language of the opinion seems to reflect the
view that rights of speech do not hold any particularly special position. Indeed, as noted above, the crucial assertion in Lth of the
fundamental or "constitutive" nature of speech is missing in Metion of the imagination. Id. at 223-24. In this light, even if the countervailing rights of
GG art. 1, § I should create a very narrow exception to the rights of artistic freedom,
that exception should exist only when the novel is used solely as a pretext for personal
attack without another motive. That was not the case here because, whatever personal
feelings Klaus Mann harbored toward Grundgens, the book was primarily intended "to
demonstrate the inner corruption of an intellectual elite by a brutal and anti-intellectual
regime." d. at 224.
In a detailed dissent, Judge Stein also argued that the courts below had appraised
the novel as though it were an attempt at biography and therefore failed to give adequate weight to its status as a work of art. Id. at 202-14.
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phisto.' 9 6 In general, the balancing process as approved in Mephisto,
seems to reflect a return to something like the relatively modest
value accorded to interests of speech in the ordinary law.
A similar point is suggested in those passages of the prevailing
opinion that rely on the patent and alimony cases in deferring to the
balancing undertaken by the ordinary courts. 19 7 Not only is the
practical result that the effective balancing is performed by the private law courts and not by the Constitutional Court; the use of the
patent and alimony cases suggests that, with respect to the scope of
review, the status of rights of expression is not fundamentally different from that of other constitutional rights including property
rights. In the patent case, for example, the Constitutional Court deferred to an ordinary court's balancing of interests in determining
that the forced revelation of certain information, submitted with a
patent application, did not violate the applicant's property rights.' 9 8
In relying on this case the prevailing opinion did not acknowledge
that the special values of speech or artistic expression distinguished
Mephisto in any significant way from a dispute over a manufacturer's
protection of commercial information.
Accordingly, these and other passages of the opinion may resemble the view urged by some American scholars and judges in the
1950s that speech should have no "preferred position" over other
substantive constitutional rights.' 9 9 Moreover, the prevailing opinion also resembles the views of those American commentators in
that it seems to contemplate a very modest role for the Constitutional Court in actually enforcing any constitutional values, includ-

ing the value of free expression.
Yet there also are important distinctions between the issues
196. In this context, the Court's emphasis on Griindgens' rights of personality may
also be contrasted with passages in Luth in which the Court appears to show scant concern for Harlan's GG art. I rights in comparison with Liith's speech rights. See 7
BVerfGE 198, 219-21 (1958); supra text accompanying note 132. It may be possible,
however, to view the Court's position in M'ephisto as assuming that speech rights deserve
a special place but countervailing rights of personality also deserve a similar special role.
197, See supra text accompanying notes 187-189.
198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
199. For American opinions of the 1950s subjecting rights of speech to a test of rationality not significantly different from the test ordinarily used to adjudicate economic
rights, see Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). On the
"preferred position" question, compare Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428
(1956) (Frankfurter, J.) ("no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference"), with Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979).
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raised in Mephisto and American discussions of the general status of
first amendment rights. At the core of the "preferred position" debate-and other American debates about the general status of free
expression-has ordinarily been a dispute about the relative power
of the judiciary and the legislature. "Majoritarian" justices like Frankfurter resisted a "preferred position" for speech because they were
reluctant to elevate the power of an unelected judiciary over that of
the representative branch in any constitutional area, including
speech.2 0 0 The prevailing opinion in Mephisto, in contrast, assumes
that in private law disputes constitutional balancing will necessarily
have to be undertaken by courts in any event. The question was
which court or courts would have primary authority in striking the balance: would the Constitutional Court have primary authority because private law is profoundly influenced by the basic rights, or
would the private law courts have primary authority because after
the constitutional "influence" is accounted for, the dispute remains
a dispute of private law. Under the Basic Law, therefore, the issue
does not primarily concern the relationship between the judiciary
and the representative legislature, but rather the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary private law
courts. °0' The prevailing opinion in Mephisto suggested that in balancing constitutional rights relating to speech, the Constitutional
Court should not have any greater power over the ordinary courts
than it has in balancing other constitutional interests-and, indeed,
200. In the decades before the New Deal crisis, jurists such as Frankfurter vigorously
argued that the unelected judiciary should defer to the democratic legislature on questions of economic regulation. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: ExTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITTrrIoN (P. Kurland ed. 1970)
[hereinafter P. Kurland]. When the Supreme Court ultimately accepted that position in
the late 1930s, some theorists concluded that democratic theory also required deference
to the legislature in many cases involving speech and other "personal" rights. Seegenerally Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 696
(1946); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 11-42 (1970). The
famous Carolene Products footnote, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 nA (1938), was an attempt to distinguish between disfavored economic rights and
certain rights of representation and equality that might enjoy more comprehensive judicial protection.
201. See Ossenbiihl, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarheit, in FESTSCHRIFT F0R
H.P. IPSEN 129 (R. St6dter & W. Thieme eds. 1977); K. SCHLAICH, supra note 2, at 150.
Of course, the "private law" that is being interpreted and applied by the ordinary courts
is derived from the provisions of a statute, the Civil Code. Yet what is ordinarily at issue
in these cases is the interpretation of very general provisions whose precise meaning has
been filled in by interpretation of the ordinary courts, rather than by any clear legislative
choice. Thus, in most cases of private law, the doctrine that is affected by the "influence" of the Basic Law is doctrine that has been elaborated by the ordinary courts rather
than by explicit legislative decision.
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that the Constitutional Court should not in any instance have substantial power over the ordinary courts in actually determining the
outcome of cases in which constitutional interests must be balanced.
Because deference here is basically deference to the judges of the
ordinary courts and not to the legislature, the justification for deference in cases like Mephisto cannot easily be traced back to
majoritarian concerns of legislative supremacy, such as those that
animated the views of Justice Frankfurter.2 0 2
Moreover, deference to the ordinary courts cannot rest on concerns of federalism-a consideration that has sometimes been urged
in arguments for more deferential Supreme Court review of state
court findings in American free speech cases.2 0 3 Although the lower
courts in Germany are perforce state courts-because there are no
lower federal courts-the underlying private law is generally federal
rather than state law. The great German codes, the Civil, Criminal
and Commercial Codes and the procedural codes, are products of
federal law. Consequently, there is no specific policy of the individual states that competes with the overriding policies of federal constitutional law in the ordinary private law case; any competing
private law values are also values of federal law. 20 4
2. Primacy of Principleor Primacy of Result.-The failure of these
justifications for deferential constitutional review-justifications
based on considerations of legislative supremacy or federalismraises the important question of exactly what it is that justifies the
measure of deference to the ordinary courts adopted by the prevailing opinion in Mephisto. One intriguing possibility is that this measure of deference should not be seen as extraordinary or, properly
viewed, as deference at all. This brings us to a second point of contrast between German and American doctrine. It is possible that the
202. See supra notes 199-200.
203. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496-508 (1957) (Harlan,J.); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288-95 (1952) (Jackson.J., dissenting). See Kalven, The New York
Times Case: A Note on "'TheCentral MWeaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191,

218-19.
Interestingly, justifications for the American state action doctrine also have rested
in part on considerations of federalism. See, e.g., Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the
State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 174 (1980) (state action doctrine, by excluding the
federal constitution and federal courts from many relationships between individuals, remits the regulation of those relationships to the states). See also The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
204. Moreover, to the extent that the Constitutional Court reviews the work of the
Federal Supreme Court in private law matters, see supra note 20, it is reviewing the work
of a federal rather than a state court.

1989]

GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

striking abnegation that an American reader sees in the prevailing
opinion in Mephisto-a position that declines to review the result of
constitutional balancing by a private law court if that court has correctly stated the applicable constitutional principles-may reflect a
distinction between general principle and individual case that is
viewed rather differently in civil law and in common-law theory. Indeed, what seems to be an extraordinary lack of concern about the
decision in the individual case (from an American point of view) may
not seem so remarkable in a civil law system. It may be that the Civil
law doctrine, with its emphasis on general rules set forth in codes
(and in the works of academic commentators), and its relative lack of
interest in the results of specific cases, reflects the view that general
principles have an existence that is independent of their "application" in the individual case. The implicit common-law view-in
which general principles are extracted from decisions in specific
cases-seems to reflect the basic position that there is no intelligible
general principle without a series of specific instances that in fact
define the principle.20 5 In the continental view, in contrast, maintenance of the general principle in the abstract may seem to some to
be the most important thing;20 6 therefore, as long as the general
statement of the principle is maintained, and the result is not too
extreme, the result in the individual case may perhaps not be viewed
as affecting the existence of the principle. In Anglo-American theory, on the other hand, each new "application" of the principle in a
specific case alters-whether substantially or only subtly-the meaning of the principle itself. The position of the prevailing opinion in
Mephisto-in which the Constitutional Court refrains from reviewing
the result below if the private law court states (and appears to apply)
the correct constitutional principle-may therefore rest on the unar205. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 2 (1960). See also Holmes, Codes, and
the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. I (1870) ("It is the merit of the common law that
it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards."); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 528 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Since the significance of
every expression of thought derives from the circumstances evoking it, results reached
rather than language employed give the vital meaning.").
206. See, e.g., FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT. supra note 23, at 4-5 ("[Flor the Civil lawyer
the rules logically precede the solutions .. . Law is still seen as a system, complete and
intellectually coherent, composed of substantive rules."). See also J. MERRYMAN, supra
note 3, at 61-67; Cooper, The Common and The Civil Law-A Scot's View, 63 HARv. L. REV.
468, 471 (1950); Watson, supra note 69 at 1128. Nonetheless it seems clear that these
differences between the two systems-which may always have been primarily a matter of
emphasis-have narrowed considerably since World War II, at least in Germany. See,
e.g., M. KRIELE, THEORIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG (1967). Yet significant remnants of an
earlier tradition do certainly remain, and that tradition may have been reflected in the
views of the prevailing judges.
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ticulated premise that the principle can be separated from the result
of individual cases purporting to apply the principle. The prevailing
opinion suggests that a constitutional principle is in an important
sense preserved if it is acknowledged in correct terms by private law
courts, even though the Constitutional Court-established to decide
constitutional cases largely because of the limitations of the ordinary courts-might have reached a conclusion different from that of
the ordinary court making the decision."0 7
3. ConstitutionalBalancing andJudicial Deference.-In addition to
the effect of the German doctrinal emphasis on principles rather
than results in specific cases, the nature of the Constitutional
Court's balancing standard may itself make deference to the private
law courts seem particularly tempting. Deference on constitutional
questions may seem particularly easy to justify when the underlying
constitutional standard is a standard of great generality such as that
evident in the balancing test elaborated by the Court. In one sense
ad hoc balancing has an enormous appeal for courts. Ultimately, it
may seem more equitable to recognize all possible social interests
according to their perceived weight and thus to avoid the screening
out of significant factors that is inevitable in the creation of categorical rules. 20 8 Because the technique of ad hoc balancing appears to
207. Quite a different position on the scope of appellate review is taken by the United
States Supreme Court in free speech cases. Emphasizing the importance of the individual case in a manner that reflects the common-law tradition, the Supreme Court frequently engages in careful factual review to assure that first amendment doctrine has
been properly applied. In some instances this review is obviously undertaken to prevent
a lower court or jury from intentionally distorting the applicable first amendment doctrine. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In other cases, however, the Court's factual review seems to reflect a more general concern that its
statements of principle be correctly understood-a goal that can best be achieved by
giving content to the principle through a series of individual decisions. In a recent libel
case, for example, the Supreme Court emphatically re-affirmed its power to review specific findings in first amendment cases. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485, 498-511 (1984). The Court in Bose noted that its "role in marking out the limits of
the standard through the process of case-by-case adjudication is of special importance,"
id. at 503, and explicitly rejected the view that its appropriate function is exhausted by a
statement of general principles. See id. at 505. See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983) (review of facts by Supreme Court in case involving asserted free speech rights of
public employee); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (review of facts by
Supreme Court in criminal case involving freedom of speech).
For a recognition of the importance of individual decisions in determining constitutional doctrine, in the German literature, see B.-O. BRYDE, VERFASSUNGSENTWICKLUNG
320-21 (1982). Bryde, however, generally endorses deference by the Constitutional
Court to the ordinary courts as reflecting the proper distribution of judicial authority.
Id.
208. See, e.g., Aleinikofl, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 962
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promise that all relevant interests will be taken into account, it may
seem to be the most effective tool in dealing with a wide range of
constitutional problems. Accordingly, once a court determines that
balancing should be undertaken to determine the permissibility of
certain forms of speech-as the Constitutional Court did in passing
on expressions of opinion under article 5, section 1 of the Basic
Law, in Lt'th-it may be difficult to confine the technique of balancing to one discrete set of cases.20 9
Constitutional balancing, however, also has its risks. Regardless
of its attractiveness as a technique of arguably greater complexity
and sophistication, constitutional balancing may ultimately be perceived by courts as unjudicial in nature because it seems to rely on
inarticulate calculations rather than the elaboration of guiding principle. When constitutional courts find themselves employing many
of the same techniques as nonconstitutional organs (such as legislatures or ordinary courts), they may lose confidence in the distinctive
value of the constitutional enterprise. There is a danger, therefore,
that courts that adopt ad hoc balancing tests will be reluctant to use
them to find governmental action unconstitutionaland will seek to remit the actual decision to those officials who are responsible for
promulgating or elaborating the ordinary positive law.2 10 Doubts of
this sort may have had their effect on the prevailing judges in Mephisto. In the views of some American judges who have advocated
(1987). In Mephisto this impulse may have contributed not only to the adoption of a
balancing test where none was clearly indicated by the text, but also to the Court's recognition of values of the ordinary law as constitutional values-which was necessary in
that case to make the process of balancing doctrinally possible. See supra text accompanying notes 158-163.
209. In this light, the Mephisto opinion illustrates what might be called the "imperialism of balancing." Although the Court stated clearly that GG art. 5, § 3, was not subject
to the limitations of GG art. 5, § 2. it nonetheless ultimately found that Klaus Mann's
right of artistic expression must be balanced against other possible constitutional interests. The beginnings of a similar "imperialism" in free speech jurisprudence were evident in the United States in the 1950s. Although ad hoc balancing was adopted by the
Supreme Court as a technique for use in certain types of speech cases, see, e.g., Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (time, place and manner of speech), proponents of the
technique sought to expand its use into other areas and implied that it should be used as
a general first amendment technique applicable in a broad range of speech cases. See
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Meaning of First Amendment, supra note 136; Reply to Frantz,
supra note 136. Presumably because the Supreme Court found that ad hoc balancing
poses dangers to the protection of speech, see infra text accompanying notes 210-211,
the spread of balancing was checked to a significant extent by the rise of the technique of
"categorization." See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
210. For this point in another context, see Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The
Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 351, 355-56.
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balancing, analogous uncertainties counseled recourse to the values
chosen by the unprincipled struggle of interests in the legislature; at
least legislation has the legitimacy of democratic choice."1 ' In ajurisdiction with a highly respected Civil Code such as Germany, perhaps a similar tendency reaches back not only toward the legislature,
but also toward the perceived legitimacy or solidity of the more
"real," underlying ordinary law.
4. Libel, State Interests, and State Action.-One final distinction
between the constitutional. law of libel in German and American
doctrine brings us back to the impact of the constitution on private
law and the underlying problems of the Lzith case. This distinction
is important because it helps us understand the different constitutional positions occupied by the law of libel in German and in American doctrine. As developed in cases such as Mephisto, the German
law of defamation is viewed as involving a conflict of two constitutional rights-the plaintiff's right of personality and the rights of
speech, press, or artistic expression asserted by the defendantspeaker. In American constitutional law, in the line of cases following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, there is also a clash of interests but
the conflicting interests are viewed rather differently. Instead of a
conflict of two constitutional interests of individuals as in German
law, American doctrine views the law of libel as pitting the constitutional (first amendment) interests of the speaker against the interests of the state in regulating the kind of speech in question.
Although the state may well be representing the interests of the defamed person-in addition to the state's own interest in preventing
the violence that might result from unredressed defamation-it is in
the first instance the state's decision whether to assert that interest,
and there is no constitutional requirement that it do so. Therefore,
the state can presumably narrow its law of defamation quite significantly (or abolish it altogether) without running afoul of federal
constitutional problems.2" 2 But in German law, as we have seen,
there is a clash between two constitutional interests and the state
probably is required-as a result of the "influence" of the constitu211. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
212. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450
(1975) (state court narrows liability for defamation beyond requirements of federal Constitution by demanding "actual malice" in case of any statement of "public or general
concern"). But see Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789 (1964) (specific language of certain state constitutions has been interpreted to prohibit narrowing of liability for libel).
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tional right of personality on private law-to provide a cause of action vindicating the constitutional interest not to be defamed that is
contained within that right of personality. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the law of defamation could be significantly weakened or
abolished under German constitutional law.
This difference in treatment reflects two important characteristics of American law that contrast significantly with German doctrine. First, unlike the doctrine exemplified by Mephisto, Soraya, and
Lebach, development of any substantive constitutional right of personality is quite limited in American law. In the United States Constitution there are no explicit guarantees of "human dignity" or "the
free development of the personality"-the guarantees that have
been crucial for this purpose in German law-and the possible derivation of such guarantees from general provisions such as the due
process clause is subject to the suspicion that has attended any extension of "substantive" due process after the constitutional revolution of the 1930s. On occasion, a groundwork for certain
substantive "due process" rights has been painfully extracted from
other specific guarantees-or from the constitutional system in general-but the rights so acknowledged have tended to focus on those
fundamental aspects of "privacy" that relate to marriage, sexual relations, and family life.2 1 3 In consequence, there is little basis for
the assertion of a constitutional right not to be defamed in American
law. Even if a state officer engages in libelous speech about an individual under circumstances in which state action is unquestionably
present, the constitutional right not to be libeled by the state seems
extremely narrow if indeed it exists at all. 2 4 Therefore, as a substantive matter, the American doctrine views the interest of an indi-

213. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
214. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (individual's interest in reputation is
not a constitutionally protected interest; "his interest in reputation is simply one of a

number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law"), limiting
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). Although Supreme Court opinions
have sometimes referred to the right to be free from defamation as an aspect of "the
essential dignity and worth of every human being" and as "a basic of our constitutional
system," see Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974), the Court has never translated these dicta
into any judicially enforceable obligation of the states to create or enforce a law of libel.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 712-14, also suggests that there is no constitutional right to be free
from statements that constitute an invasion of privacy of the Warren and Brandeis type,
even when those statements are made by the government. See supra note 106. See also
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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vidual in remaining free from libel as an interest that generally does
not rise to independent constitutional status.
Second-and more important for our purposes-even if there
were a constitutional right not to be libeled in American doctrine,
under the state action doctrine that right probably would remain a
right against the state only. It is rather difficult to conceptualize the
precise role that such a right would play in a defamed person's libel
action against another individual because when a private individual
defames another private individual that act of defamation does not
in itself constitute state action. As noted above, the only state action
that is present in the typical libel case is the action of the state court
in enforcing a rule of libel law against the speaker (in a manner that
may infringe his or her first amendment rights). A putative right not
to be defamed could be infringed only by the private individual's
making of the statement itself (but actions of private individuals do
not in themselves constitute state action under American doctrine),
or by the failure of the court adequately to redress the speaker's
infringement of the defamed person's constitutional right. Ordinarily, however, in American law the failure of a court to act to protect
an asserted interest under the tort law is not state action. Therefore, the application of any constitutional or other protection of a
speaker that resulted in the dismissal of a defamation action against
the speaker is difficult to conceptualize as state action infringing the
plaintiff's right of personality, because it is just the court's decision
to do nothing. This is probably another reason why the interests of
the defamed person and the integrity of his or her personality are
not viewed as establishing an individual constitutional right in
American libel law.
Of course, the state has an interest in protecting the reputation
of defamed persons-which it can assert as a discretionary matter in
defining its law of defamation-and, as we have seen in cases like
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the state's
interest may be strong enough to impose some limits on the
speaker's freedom of speech. The decision to assert this interest,
however, is basically the state's decision and, accordingly, the interests that confront the speaker's first amendment interest are viewed
in American doctrine as the state's interests in limiting speech and
not as a countervailing constitutional interest of the defamed person
standing on its own." 5
215. In contrast to a putative right not to be defamed, rights to property in the United
States Constitution probably do require that the state act against private persons who
seek to impair the property interests of other private persons. Indeed, the entire institu-
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In German doctrine, in contrast, the development of a constitutional right of personality that protects individuals against defamatory (and other forms of injurious) speech is now accepted as a
26
substantive matter.26
More important for our purposes, however,
is the fact that the doctrine of the influence of constitutional values on
relations of private law-first outlined in the bith case-does not
rest on the finding of any state action in the American sense. As we
have seen, an important result of this doctrine is that the Basic Law
not only provides certain defenses against judicial decisions in private law; it also seems to go farther and require that-under some
circumstances-the courts provide rights of action by one private
individual against another private individual for the redress of constitutional violations. 2t 7 Under those circumstances, it seems quite
natural-and indeed necessary-to take into account the constitutional right to freedom from defamation in any consideration of the
application of the German law of libel and slander. When the cause
of action for defamation is probably required by the Constitution
itself, it is certainly natural to weigh the constitutional interests that
have led to the creation of the cause of action against any constitutional defenses--e.g., defenses based on the freedom of expression-that might be asserted by the defendant. 2 8
tion of property seems to make no sense without such a basis of state obligation to act.
Cf. Truax v. Corigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (state's abolition of injunction action on
behalf of a property owner against labor picketers unconstitutionally infringes owner's
property rights); see generally P. Kurland, supra note 200, at 52-67. Although the specific
holding of Thuax doubtless does not survive the Court's depreciation of property rights
after the New Deal, the basic proposition that constitutional rights of property imply
some measure of a judicial obligation to protect those rights against other individuals
most likely remains unimpaired. See Henkin, supra note 83, at 491 n.39. A judicial obligation to enforce rights of property, however, does not furnish support for a judicial
obligation to redress defamation, which would lack textual basis and a federal constitu-

tional tradition requiring affirmative governmental enforcement.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 102-106 & 159-160.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 107-112. To some extent it might be said that
the requirement of affirmative judicial action arises from the duty to "protect" human
dignity specifically imposed on the government by GG art. 1, § 1, because the general
"right of personality" (including the right not to be defamed) is an aspect of human
dignity. Yet, the creation of a constitutional cause of action against private individuals
can also occur with respect to rights other than those in which the guarantee of human
dignity plays a central role. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100 (discussion of
Blinkfuer case). See generally Canaris, supra note 66.
218. GG art. 5, § 2, also states that the ights of free expression set forth in § I are
limited not only by the "general laws" but also by "the right of personal honor." See
supra text accompanying note 154. Yet, as we have seen, art. 5, § 2, does not limit the
ights of artistic expression of § 3. Moreover, creation of a constitutional right of personality (including a right to be free of defamation) doubtless gives this interest greater
weight in the balance than it would have solely by virtue of its inclusion in § 2 alone. See
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In sum, therefore, the result of the Mephisto case emphasizes the
power of the constitutional right not to be defamed which, although
the court acknowledges it as a constitutional right, was first developed as a more traditional doctrine of the ordinary law. In the Mephisto case this traditional right, now protected by the constitution,
was asserted in a manner that limited rights of artistic expression.
Moreover, the balancing of those countervailing constitutional inCourt but was efterests was not undertaken by the Constitutional
219
fectively remitted to the courts of private law.
IV.

THE DEUTSCHLAND-MAGAZIN CASE

If the influence of the Constitution on private law was to continue to play a significant role in the free speech doctrine of the
Constitutional Court, it might seem that aspects of the prevailing
opinion in Mephisto would have to be subject to some qualification.
And indeed in a later case--the Deutschland-Magazin case decided in
1976 2 2 -the Court revealed some second thoughts about the standard of constitutional review employed by the prevailing opinion in
Mephisto. In the Deutschland-Magazin case the Court moved away
from the extreme deference of Mephisto, and attempted to strike a
middle position between that opinion and Lith by elaborating an
adjustable standard of review for the Constitutional Court in private
law actions.
In 1969 a labor union press service distributed an article attacking the conservative Deutschland-Magazin as "a right-radical hate
sheet" (rechtsradikalesHetzblatt). In a libel action filed by the magazine's publisher, a state court enjoined the union press service from
repeating this statement "in the same words or in words that have
the same meaning." ' 22 l On review, the state supreme court upheld
supra note 165 and accompanying text; see generally Tettinger, supra note 135, at 317-18,
325.
219. The history of the Mephisto case has a recent and perhaps final coda. In 1980, a
publisher in Hamburg issued a paperback edition of Mephisto as part of the full edition of
the works of Klaus Mann and the edition has sold well over 300,000 copies. Whether
this publication violates the injunction upheld in Mephisto is not clear because the opin-

ion of the BGH noted that Griindgens' right of personality would diminish in strength as
his memory among the population fades. See supra note 162. See also Kastner, supra note
105, at 605. Perhaps enough time has now elapsed to change the result in Mephisto; in
any event, no judicial action appears to be in the offing. The republication of Mephisto
has, however, provoked new discussions of the tension between the right of artistic freedom and the right of personality. See generally id.
220. 42 BVerfGE 143 (1976).
221. Id. at 144. The magazine's publishers proceeded under BGB § 823(l), (2). As
noted above, BGB § 823(1) has been interpreted to afford civil redress for statements
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the injunction to the extent that it prohibited any repetition of the
specific phrase "right-radical hate sheet," but reversed the prohibition against restating the remarks in words that are different but
"have the same meaning." The court found that the specific phrase
used by the press service accused the Deutschland-Magazin of agitating for unconstitutional goals-a particularly severe charge-and
that the defendant's basic criticism could have been made in less
inflammatory language, in which case the statement might have
been constitutionally justified.2 22
The Constitutional Court upheld the judgment, but did so in an
opinion that departed substantially in its underlying doctrine from
the prevailing opinion in Mephisto. The Court began by recapitulating the passages from Ltith which emphasized that, even though
constitutional law has an impact on the resolution of a private law
dispute, the litigation remains fundamentally a dispute of private
law. The Court also cited the Mephisto decision in reiterating that
the role of the Constitutional Court is not to review the interpretation and application of private law nor to substitute its own judgment in each individual case, but rather to assure that the private
law courts have taken constitutional norms and standards into account. 223 Indeed, the Court even seemed to make explicit a point
implied by the prevailing opinion in Mephisto by asserting that the
constitution does not prescribe a specific result in any given private
law case.224
Nonetheless, the Court indicated, some circumstances can justhat violate the "general right of personality" arising from GG arts. 1, 2. See supra note
106. BGB § 823(2)-under which the cause of action apparently was chiefly considered-affords civil redress for acts that violate certain criminal statutes. See infra Appendix at pp. 348-49; see generally H. K6TZ,supra note 18, at 83-90. In order to fall within the
provisions of BGB § 823(2), the publishers claimed that the statement in question violated two sections of the Criminal Code that prohibit various forms of defamatory statements. See StGB §§ 185 (Beleidigung), 186 (uble Nachrede).
222. 42 BVerfGE at 145-46. The court's reasoning may rest on the particular historical resonance of the phrase "rechtsradikales Hetzblatt." The noun "Hetze" (verb:
"hetzen," originally meaning "to hunt") is particularly difficult to translate in this context. Although "Hetzblatt" can be translated generally as "scandal-," -hate-" or "slander-sheet," the word in this context carried rather clear overtones of persecution under
the Nazis-particularly when coupled with the epithet "right-radical" (rechtsradikales).
Therefore the phrase "rechtsradikales Hetzblatt" suggests that the magazine purveys
the kind of virulent hatred that can result in murder and genocide. This connotation
may explain the distinction that a court might see between this phrase and other language which, in translation, might seem equally sharp.
223. Id. at 147-48.
224. How the "correct" decision of a civil law dispute should appear in the specific case is not prescribed in the Basic Law. Rather, [the Basic Law] contains
. ..fundamental constitutional determinations for all areas of law, which are
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tify a heightened standard of review in private law cases. The Constitutional Court must be allowed a certain degree of discretion to
adjust the standard of review according to the nature of the individual case. 2 5 According to the Court, the degree of constitutional
review of lower court decisions in private law matters will depend on
the seriousness of the "invasion" of the area protected by the asserted basic right. In the case of a serious sanction levied against a
speaker, for example, the degree of judicial review of the lower
court judgment will be greater than when the sanction against a
speaker is a minor one. Thus a heavy fine would presumably evoke
a higher degree of scrutiny than a nominal penalty. According to
the Court, as the lower court's invasion of an asserted basic right
becomes more enduring and intrusive, the greater must be the requisite justification and, consequently, the broader must be the scope
of review by the Constitutional Court.2 2 6 Indeed, in extreme cases
developed in the first instance through the medium of the rules that directly
control the area of law in question.
42 BVerfGE 143, 148 (1976) (citing Liith). See supra text accompanying note 186.
This basic position is interestingly reflected in a commentary on three recent decisions of the Constitutional Court involving free speech and private law. See Roellecke,
Meinungskampf und allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht, 1980 JZ 701. The commentator begins
his discussion of the problems raised by the cases with the following revealing statement: "Whether the three cases were correctly or wrongly decided is not discussed
here. That is a problem of the ordinary[private]law." Id. (emphasis added). The author then
goes on to discuss the relevant constitutional principles in some detail.
225. 42 BVerfGE at 148. Interestingly, the Court at this point cited language to the
same effect from the patent case, 18 BVerfGE 85, 93 (1964); see supra note 187 and
accompanying text-language that had been emphasized in Rupp-von BrUnneck's dissent in Mephisto but was ignored by the prevailing opinion in that case. See 30 BVerfGE
173, 220 (1971).
226. 42 BVerfGE at 149. Upon first reading, this standard of constitutional review
may seem problematic. Because the level of review depends upon the "intrusiveness" of
an asserted invasion, the Court's formulation may seem circular--calling for an intrusive
degree of review only after the Court has determined on the merits that the constitutional right in question has been violated. Upon examination, however, it appears that
the Court's argument is not subject to this infirmity. Under Laith and Mephisto, whenever
the general "sphere" of a basic right is invaded, the final determination of whether the
right is actually infringed must rest on a balancing of the right against general laws
limiting that right or against other countervailing constitutional interests. Only after
this weighing has been undertaken can the court determine that an actual violation has
occurred. The Court in Deutschland-Magazin seems to be saying that, in order to determine the appropriate level of constitutional review, the Court will make an initial assessment only of the extent to which the general "sphere" of the basic right appears to be
invaded by the lower court's decision-without considering the countervailing justifications. If the "sphere" of the right is not substantially invaded, the Court will not engage
in a careful examination of the countervailing interests asserted to justify the invasion of
the right-as long as the lower court appears to have applied the correct general principles. The Court's rationale seems to be that, since the invasion of the right is not very
great in any event, there would not be a serious invasion of freedom even if the lower
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the Court can undertake a very significant degree of constitutional
review. "When the intensity of the invasion is at its greatest ... the
Court is fully empowered to replace the22 7evaluation undertaken by
the civil court with its own evaluation.
In the Deutschland-Magazin case, however, the invasion of the
speaker's interest was not severe. First, according to the Court, the
injunction was directed solely against a repetition of the precise
phrase "right-radical hate sheet." This phrase was particularly
sharp but, according to the Court, it did not represent a unique idea
that could not be phrased in other words.22 8 In this sense, therefore, the lower court had not really prohibited the expression of a
particular opinion but only one "form" of expressing that opinion.22 9 Moreover, the Court indicated, the invasion of the speaker's
interest was minor because the sanction was minor. The only sanction issued against the press service was a prohibition of the repetition of the remark; there was no "imputation of individual guilt," no
fine, no requirement that the phrase be retracted, and no other lasting sanction. Indeed because the press service had already accomplished its general goal of informing its readers about the nature of
the Deutschland-Magazin in the article itself, the dispute had become for both sides "little more than a matter of prestige. ' 23 0 Thus
in both respects-the mildness of the sanction and the narrow nature of the speech covered by the sanction-the "invasion" of the
area protected by the basic right of free expression was not severe.
In consequence, the case was distinguishable from decisions, such
as Lith, in which the Court had exercised closer appellate review. 2 3 ,
In this light the lower court's balancing in Deutschland-Magazinalthough it may not have been done precisely as the Court would
court were incorrect and the right were actually violated. In contrast, if the general
sphere of the basic right is seriously invaded-either by a severe sanction issued against
the claimed exercise of the right or even perhaps by a less severe sanction that covers a
broad area of activity possibly guaranteed by the right--error by the lower court would
involve a more severe infringement of the right, and the Constitutional Court should
exercise a high degree of constitutional scrutiny.
227. Id. (citing Lebach, 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973)), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 171-176. Lebach can be viewed as a precursor of Deutschland-:MVagazin because in
Lebach the Constitutional Court applied a stringent standard of constitutional review of
facts in a private law case. See generally Wenzel. supra note 173. In Lebach, however, the
Court applied a stringent standard of review not for the purpose of protecting speech
interests, but rather for the purpose of protecting rights of personality that were opposed to speech interests.
228. 42 BVerfGE 143, 151 (1976).
229. See id. at 149-150; see also supra note 222.
230. Id. at 151.
231. Id.
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have done it-adequately recognized the contending constitutional
interests and, given the modest scope of review in such a case, was
not impermissible.
Although the lower court's injunction was thus upheld in
Deutschland-Magazin, a companion case 2 3 2 suggests that the decision
may indeed reflect a real move from the deferential attitude of Mephisto back toward the more substantial degree of constitutional review exercised in Lith. In this case a political party official, Jilrgen
Echternach, wrote an article attacking the Deutschland Foundation,
publisher of the Deutschland-Magazin. Among other things, Echternach stated that in establishing a "Konrad Adenauer Prize," the
Foundation had "misused the name of Konrad Adenauer for [the
benefit of] right-wing sectarians. "233 The article also asserted that
the Foundation was "a nationalistic enterprise .. .in democratic

clothing.- 2 3 4 In a libel action by the Foundation, a state supreme
court prohibited a repetition of these remarks, either in the same
words or words having an equivalent meaning.23 5 The Constitutional Court reversed this decision, employing the heightened standard of review outlined in Deutschland-Magazin. Restating (or
rephrasing) the doctrine of that case, the Court remarked: "The
more a civil court's decision infringes the predicates of free existence and action that are protected by a basic right, the more searching must be the Constitutional Court's investigation to determine
whether the infringement is constitutionally justified. ' 23 6 In contrast with the Deutschland-Magazincase, the state court's order in Echternach prohibited not only a repetition of the defendant's exact
words but also the repetition of defendant's remarks in "language
having an equivalent meaning." The state court's order, therefore,
"prohibited the expression of a certain thought-content" and thus was
"a limitation of the complainant's freedom of opinion which touches
the basic right of article 5 of the Basic Law not only at the margin,
but in its central meaning .... .. 37 Consequently, the Constitu232. 42 BVerfGE 163 (1976) (Echternach).
233. Id. at 164.
234. Id.
235. Id. Here also, the state court's decision rested on a finding that the statements
violated StGB § 185 or 186, and therefore gave rise to civil liability under BGB § 823(2).
See supra note 221. The state supreme court found for the plaintiff on the ground that
Echternach's statements of opinion should have been accompanied by underlying facts
that would have allowed the average reader to assess the accuracy of Echternach's opinions. 42 BVerfGE at 165-66.
236. Id. at 168.
237. Id. at 169.
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tional Court was required not only to review the general principles
employed by the lower court but also to consider specific mistakes in
the application of those principles 2 3 -a level of review that more
closely resembles the review exercised in Ltith than that exercised in
Mephisto.
Employing this higher level of review, the Court found that the
state supreme court had not adequately understood the manner in
which the rights of article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law themselves
influence the "general laws" (or laws protecting "personal honor")
which are asserted to limit those rights. 23 9 Harking back to some of
the factors considered in Ldith, the Court noted that Echternach's
criticisms of the Deutschland Foundation were not inspired by any
private goal or solely by a desire to insult the Foundation, but rather
were the normal sort of expression that is found in public political
disputes. Under these circumstances, the lower court's requirement
that Echternach's statements of opinion must be accompanied by a
supporting factual discussion was an excessive requirement that violated article 5 of the Basic Law.2 40 Something that approaches a
careful balancing of the interests by the Constitutional Court itself is
evident in this opinion.
The difference between the modest scope of review exercised in
the Deutschland-Magazin case, and the more searching review exercised in Echternach, seems to rest on a distinction between prohibition of a specific form of words in the first case and the prohibition
of all "forms" of expressing a certain "thought-content" in the second. Because the Court perceived a greater invasion of the
speaker's interest in Echternach, the Court undertook a searching review that was much like the review in Luth itself; but because the
Court saw the prohibition of only one "form" of words as a less
serious infringement, it exercised a narrower review in DeutschlandMagazin.
It is interesting that the distinction suggested in Echternach between the "thought-content" of a statement and the expression of
that content in a specific "form" bears some resemblance to the distinction that appears to underlie the prevailing opinion in Mephistothe distinction between the expression of a general principle and
the "application" of that principle in a specific case-and this distinction also may yield insights on modes of thought in the Constitu238. Id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 118-119 & 154.
240. 42 BVerfGE 163, 170-71 (1976). See supra note 235.
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tional Court. The idea that there is an intelligible, but disembodied,
"content" that can remain unimpaired even though its expression in
a particular "form" is prohibited, seems related to the idea that
there is an intelligible abstract principle which can exist intact even
though no particular attention is paid to its "application" in certain
specific cases. As noted above, the latter view is implicitly rejected
in common-law theory. The underlying common-law view is that
there are first ihidividual cases, which are the important elements,
and it is from a series of these cases that tentative (and always incomplete) statements of "general principles" can be successively essayed. 2 4 ' In the same way, one might say that in speech the
important elements are the individual expressions themselves and
that an attempt to generalize the "content" of supposedly related
expressions may be useful for some purposes but can never actually
refer to some detached ideal "content" that exists apart from any
specific expression.
Indeed, in the Deutschland-Magazin case the phrase "rechtsradikales Hetzblatt"2 4 may have been chosen precisely for its
unique historical overtones. Language is inextricably linked to the
cultural and social history not only of a particular society in general,
but also of smaller social groups. 243 The press service of a German
labor organization-a number of whose members may have suffered
under Nazi dictatorship-might find it useful, for the purpose of explaining the intensity of its views about a right-wing hate-filled
newspaper, to use language which in its overtones seemed to carry
connotations of possible dictatorial oppression not unlike that of recent history. Any less pungent expression might indeed lack an
equivalent "content. "244
241. See supra text accompanying note 205.
242. See supra note 222.

243. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775-77 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
244. Interestingly, it is this position (or something very much like it) that has been
adopted in the basically common-law perspective of American constitutional law. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the defendant was convicted of disturbing the
peace after he wore ajacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft," in a courthouse corridor. Writing for the Court, Justice Harlan found that the conviction violated the first
and fourteenth amendments. Against the state's argument that the content of the defendant's views could reasonably have been expressed in a different and less offensive
form of words, Justice Harlan remarked:
[Mluch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little
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In her dissent in Deutschland-Magazin,Judge Rupp-von Brinneck appeared to favor a higher degree of constitutional review in
all cases involving freedom of expression, because of the "fundamental" nature of that basic right. 245 Rupp-von Briinneck emphasized that the Court's function in speech cases is not only to protect
the specific speaker from sanctions, but also to prevent incorrect decisions of lower courts from having a "negative effect on the general
exercise" of free expression:2 4 6 if an incorrect lower court decision is
allowed to stand by reason of superficial review, the speech of numerous individuals in society may be chilled. Varying the Court's
standard of constitutional review according to the impact of the
sanction on the specific speaker therefore reflects an unduly narrow
conception of the Court's proper role in protecting rights of
7
24

expression.

As an important landmark in this line of decisions, the Deutschland-Magazin case reaches an uneasy-and quite possibly unstableaccommodation between the thorough constitutional review exercised in Llth and the deference to private law courts evident in the
prevailing opinion in Mephisto. Even though the constitution applies
to matters of private law, it applies in an "indirect" and muted form
as a matter of doctrine. Consequently, the private law courts continue to enjoy a degree of deference in certain cases even though
their decision may as a practical matter determine whether or not a
or no regard for that emotive function which, practicallyspeaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.

Id. at 26 (emphasis added). For an indication, however, that certain members of the
Supreme Court may be retreating from Justice Harlan's position in Cohen, see Pacifica
Found.. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18 (Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist, JJ.); compare id. at 772-74
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Dissenting in the Deutschland-Magazin case, Judge Rupp-von Briinneck developed an
argument similar to that of Justice Harlan: "Even the majority acknowledges that the
basic right of free expression of opinion includes the freedom to decide how an expression should be formulated. Is it not, then, a dangerous self-deception to believe that the
'censorship' of a [specific form of speech] leaves the intellectual content unaffected?"
42 BVerfGE 143, 158 (1976). Rupp-von Briinneck went on to speculate on the "forms"
of expression that, as a practical matter, are now open to the press service. The lower
courts in Deutschland-Magazin gave no examples of what formulas are permissible. Indeed "it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find a substitute formula that has the requisite journalistic impact." Id. at 159. The result may be a chilling effect because the
speaker, not knowing what precise form of words will satisfy a future court, may not wish
to risk another legal action that might result in a more severe sanction.
245. 42 BVerfGE at 154.
246. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
247. id.
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constitutional right is to be protected. 248
With the added illumination of the Deutschland-Magazin case, we
can return to the question of how this measure of deference by the
Constitutional Court to the ordinary judiciary in private law casesparticularly those involving freedom of expression-is to be explained. As we have seen above,2 4 9 various arguments advanced by
American jurists in support of a measure of judicial deference-arguments based on considerations of majoritarianism or federalism-are generally inapplicable to the German doctrine involving
the influence of constitutional principles on private law. On the
other hand, the Deutschland-Magazin case suggests with even greater
clarity than Mephislo that deference to the private law courts may
reflect certain considerations of efficient judicial administration.
The Federal Constitutional Court is the only federal court whose
specific mission is to decide constitutional questions. Although the
state courts and the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) also must pass
on constitutional questions, the constitutional decisions of those
courts are not nearly as authoritative as decisions handed down by
the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is
obliged to decide all constitutional issues appropriately presented
to it-unless a committee of three justices decides that the result in
the case is so clear that the complaint can be summarily rejected or
sustained.25 0 In this light a deferential or adjustable scope of review
might be seen as an acceptable method of controlling the Court's
caseload 25 1 -perhaps through a reliance on the developing consti248. For a criticism of the formula of the Deutschland-Magazin case and for alternative
tests proposed by academic commentators, see K. SCHLAICH, supra note 2, at 143-47. See
also W.-R. SCHENKE, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND FACHGERICHTSBARKEIT 44-46
(1987). Many of the commentators argue that the Constitutional Court's scope of review, as outlined in Deutschland-Magazin, unduly invades the province of the private law
courts.
Although the test for review by the Constitutional Court, elaborated in DeutschlandNlagazin, was first developed in the private law context, it has been applied to the Constitutional Court's review of lower court judgments in public law cases as well. See Hesse,
Funktionelle Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in AUSGEW.iHLTE SCHRIFTEN 316 (P. Hiberle & A. Hollerback eds. 1984). Even though the Constitutional Court employs the
Deutschland-Magazin formula in reviewing both private and public law cases, it has been
suggested that the actual review exercised by the Court is less stringent in private law
cases because the application of the Basic Law is "indirect" rather than "direct" in those
cases. See K. SCHLAICH, supra note 2, at 151-52. See also 73 BVerfGE 261, 268-69 (1986)
(expressly relating Constitutional Court's restricted scope of review to the "indirect"
impact of basic rights on private law).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 200-204.
250. See infra note 254.
251. See Faller, Zu den Eingriffsmoglichkeiten des Bundesverfassungsgerichts bei Riigen der
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tutional expertise of the lower courts.2 5 2 With constitutional cases
coming from the BGH and from other courts (and, in some instances, directly to the Constitutional Court without prior judicial
consideration), some comprehensive method of screening may be
required. The argument that the function of screening in the Constitutional Court is adequately performed by the present system of
relegating preliminary decisions to three-judge. panels-an argument suggested, for example, by Judge Rupp-von Brunneck in
Deutschland-Magazin 2 5 -may not entirely meet the point. Although
a three-judge panel can dispose of a constitutional complaint in
clear cases,2 5 4 maintenance of a manageable caseload in the Constitutional Court might require additional screening techniques.
Deference to the private law courts, however, does not seem to
be based entirely on a fear of inundation by reason of numbers. It
may also have a qualitative side. The Constitutional Court is basically limited to the decision of constitutional questions; it is not a
tribunal like the Supreme Court of the United States, which is also
authorized to decide a broad range of nonconstitutional matters.
Many judges of the Constitutional Court have never been judges of
the ordinary courts, and these judges may not be imbued with the
doctrine and characteristic modes of thought of the private law. 2 55
Verletzung von Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR MARTIN L6FFLER 56-57
(1980); Ossenbijhl, supra note 201, at 129-30.
252. Constitutional expertise may be particularly well-developed in the BGH-a huge
tribunal with over a hundred judges sitting in many panels-which must decide numerous constitutional questions in civil and criminal cases. See supra note 20.
253. See 42 BVerfGE 143, 154 (1976).
254. See BVerfGG § 93b(i), (2); Vitzthum, supra note 4; Zuck, supra note 4. A unanimous three-judge "chamber" can rJect a constitutional complaint if the complaint has
.'no adequate prospect of success" or "if it is to be expected" that the full eight-judge
senate will refuse to "accept" the case. BVerfGG § 93b(l). The three-judge chamber
can decide the case infavorof the constitutional complainant if it unanimously finds that
the complaint is "obviously well-founded . .. because the Constitutional Court has already decided the relevant constitutional question." BVerfGG § 93b(2).
If the three-judge panel does not dispose of the complaint, the full senate of the
Constitutional Court must "accept" the case if at least two judges believe that the case
will clarify a constitutional issue or that failure to decide may expose the complainant to
a serious and unavoidable detriment. BVerfGG § 93c.
255. The basic academic qualification for appointment to the Constitutional Court is
successful completion of the first and second state examinations, the prerequisite for
becoming a practicing lawyer or ajudge of any court. See BVerfGG § 3(2). The framers
of the Basic Law apparently intended, however, that most judges of the Constitutional
Court would not be appointed from the regular judiciary. Only six of the sixteen judges
of the Constitutional Court must be chosen from among the judges of the other highest
courts of the Federal Republic. BVerfGG § 2(3); see supra note 4. Because a majority of
these six judges will normally be appointed from "highest courts" other than the BGH
(e.g., the Federal Administrative Court, Federal Social Security Court, etc.). it is not
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With a highly sophisticated and academic Civil Code, it is possible
that private law doctrines are considered particularly complex and
that a high degree of expertise is thought necessary to thread one's
way with confidence through those complexities. Presumably, however, the private law judges develop a special degree of skill in the
evaluation and weighing of private law arguments.2 5 6 In American
doctrine-where constitutional law can completely supersede the intricacies of the private'law (if state action is present) and where, in
any event, private law is probably not as complex-such a point possesses less force. But, if one starts with the proposition that in German doctrine the matter remains a private law matter and is only
"influenced" by the principles of constitutional law, then in many
cases the Constitutional Court may be reluctant to become involved
in the intricacies of private law analysis. Moreover, when a court
applies a balancing test, close familiarity with the facts of the case
becomes particularly important; the likely combination of doctrinal
and factual complexity in a large number of private law cases may
seem especially onerous for the Constitutional Court.2 5 7
If this view is adopted, the ultimate position of the DeutschlandMagazin case may make some sense. If the Court believes that
parsing the intricacies of a private law problem is a strenuous
mental operation, it might be sensible to undertake that effort only
when the damage to constitutional interests appears severe. In
speech cases, this could be done in a manner not suggested by the
Court: an assessment could be made of the value of the speech involved, and constitutional intervention undertaken only when particularly valuable speech is suppressed. The Court, however, avoids

likely that many judges of the Constitutional Court will have had substantial experience
as private law judges--or, indeed, as judges of any other specific area of "ordinary law."
See generally supra note 27.

256. In the Deutschland-Magazin case, for example, Rupp-von Briinneck refers to the
"range and specialization" of the ordinary law and notes the "qualitative" burden that
excessive review of private law cases would impose on the Court. 42 BVerfGE at 154.
257. Cf. Ossenbfihl, supra note 201, at 130 (referring to the greater expertise of the
highest ordinary courts and their closeness to the problem in question); W.-R. SCHENKE,
supra note 248, at 57-58 (emphasizing the experience of ordinary courts, developed in a
constant stream of private law cases).
To this view of the doctrinal complexity of the private law should also be added the
view-still of some importance in German legal theory-that the private law is a particularly well thought-out and excellent product oflegal science and that, in consequence, it
should be disrupted as little as possible even by general constitutional norms. See supra
text accompanying note 29. In the last analysis, therefore, the limited scope of constitutional review in private law cases may be a continuing reflection of the traditional mystique of the private law. See also supra note 60.
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the assessment of values that such a course would entail and focuses
instead on the seriousness of the invasion or sanction.
These arguments may seem plausible from within the German
doctrinal system. Yet the use of an adjustable standard of review of
this nature also raises its own problems. The use of an adjustable
standard of review-in which the factors triggering a greater or
lesser degree of scrutiny are themselves vague in nature-adds another layer of uncertainty to an already complex doctrine. Moreover, the technique opens the possibility that a court could employ
the standard as a method of reducing the substantive protection of
certain constitutional interests without actually acknowledging that
those interests are receiving reduced protection. If the ordinary
courts tend to disfavor certain constitutional interests, a decision to
remit a significant number of cases involving those interests to the
private law judges might-on balance-achieve the result of according those interests diminished protection. Relaxing the scope of review of ordinary courts in such cases-while simultaneously
requiring a statement of strong constitutional principles adopted by
the Court-could, therefore, result in according diminished actual
protection to certain values while maintaining the general position
that they are being strongly protected. To the extent that adequate
protection of the values of the Basic Law requires active intervention by the Constitutional Court, relaxing the scope of review might
mask a retreat from certain constitutional values under the guise of
2 58
a procedural adjustment.
Notwithstanding these possible difficulties, the principles of
Deutschland-Magazin significantly expand the Constitutional Court's
review of decisions limiting freedom of expression-in comparison,
at least, with the principles of the prevailing opinion in Mephisto.
Therefore the Deutschland-Magazin decision can be viewed-at least
258. Judge Rupp-von Briinneck seems to suggest such a possibility in her dissent in
Deutschland-Magazin. See 42 BVerfGE 143, 156 (1976). Rupp-von Briinneck remarks that
the Court's restraint in reviewing decisions of private law courts appears inconsistent
with other decisions of approximately the same period which greatly expanded the scope
of the Court's review of acts of the legislature in certain areas. Rupp-von Briinneck cites
two cases in which the Court invalidated statutes that seemed to represent a new reformist spirit of the early 1970s. See 39 BVerfGE i (1975) (Abortion Case) (invalidating a
federal statute that permitted most abortions during the first three months of pregnancy); 35 BVerfGE 79 (1973) (University Case) (striking down a state statute granting
students, nontenured faculty members, and workers a share in the governance of universities). In the abortion case, particularly, the Court replaced legislative findings of fact
with its own determinations. Rupp-von Briinneck's laconic paragraph seems to imply
skepticism about a doctrine that narrows constitutional review of the ordinary courts
while expanding constitutional review of these legislative measures.
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at this point in the story-as a decision that clearly favors the protection of speech in contrast with what had gone immediately before.
Nonetheless, the vagueness of the variable standard of review-together with the vagueness of the Court's underlying balancing test
for speech cases-may raise concerns about whether expression is
adequately protected under formulas of that sort. We have seen,
moreover, that the doctrine of Deutschland-Magazin was prefigured
by the Lebach case, in which the Court employed a heightened standard of review to protect interests in personality that were opposed
to speech. 2 5 9 The Deutschland-Magazin case does not specifically confront the question of how the variable standard of review shall be
applied with respect to interests in personality that conflict with constitutional rights of expression; the answer to that question-which
was addressed in important cases in the 1980s-will also be important in achieving a full understanding of the relationship between
free speech and private law in German doctrine.
V.

FREE SPEECH AND PRIVATE LAW IN THE 1980s: BbLL AND
W'VALLRAFF

Notwithstanding any difficulties that may remain in its theoretical justification, the general technique of the Deutschland-Magazin
case continues to be the Court's standard of constitutional review in
private law cases. Indeed, in recent years the application of the
standard has been refined and to some extent extended. In a case
decided in 1980, for example, the Court reversed a damage award
for defamation issued in favor of a sculptor against two radio broadcasters who had criticized a lecture that the sculptor had delivered.2 60 Applying the concepts of Deutschland-Magazin, the Court
emphasized that an award of damages for defamation is a particularly severe penalization of speech in comparison with more typical
sanctions under the Civil Code, such as an order prohibiting repetition of the defamatory matter. 26 ' Because a damage award would
have an "unavoidable deterrent effect" on expression, the Court did
not limit itself to a review of the general principles applied by the
state court but subjected the lower court's opinion to a more search259. See supra note 227.
260. 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980) (Art Critique).
261. Id. at 135-36. As noted above, injunctive relief is the basic remedy under the
Civil Code-in libel cases as well as other civil actions-while damage awards are often
viewed as extraordinary. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109. In American doctrine, of course, just the opposite is true. An injunction against continued speech is
viewed as a more serious invasion of first amendment interests than damages for
defamation.
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ing review. 2 62 As a result, the Constitutional Court reversed the
defamation award largely because the sculptor had himself invited a
response by launching a bitter attack on certain art critics.2 63
If this case and other cases such as Echternach are compared with
the result in Mephisto, the technique of Deutschland-Magazin appears
to be a move towards using a heightened scope of constitutional
review in order to accord enhanced protection to speech. Yet such a
conclusion would reflect only part of the story, for a parallel development in other cases shows that in some circumstances the heightened judicial review of Deutschland-Magazin can also work to limit the
freedom of expression. As we have seen in cases such as Mephisto,
Soraya and Lebach, free speech interests are sometimes confronted by
countervailing constitutional interests and-because those countervailing rights are often considered fully as important as rights of
speech-the Court has employed heightened constitutional review
to protect those interests as well. Accordingly, certain recent cases
have shown that when the basic principles of Deutschland-Magazinare
used to protect other constitutional rights--e.g., the right of personality protected by articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law-the technique
can have the seemingly paradoxical effect of imposing increased
burdens on speech.
This tendency is perhaps most clearly seen in a recent case involving the famous author, Heinrich B611, 64 in which the Court applied the principles of Deutschland-Magazin to the judicial
enforcement of the right of personality where that right was opposed to the interest in free speech. As a result, the Court exercised
vigorous judicial review in order to protect the constitutional interest in personality in a decision that had the effect of penalizing political expression.
The B6ll case arose out of a television commentary-broadcast
shortly after a terrorist assassination-in which the commentator
charged that public statements of certain well-known social critics
262. 54 BVerfGE at 136.
263. Id. at 130; see generally supra note 130.
For the application of the principles of Deutschland-Magazin in the Constitutional
Court's review ofcriminal libel convictions, see 43 BVerfGE 130 (1976) (Political Leaflet)
(criminal libel conviction requires closer review by Constitutional Court than civil judgment, because criminal conviction imposes greater burden); 67 BVerfGE 213 (1984)
(Anachronistic Parade) (because the imposition of a criminal libel penalty in a case involving political street theater would have a particularly severe impact on art, close constitutional review is justified); 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987) (Strauss Caricature) (strict review
should be exercised in criminal case involving political satire). See generally Tettinger,
supra note 135, at 324.

264. 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980).
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had laid the groundwork for violence. To illustrate his point, the
commentator cited a number of disparaging remarks about the German state which he attributed to B611. 26 5 In a suit against the commentator, B611 asserted that his right of personality had been
violated, and a state supreme court awarded substantial damages on
the ground that the purported quotations were inaccurate or taken
out of context. 266 The Federal Supreme Court (BGH) reversed,
however, and dismissed the action. 2 7 The BGH found that,
although the commentator may have misquoted Boll's remarks, the
statements that B611 actually made could convey to the ordinary
reader a message not unlike the message attributed to him by the
commentator. 2 68 Consequently, B611's right of personality was not
invaded and the broadcaster's remarks were protected speech under
article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law.
In applying the principles of Deutschland-Magazin to this case,
the Constitutional Court confronted a novel and interesting problem. The BGH had dismissed B611's action and consequently had not
imposed a penalty on anyone. The constitutional complainant in
the B61 case, therefore, was a plaintiff who argued that his failure to
receive redress in the courts below violated his constitutional
rights-unlike the constitutional complainants in cases such as LUth,
Mephisto, Deutschland-Magazin and Echternach who were defendants
challenging as unconstitutional a lower court's imposition of a butden on them. Thus the degree of review in the Constitutional Court
could not depend-as it had in Deutschland-Magazin and Echternachon the severity of a judicially imposed penalty that might affect the
interests of the constitutional complainant. Rather, in this case, the
Court indicated that the degree of constitutional review depended
on the effect that the lower court's rejection of B611's claim would
have on his right of personality if the lower court's decision were
265. According to the commentator, "Heinrich B611 characterized the liberal state
[Rechtsstaat]-against which the (terrorists'] violence was directed-as a 'pile of dung',
and said that he saw only 'the remnants of decaying power, which are defended with rat-

like rage.' He accused the state of pursuing the terrorists 'in a pitiless hunt.' " Id. at
209.
266. According to the state supreme court, B611 had never said that the liberal state
was a "pile of dung." The statement about "decaying power" had been taken out of
context, and B611 had accused the press-not the government--of having pursued the
terrorists "in a pitiless hunt." Id. at 210. Prior cases had established that the right of
personality includes the right not to be quoted or cited erroneously. See 13 BGHZ 334
(1954) (Schacht-Letter); supra notes 104 & 106; see also 34 BVerfGE 269 (1973) (Soraya);
supra note I11.
267. 1978 NJW 1797; see 54 BVerfGE at 211-13.
268. 54 BVerfGE at 211-13.
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incorrect. The Court concluded that because of the nature of the
commentator's statements and the broad impact of television, a decision improperly protecting the commentator's remarks would invade the core of B611's right to personality; accusations of
intellectual complicity in terrorism would gravely injure B611's personal honor. A substantial degree of- constitutional review was
therefore justified.2 6 9 In focusing on the impact of the lower court's
rejection of B611's claim, the Constitutional Court in effect allowed
the standard of review to depend on the severity of the unredressed
injury to constitutionally protected rights of personality inflicted by
one private individual upon another-that is, the severity of the
claimed injury to B611's personality inflicted by the television commentator. Lying behind this discussion, therefore, appears to be the
Court's continued assumption that an individual's constitutional interest of personality can be damaged by the action of another
individual."' 0
In undertaking the requisite substantial degree of review, the
Constitutional Court found that the judgment of the BGH, dismissing the action, invaded B611's right of personality. The Court
emphasized that an individual's right of personality includes the
right not to be misquoted because each individual has a right to decide how he or she will be presented or represented to others. 2 7'
The Court concluded that the BGH had applied an improper standard in deciding the case and that the commentator's statements
were not protected by article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law. 272 Con269. Id. at 215-17.
270. See generally supra text accompanying notes 10 1- 112. Certain alternative methods
of viewing this problem are possible, however. It could be argued, for example, that the
dismissal of the plaintiff's civil action by the court below in effect placed the court's imprimatur on the statements, thus converting the action of the individual into the action of
the court, a branch of the state. This is the position advocated by Professor Schwabe, see
supra note 180. An alternative view is that the Basic Law (in GG art. I and elsewhere)
imposes certain affirmative obligations on the state to protect the constitutional rights of
individuals against other individuals. The lower court's dismissal of the action could
therefore be viewed as the state's failure to live up to its constitutional obligations of
affirmative protection. See generally Canaris, supra note 66.
271. 54 BVerfGE at 217-18. See supra text accompanying note 172 and infra text accompanying notes 283-286.
272. According to the Court, the BGH applied an improper standard because it replaced B611's decision about the meaning of his own language with the possible misinterpretations of the "average reader or listener." 54 BVerfGE at 218-19; see supra text
accompanying note 268. The commentator's statements were not protected by GG art.
5, § 1, because incorrect citations-like any other false statements-are not protected
speech. If there was a question about the meaning of BbI's remarks, the commentator
should have made it clear that he was transmitting an interpretation of those remarks
rather than a purported quotation. 54 BVerfGE at 219-22.
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sequently, the Court indicated that B611's right of personality had
been infringed and remanded the case to the BGH for2 73further determination of the precise extent of that infringement.
In a more recent case in this series, the Court again employed
the principles of Deutschland-Magazin for the purpose of undertaking
stringent constitutional review which had the effect of imposing burdens on expression.27 4 The case was particularly interesting because the countervailing constitutional right that was found to limit
speech was itself elaborated from the guarantee of freedom of the
press also contained in article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law. Among
other things, this case reinforces the suggestion in Blinkftier that an
individual can have article 5, section 1 rights against another individual and that the legal system is constitutionally obligated to provide a remedy for violation of those rights. 75 It is ironic, however,
that the Court here interprets article 5, section 1, in a way that has
the ultimate effect of limiting certain individual rights of expression.
In 1977 the well-known journalist Giinther Wallraff employed a
fictitious name to secure a job at the "Bild"-Zeitung, a right-wing
newspaper of wide circulation in Germany. Using information so
273. On remand, the BGH upheld the judgment in B611's favor. 1982 NJW 635.
The BoI case evoked wide comment. For a suggestion that the Court's requirement
of scrupulous quotation may have undervalued speech interests, see Zippelius, Meinungsfreiheit und Persbhlichkeitsrecht, in BEITRAGE ZUM SCHUTZ DER PERS6NLICHKEIT UND InRER
SCH6PFERISCHEN LEISTUNGEN-FEsTSCH RIFT FUJR H. HUBMANN 519-21 (H. Forkel & A.
Kraft eds. 1985). For an argument that the Court's result in B6ll was correct, but that the
decision should have rested on the view that the commentator's remarks linking B611
with terrorism invaded the "core" of B611's personality, see E. S'rEINDORFF, supra note
136, at 20, 25.
An interesting contrast is furnished by a case decided by the Constitutional Court
on the same day as Bll. 54 BVerfGE 148 (1980) (Eppler). In this decision Erhard Eppier, a well-known politician, sought an injunction prohibiting opponents from repeating their charge that Eppler, in his proposals for economic and social policy, indicated a
desire to "test the endurance of the economy." This statement apparently implied that
Eppler was willing to take undue risks with the economy in pursuing his social goals. As
in B6l, a lower court dismissed the action; in determining the appropriate scope of review, therefore, the Constitutional Court was again required to apply the principles of
Deutschland-Magazin in an instance in which the complainant was a plaintiff contesting a
lower court's dismissal of the complaint. In contrast with Boll, however, the Constitutional Court indicated that the challenged remarks did not pose a severe danger to Eppier's constitutional right of personality. The Court was therefore confined to a minimal
level of review and could do no more than correct any basic misconceptions of principle
revealed by the lower court. Applying this deferential standard, the Court rejected Eppier's constitutional complaint. For an interesting discussion of Bol, Eppler and the art
critique case, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 260-263, see Schmidt, Der
verfassungsgerichtliche Grundrechtsschutz im offentlichen Meinungskampf, 1980 NJW 2066.

274. 66 BVerfGE 116 (1984) ("Bild"-Wailraff).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
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obtained, Wallraff published a book criticizing "Bild's" journalistic
methods. "Bild" sued to enjoin publication of portions of the book,
including a passage describing an editorial conference at the newspaper. State courts issued a partial injunction, but the BGH dismissed "Bild's" complaint on the ground that, even though Wallraff
may have engaged in illegal deception in concealing his identity, his
publication was protected by article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law
because it revealed various abuses in the editing of a mass circulation newspaper. 7 6 As in the B67l case, therefore, the Constitutional
Court was not reviewing the imposition of a penalty by a lower
court, but rather the lower court'sfailure to impose a penalty at the
request of a plaintiff-here "Bild." The Court emphasized, as it had
in Bdl, that the intensity of its scrutiny must depend on the constitutional interest threatened by the lower court's dismissal of the action.
As in B61, the Court appeared to recognize that Wallraff's actionsthe actions of an individual-may have violated the constitutional
rights of "Bild," with the result that a court's failure to redress that
constitutional violation may itself be a violation of the Basic Law.
In determining the proper standard of review, the Court found
that publication of passages describing "Bild's" editorial conference
threatened a serious invasion of the paper's constitutional interest
in editorial confidentiality. Accordingly, a heightened degree of
scrutiny was necessary in reviewing the lower court's failure to enjoin publication of those passages. To that extent, it was insufficient
for the Court to review the lower court's understanding of general
principles only; rather, the Court had to decide whether specific
mistakes in constitutional interpretation had been made.Y
Undertaking this review, the Court first found that a newspaper's editorial confidentiality is protected by the guarantee of press
276. 80 BGHZ 25 (1981). The decision of the BGH dismissing "Bild's" action encountered vigorous criticism in the scholarly literature. The critics were particularly dismayed that the BCH had not more strongly condemned Wallraff's use of a fictitious
name to obtain his job at the "Bild"-Zeitung. See Bettermann. Publikationsfreiheitftir
erschlichene Informationen?, 1981 NJW 1065; Schmitt Glaeser, Der Fall Gi'nter liallraffoder
die Dogmatisierungder Kritik, 1981 ArP 314.

277. 66 BVerfGE at 131-32. In contrast, the Court employed the principles of
Deutschland-Magazin to set a much less intrusive standard of review in other parts of the
same case. The BGH had also refused to enjoin publication of (1) a passage that reproduced one of Wallraff's manuscripts as edited by "Bild's" chief reporter, (2) a description of a conversation between a "Bild" editor and Wallraff, and (3) Wallraff's critical
appraisals of "Bild." In each of these instances (in the first instance by an equally divided panel), the Constitutional Court decided that the potential infringement of editorial confidentiality was not great and that a minimal standard of review was justified.
Exercising that lower standard of review, the Court affirmed the refusal of the BGH to
issue an injunction on these matters. Id. at 143-51.
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freedom contained in article 5, section 1 of the Basic Law. 2 7 8 This
right of editorial confidentiality is protected more fully against the
state than against individuals. Nonetheless, "editorial confidentiality is one of the prerequisites of a free press, which can be infringed
not only by the state but also by societal forces and individuals. To
that extent editorial confidentiality is an aspect of the guarantee of
the independence of the press as an objective principle which governs the interpretation and application of the relevant rules of the
civil law. ' 2 79 The freedom of the press can be limited, however, and'
when that right is asserted against other individuals it may sometimes have a narrower scope than it has when asserted against the
o
state.2
In this case, the newspaper's right of editorial confidentiality
apparently possessed substantial weight. The real question centered on the strength of Wallraff's countervailing rights of free expression. In a detailed discussion, the Court concluded that
Wallraff's rights of expression were not sufficiently weighty under
the circumstances, because the information in his book had been
obtained in a deceptive and therefore illegal manner. 28 ' Consequently, the Court found that the newspaper's right of editorial confidentiality outweighed Wallraff's rights of expression and that an
injunction against the publication of the description of the editorial

278. Id. at 134-35; see infra Appendix at p. 348. Citing the famous Spiegel case, 20
BVerfGE 162 (1966), the court emphasized that editorial confidentiality is important for
the preservation of sources of information and frank collaboration among the editors.
279. 66 BVerfGE at 135.
280. Id.
28 1. Id. at 135-43. The Court emphasized that Waliraff's constitutional rights of expression and press freedom were themselves limited under GG art. 5, § 2, by "general
laws" such as BGB §§ 823(1), 826. Under these statutory provisions-prohibiting certain actions that are "contrary to good morals" or otherwise wrongful, see infra Appendix
at pp. 348-49 and supra notes 18 & 147-Wailraff's deceptive acquisition of the information was found to be illegal. Although publication of illegally acquired information is
not necessarily excluded from constitutional protection, the requisite weighing of interests will ordinarily not result in protection unless the information so acquired possesses
particular social importance. 66 BVerfGE at 138-39. Indeed, illegally obtained information will ordinarily be excluded from constitutional protection unless the information
actually reveals other illegal actions. Id. Although the BGH accepted a similar principle,
it applied the principle incorrectly by overvaluing Wallraff's interest in using the information to criticize "Bild" and undervaluing the general interest in furthering observance of the law-an interest that would be neglected if the illegality of Wallraff's action
were not taken into account. Id. at 140-43. Because Wallraff's book revealed no actual
illegality by "Bild," Wallraff's rights under GG art. 5, § i, were limited by the general
laws and therefore could not overcome "Bild's" rights of editorial confidentiality.
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conference should be granted.28 2
A review of recent cases such as B6il and Waliraff indicates that
the recognition of constitutional rights in private legal relationships-even though that recognition may begin with a vigorous protection of free speech-is not necessarily an unmitigated gain for
expanded rights of expression. This is even the case if, as in
Blinkfffer, there is an indication that one person may have an individual right of action against another for violation of free speech rights.
The danger to speech interests arises in part from the difficulty of
limiting the impact of the constitution on private law to the protection of rights of expression, and the possibility that countervailing
values of privacy and personality-interests that are sometimes related to the traditional values of the private law-will be recognized
as powerful constitutional values on their own account. Under
those circumstances these countervailing values can be asserted with
great force against the speech interests of individuals. Thus, in the
B6l case, for example, the constitutional right of personality is asserted in a way that limits the constitutional speech rights of other
individuals. Not only does the language of that case reaffirm a constitutional requirement of a cause of action to vindicate the right of
personality against certain forms of speech as in Mephisto, Soraya and
Lebach; the B6"ll case also affirms a requirement of vigorous judicial
review under some circumstances in order to vindicate the right of
personality against the countervailing interests in speech. Moreover, as the Waliraff case indicates, certain putative speech or press
interests can themselves be asserted in actions of private law in a
way that may limit speech. Thus in Wallraff the Court indicates that
282. The Court did, however, affirm the refusal of the BGH to issue an injunction
against three other portions of Wallraff's book. See supra note 277.
One possible approach to the problems of the Vallraff case-an approach that was
emphasized in Blinkfiir-was curiously ignored by the Constitutional Court. The
"Bild"-Zeitung is a branch of the Springer publishing empire (the defendant in
Bfinkfiier), which is a massive economic enterprise, one of the most important in the
Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast, Wallraff-athough an eminent journalist-is
simply one individual. As we have seen, courts and commentators have sometimes focused on the relative social and economic power wielded by the respective parties in
considering disputes of private law when constitutional rights are at issue. See supra note
100. Certainly in this context "Bild" and Springer Publishing Company wield much
greater economic and political power than any individual journalist. It might have been
reasonable, therefore, for the Court to have taken these respective positions into account in determining the "indirect" impact of constitutional rights on this particular
relationship of private law. Cf. 45 BGHZ 296, 310 (1966) (Hellfire) (defamation action
between two magazines was dismissed in part on the ground that plaintiff magazine "because of its wide circulation and the potential influence on public opinion resulting
therefrom, is not defenseless against sharp attacks.")
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a newspaper has a constitutional right against a private speaker who
invades the privacy of the newspaper's editorial room-even though
the incursion was undertaken in order to further commentary about
the newspaper's policies and actions. In Waliraff, therefore, the
views of the Blinkfzier Court are re-affirmed, and a constitutional
right is elaborated from the guarantees of article 5, section 1, on
behalf of private individuals against other private individuals. Paradoxically, however, the constitutional right of the press in Waliraff
has the effect of limiting and inhibiting other constitutionally protected rights of expression.
It may be useful to conclude this discussion of the German doctrine by mentioning a recent ground-breaking decision of the Constitutional Court that may presage an even stronger enforcement of
individual constitutional rights of privacy and personality, possibly
against values of speech asserted in private law. In 1983 the Constitutional Court invalidated portions of a statute authorizing the national census, on the ground that the statutory measures for
protecting the privacy of census information were inadequate. 8 3
The decision rested on possible violations of the general right of
personality, and the Court emphasized that the right of "informational self-determination" might be infringed if personal census information became public.2" 4 In the census case itself the right of
personality was asserted against the state, but scholars have also discussed the possible effect that this decision may have on the relationships of private law through the technique of the "indirect"
effect of the constitution on private relationships, outlined in Lzit.
According to some commentators, one possible effect of the decision might be to impose constitutional limits on the collection or
distribution of information by employers, creditors, banks, and
other "private" actors who come into possession of information
about others by virtue of a position of social or economic power.28 5
283. 65 BVerfGE I (1983) (Census Case); for an English translation, see 5 HUMAN
RTS. L.J. 94-116 (1984). For general commentary on the decision, see Riedel, New Bearings in German Data Protection/CensusAct 1983 Partially Unconstitutional,5 HUMAN RTS. L.J.
67 (1984); Krause, Das Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung-BVerGE 65, 1, 1984 JuS
268. See also Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707,
734, 738-39 (1987). For an earlier decision on the same subject, see 27 BVerfGE 1
(1969) (Microcensus).
284. See supra text accompanying note 172.
285. For differing views on this point, see, e.g., Simitis, Die informationelle Selbstbestimmung-Grundbedingungeiner verfassungskonformen Informationsordnung, 1984 NJW 398, 40002; Wente, supra note 180; Z611ner, supra note 66. See also Riedel, supra note 283, at 7273. For a recent decision finding that the constitutional right of "informational selfdetermination" does indeed apply in relationships of private law, see 46 BAGE 98
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Another effect, however, might be to add even further strength to
the right of "informational self-determination" when it confronts
the rights of speech. 2" 6 The result might be a further extension of
the doctrine of cases like Lebach to permit individuals to secure judicial prohibition of true but unfavorable statements about themselves
on the ground that the statements would impair their right of informational self-determination. Such a development would indicate
further that the doctrine of the impact of constitutional values on
private law can have a significant-sometimes severe-limiting effect on rights of expression.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This review of the development of German doctrine has shown
that there are important contrasts between German and American
theories of the public and the private realm in constitutional law.
Indeed, the German and American doctrines appear to reflect fundamentally differing views about the nature of the distinction between the public and the private realms.
The American doctrine posits a clear distinction between the
state and society-an "essential dichotomy" between state and private action-and adheres to the position that only the state is bound
by the fundamental law."8 7 Society enjoys a realm of freedom from
constitutional restraint and, although individuals and private groups
can be regulated to a substantial extent, that regulation must be undertaken by statutes or other measures of positive law which are
subject to continuing contemporary adjustment unlike the more
rigid rules of constitutional law. Although nongovernmental individuals or groups may sometimes be bound by the American Constitution, such a result occurs mainly when the members of society
concerned have entered into some kind of partnership with the
state-either through actual involvement with organs of the state or
through the performance of traditional state functions. If this form
of partnership were to be free of constitutional restrictions, the state
might well circumvent constitutional guarantees by entering into ar(1984) (invoking census case in finding that unsuccessful job applicant can require private employer to destroy personal questionnaire filed as part of job application).
286. See generally Wente. supra note 180; Krause, supra note 283 (discussing speech
issues after census case).
287. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461
(1988); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (state action doctrine 'a fundamental fact of
our political order").
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rangements of that sort on a large scale. This aspect of the state
action doctrine can therefore be viewed as a necessary device to prevent circumvention by the state of constitutional limitations rather
than a significant extension of the constitution into the private or
social realm. And, indeed, the history of the state action doctrinewhich until recently has largely focused on attempts to prevent the
state from collaborating with private groups in racial discrimination-seems to reinforce this position. American cases like New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan and NAACP v. Claiborne HardwareCo. are not inconsistent with this general view, because in those cases the state
has made a decision-either through its legislature or through its
courts-to protect a certain private interest and the circumstances
under which that interest will be protected are completely defined
by the state, leaving nothing to private choice except the decision of
the injured person to commence legal action.2 88 Thus, the American view rests on the assumption that a relatively clear theoretical
line can be drawn between the state and society and that the state
alone-and in certain narrow cases, members of society effectively
collaborating with the state-should be bound by constitutional
limitations.
The German position, in contrast, seems to rest on a different
fundamental view. The underlying German theory appears to reject
the problematic view that it is possible to separate the public from
the private realm. At very least, the German view is skeptical of the
position that the fundamental law should apply only to the "public"
realm, even assuming that such a realm can be clearly delineated.
The German doctrine rests on the position that certain constitutional values are so fundamental-for a decent life for all-that
those values should permeate state and society, wherever the line
between the two (if any) is to be drawn.2 89 This position may seem
paradoxical in light of the clear traditional distinction between public and private law in German theory, but the doctrine that constitutional values should "influence" even private law indicates that,
when constitutional values are at issue, the distinction between public and private realms cannot be absolute. That is a crucial difference between the American state action doctrine and the doctrine of
the German cases first elaborated in Lith. As a practical matter, this
288. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
289. A view of this sort seems to underlie not only the Constitutional Court's adoption of Professor Drig's "indirect" theory in Lzth, but also the Labor Court's adoption
of its "direct" theory of the impact of constitutional rights on private law. See supra text
accompanying notes 47 & 53-56.
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difference can be seen most clearly in the impact of the German
Constitution on contractual relations (an area in which state action
under American doctrine is rarely found) and in the recognition of
constitutional causes of action by one private individual against another private individual-also ordinarily without an analogue in
American doctrine.
Instead of attempting to exclude the application of constitutional values in the private realm, the German position recognizes
that even in private law an accommodation of constitutional and private law values must be achieved. This accommodation is to be accomplished through a wide-ranging consideration of the specific
circumstances of each case. In determining the strength of constitutional values in relations between individuals, a range of factors
must be taken into consideration-the degree to which the asserted
constitutional right has been impaired, the motive with which the
constitutional values are asserted, the social and economic power of
the person whose actions threaten those constitutional values, and
any countervailing constitutional rights or other interests that such a
person might have. Thus, under German doctrine, the status of an
actor as a private person rather than the state is not dispositiveinstead, it is just one factor to be taken into account in a broader
determination of whether the constitutional values at issue are sufficiently weighty to require their imposition in a specific case. As discussed above, an assessment of the impact of the constitution on
values of private law-that is, on legal relationships among individuals-requires a complex balancing of countervailing factors in each
case.

29 0

Indeed the German view, in which all rules of private law are at
least "influenced" by constitutional values, is more or less in accord
with the perception of the American legal realists that there is no
clear distinction between the public and private realms. 29 ' Accord290. For an argument in the literature of American political theory rejecting the sharp
distinctions of the state action doctrine and adopting a comprehensive balancing test
similar to the German position, see Gutmann, Is Freedom Academic?: The Relative Autonomy
of Universities in a Liberal Democracy, in NoMos XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 257-86 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1983). For similar views in the American legal literature, see,
e.g., Glennon & Nowak, supra note 133; Henkin, supra note 83; Williams, supra note 133.
See also Horowitz, The Misleading Searchfor "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30
S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957).
291. See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933); Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of
"Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Hale, Bargaining,
Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). For a recent discussion of the
general impact of the German "free law" school on the American legal realists-
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ing to the realists, even those realms of private law considered most
private-such as tort, contract and property-actually represent the
results of significant choices of public policy and applications of
public power.2 9 2 If one accepts this position, there seems little reason to interrupt the impact of constitutional values-in what must
seem to be an artificial manner-when the focus moves from the
clearly identifiable realm of public power to another realm where
public power is applied but in a somewhat less evident way.
In contrast to the German view, however, the American "state
action" doctrine turns its back on these arguments of the realists
when it posits a clear distinction between the public and private
realms. In the American view, only the public realm-that is, governmental power-has sufficient danger to be subjected to constitutional limitations; the actions of private individuals do not possess
that special measure of comprehensive danger unless they are
closely aligned with the state.
The complexity and incoherence of the Supreme Court's state
action doctrine may well arise from an attempt to maintain this position. The gyrations apparent in some of the cases reflect an attempt
to make certain particularly dangerous exercises of "private"
power-that is power exercised by parties not nominally the stateappear to be so closely related to the state that those actions can be
attributed to the state. As a theoretical matter, however, it is not
absolutely clear why a particularly close relationship to the state
should be determinative with respect to the application of constitutional limitations. If one treats constitutional values as "objective"
values, then it may not make a difference whether the agglomerations of power represented by company towns or controlling political parties are considered a part of the state or not.2 93 To ask
whether they should be considered to be exercising the power of the
state is perhaps to be asking the wrong question. The German doctrine suggests that the question should be the extent to which an
important constitutional value is infringed by the action of the company town or political party-or other individual or group-without
adequate countervailing justification in the rights or constitutionally
legitimate interests of the acting party. In this view, the inquiry
although not considering this specific question-see Herget & Wallace, The German Free
Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987).

292. This view has been re-asserted by writers in the critical legal studies tradition.
See, e.g., Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349 (1982); Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1985).
293. See generally Berle, supra note 100.
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should focus on the seriousness of the infringement and not (in the
2 94
first instance) on the source from which the infringement comes.
Yet even conceding the power of the realists' views, it is important to understand that an extension of the constitution into "private" relations will not necessarily result in an unqualified
expansion of any given substantive right. Indeed, an extension of
the constitution into relations among individuals-as is evident in
the theory of the German cases-may raise new difficulties of its
own. It seems inevitable that an extension of the constitution into
the "private" realm will ultimately require a balancing of interests of
the individual who claims that constitutional rights have been violated against the asserted rights of the individual who is said to have
effected the violation. If one were to focus on one set of rights
only-for example, rights of expression, which generally occupy a
special position in American doctrine-the extension of those rights
into private legal relationships might seem to be a welcome extension of constitutional liberty. Thus, one might welcome the recognition of constitutional speech rights of employees against
employers-rights that might prohibit, for example, employers from
discharging employees on the grounds of protected expression-a
form of guarantee that does play a role in German constitutional
doctrine. 29 5 As we have seen, however, the extension of the constitution into private legal relationships may not be limited to one set
of "preferred" rights; in the German cases, for example, courts have
recognized other constitutional rights which are applicable against
individuals and may have the effect of limiting the speech rights of
those individuals. Thus, the German courts have developed individual rights of personality which can be asserted against other individuals in a manner that may very sharply curtail rights of expression.
Moreover, even apart from separate countervailing rights, the recognition of constitutional rights in private relationships can result,
in effect, in one right's being turned against itself-one individual's
constitutional right can form the basis of a constitutional cause of
294. Of course the text and history of relevant American constitutional provisions
may be viewed as requiring a state action doctrine of the American type-although as an
historical matter such a conclusion with respect to the fourteenth amendment has been
questioned. See Nerken, A New Dealfor the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 297 (1977). See also Williams, supra note 133, at 348-49. The discussion in
the text is not intended to take a position on this specific point but rather to explore how
"private" action may best be treated in a constitutional system.
295. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also supra text accompanying notes
90-92 (Freedom of Conscience Case).
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action that might curtail the exercise of the same or related right by
another individual. Thus, in the Waliraff case the protection of editorial confidentiality-a right very closely related to other rights of
expression-was found to justify (and indeed require) curtailment
of ajournalist's rights of speech. 9 6 Moreover, although the Constitutional Court did not pursue the point in Ltith, the impact of constitutional rights on private legal relationships might also have
rendered plausible an argument that Harlan's article 5 rights of expression might-under some circumstances-have justified (or required) curtailment of LUth's attack on Harlan's films.29 7 In this
sense, the extension of the constitution into the private realm may
not necessarily be viewed with unreserved enthusiasm from the perspective of any given set of constitutional rights, because the result
may be the elaboration of countervailing constitutional causes of action that may have the ultimate effect of restricting those rights.
And, as apparently is the case in the German doctrine, these may be
permanent constitutional causes of action, which cannot be moderated or withdrawn by the legislature.
This observation suggests one additional point that should be
borne in mind when considering the implications of an extension of
the Constitution into the private realm. To the extent that an extension of this sort will result in a required balancing of constitutional
interests of individuals on both sides of the dispute, the Constitution may be more likely to require a specific result in each case, because under such a technique, where the constitutional rights of one
individual end, the countervailing constitutional rights of the other
individual may well begin. In American defamation and privacy
doctrine, the first amendment rights of the speaker extend up to a
certain point, but after that point there are no countervailing constitutional rights but rather the discretionary power of the state. That
is to say, within a certain area the speaker is protected by the first
amendment, but outside that area the state can decide whether or

296. In American doctrine the assertion of a first amendment right of editorial confidentiality has not prevailed on the facts of a number of recent cases. See, e.g.,Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged a measure of protection for editorial confidentiality in dictum and has indicated
that the first amendment would prohibit a "law that subjects the editorial process to
private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end
such as the public interest." Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174; see also id. at 208-10 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
297. See supra note 132.
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not to impose penalties on the speech in question.2 9 As we have
seen, there is no requirement that the state impose liability; consequently, there is room at this point for experimentation and legislative discretion. 29 9 In a regime in which the Constitution influences
individual legal relationships and in which (perhaps as a result)
there are countervailing constitutional interests on each side-that
is, for example, the speaker's constitutional right to speak and the
defamed person's constitutional right of personality-there is less
room for adjustment and legislative discretion. It may well be that
in many instances in which the speaker is not constitutionally protected, the balance has fallen in favor of the constitutional right of
the defamed person and, consequently, the state must under such
circumstances vindicate the right of personality and provide a cause
of action against the speaker.° 0 This may or may not be a disadvantage, but it is important to understand that the extension of the constitution into private legal relations may have the effect of
withdrawing legislative discretion and remitting all questions of private law in certain areas to judicial constitutional decisions that cannot be legislatively reconsidered.'
In some ways the differences in the German and American
treatment of the impact of constitutional values on the private realm
reflect the more fundamental fact that American constitutional theory generally excludes constitutional provisions that impose affirmative obligations on the government to act in society, whereas the
298. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (in defamation
actions by private individuals, "the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability," so long as liability without fault is not imposed); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977) (states can decide
whether to grant state law privilege against plaintiff's "right of publicity").
299. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVENJR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 121718 (4th ed. 1984) (differing fault standards can be chosen by various states to govern
defamation actions by private individuals); see supra note 212.
300. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 101-112 (discussion of Soroya). But see
Laufke, supra note 32, at 166 (suggesting that even when Court sets down constitutional
principle, some legislative discretion may be possible).
301. The German system interestingly mitigates this result-to some extent at leastby dividing judicial competence between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary
courts and by according a significant measure of discretion to the ordinary courts. Even
in the German system, however, the Constitutional Court will feel obliged to exercise
stringent judicial review under some circumstances and, when it does, it may well decide
which of two countervailing rights prevails-without the opportunity for discretion
either by the legislature or by the ordinary courts. See, e.g., 66 BVerfGE 116 (1984)
("Bild"-Wallrafl); 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980) (B611). For a discussion of an analogous point
in the context of Shelley v. Kraemter, see Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality. 33 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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German system acknowledges certain affirmative constitutional requirements of social welfare and also certain requirements that the
government act affirmatively to impose certain burdens on individuals.3 0 2 In interesting ways, provisions that require the constitution
to affect legal relations among individuals in society resemble other
constitutional provisions that require the government to confer various sorts of benefits and burdens on individuals-such as provisions
that require the government to grant social welfare benefits to individuals. A constitutional doctrine that affects the legal relations of
individuals will upon occasion require the government to act affirmatively to realign individual legal relations and, consequently, require the government to grant benefits to some individuals and
impose equivalent burdens on others. Indeed, we have seen that
the Basic Law imposes this sort of affirmative obligation on the state
in cases like Soraya, Lebach, B6"l, and Wallraff, in which the Court apparently acknowledges that the state must create a cause of action
on behalf of one private individual against another. This result resembles an affirmative requirement that the government grant funds
(or other benefits) to plaintiffs in such cases and an equivalent constitutional requirement that the government take funds from some
other private person or that some other burden (such as an injunction) be imposed on that person.
If, in contrast, the Constitution is applicable against the state
only-as in American doctrine-then there is no constitutional requirement that the government in effect enter society to reallocate
burdens and benefits among individuals and accordingly impose
burdens on some individuals for the benefit of other individuals (except to the extent that the former are considered to be the state for
the purposes of the state action doctrine). The state action doctrine, by excluding requirements that the government act in society
in this manner, is therefore consistent with broader presuppositions
of American constitutionalism that the government generally has no
constitutional obligation to act for or against private individuals in
society-unless the government itself has previously deprived those
individuals of constitutional rights.
302. See Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights. 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
See also Quint, The Constitution of the United States as a Constitution of Limits and Discretion,
presented at the First World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional
Law, Belgrade, Yugoslavia (Aug.-Sept. 1983) (copies on file with the Maryland Law Review) (German Basic Law contains "affirmative" provisions that require government to
extend benefits, and impose burdens, on individuals). See generally Tribe, The Abortion
Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985).
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An important underlying theme of American constitutional law
is thus the withdrawal of the Constitution from society-both in its
restriction of constitutional limitations to actions of the state and its
exclusion of other types of constitutional provisions that might require the government to act in society.3 0 3 The broader German doctrine requiring that the constitution influence private legal relations
is in accordance with the Basic Law's more general acknowledgment
of affirmative constitutional requirements affecting society-both
through requirements that the government accord benefits to certain members of society and through requirements that the government impose burdens on certain members of society. This is
accomplished not only by constitutional provisions which are interpreted directly to require such governmental action. The "influence" of the constitution on private law also has this effect to the
extent that it requires the state, as a constitutional matter that probably cannot be changed by legislation, to grant benefits to certain
individuals whose constitutional rights may be violated and to impose burdens on other private individuals-those who have been
found to have violated the constitutional rights in question.

303. For attempts to change this paradigm, see, e.g., Black, Further Reflections on the
Constitutional justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986).
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APPENDIX
Selected Provisions of the Basic Law
Art. 1. § 1 Human dignity is inviolable. It is the duty of all
state authority to observe and protect human dignity.
§ 2 The German people thus acknowledge that inviolable and inalienable human rights are the basis of every
human society and the basis of peace and justice in the
world.
§ 3 The following basic rights bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly effective law.
Art. 2. § 1 Everyone has the right to the free development of
his personality, so long as he does not infringe on the
rights of others or violate the constitutional order or the
law of morals.
§ 2 Everyone has the right to life and bodily integrity.
The freedom of the person is inviolable. These rights may
be curtailed only pursuant to law.
Art. 5. § 1 Everyone has the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion, orally, in writing, and in pictures,
and to educate himself without hindrance from all generally accessible sources. The freedom of the press and the
freedom of reporting through radio and film are guaranteed. There is to be no censorship.
§ 2 These rights find their limits in the rules of the
general laws, the statutory provisions for the protection of
youth and in the right of personal honor.
§ 3 Art and scholarship, research and teaching are
free. The freedom of teaching does not release one from
loyalty to the constitution.

Selected Provisions of the German Civil Code
§ 823 (1) Whoever intentionally or negligently infringes on
the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of
another person, in a manner contrary to law, is obligated
to provide compensation to that other person for the resulting damage.
(2) The same obligation applies to a person who violates a statute whose goal is the protection of another person. If the content of the statute indicates that it can be
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violated even without fault, the obligation of compensation arises only if fault is present.

§ 826

(1) Whoever intentionally causes injury to another
person in a manner contrary to good morals has the duty
of compensating for that injury.

